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In decision theories the assumption is usually made that a
decision maker maximizes some quantitative goal function. Depending on
the context, such a function may be called a profit function, utility
function, representing function (this will be our term), etc., and is
usually assumed to possess certain desirable properties, such as con-
tinuity, concavity, etc.
The purpose of this monograph is to show a way to make the above-
mentioned assumption operational. To this end, choice behaviour of the
decision maker is taken as observable primitive. In Chapter I we shall
give the conditions under which choice behaviour can be represented by
a preference relation. This preference relation then will be taken as
primitive in the following chapters, in the formulation of the so-called
"representation theorems" given there.
After specification of the presupposed context, these represen-
tation theorems will show equivalence of (usually) two statements. The
first statement, numbered (i), says that a representing function, with
certain desirable properties, exists. The second statement, numbered
(ii), characterizes statement (i), i.e. gives the properties of the
preference relation, necessary and sufficient for the truth of (i).
Thus statement (ii) gives the criteria for verification/justification,
or falsification/criticism, of the assumption that the desired represen-
-          ting function  in (i) exists. At the end of the representation theorems
usually so-called "uniqueness results" are listed, i.e. results which
describe in how far a representing function in (i) is uniquely deter-
mined.
We have as much as possible formulated the representation theorems
in such a way that the reader can understand them without consulting
other parts of the text. The proofs of these representation theorems
not only show the existence of representing functions, but they also
indicate how to construct the (quantitative) representing functions
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from the (qualitative) information that is reflected by the preference
relation.
The main subject of study in this monograph is subjective expected
utility maximization, in the context of decision making under uncer-
tainty. Subjective expected utility maximization is notorious for the
many vivid discussions about its appropriateness. The first well-known
representation theorems for (subjective) expected utility maximization,
in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), and Savage (1954), have had
great influence in economic literature, and have shocked the statisti-
cal literature because of their profound implications for the foun-
dations of statistics. It should be emphasized that representation
theorems as such are not only useful for advocates of the use of some
special kind of representing function, but just as well give the
operational tools for Criticisms.The independence condition   o f   von
Neumann and Morgenstern, and the sure-thing principle of Savage, gave
valuable tools to critics, see for instance Allais (1953, 1979).
The  theorems of Savage, and von Neumann and Morgenstern,    (and
Anscombe and Aumann, 1963,) apply to special circumstances, where the
state space is well structured, or where many lotteries are available.
Such special circumstances are usually not present in economic contexts.
The main purpose of this monograph is to provide representation
theorems for subjective expected utility maximization, under special
circumstances that are usually present in economic contexts.
First, in Chapter 0, we give some elementary definitions.
In Chapter I we relate preference relations to choice behaviour
by means of the "revealed preference" approach, which has originated
from consumer demand theory. In order to achieve maximal operationality,
we define our "revealed preference" relations slightly differently from
the way most usual in literature; and we derive the characterizations
with the aid of these. For intuitive purposes, choice behaviour in
our   view  is  a more appropriate primitive for decision theory,   than   a
preference relation. Hence we discuss the "paradigm" of decision theory
in terms of choice behaviour, in Chapter I.
In Chapter I we do not assume any structure (other than set-
theoretic) on the set of alternatives. In the following chapters, more
and more structure will be introduced on the set of alternatives. Then
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not only the preference relation, but also this structure on the set of
alternatives, will be considered observable. No structure will ever be
introduced which is not present in our main intended application: the
one where the set of alternatives is a Euclidean space.
One reason to consider spaces, more general than Euclidean spaces,
is to increase applicability. With the exception of section VII.6, all
of our work is applicable to decision situations where no (physical)
quantification of the alternatives is available. A second reason to
consider general spaces is that, even if the only ultimate purpose is
to obtain theorems for Euclidean spaces, then theorems   for more general
spaces may still have value as intermediate means. For example, if we
would have formulated the main result of Chapter VI, Theorem VI.5.1,
for Euclidean spaces only, then in its proof (Proposition VI.7.4, and
subsection VI.7.2), we would still have needed the results of Chapter
III for more general topological spaces.
In Chapter II the structure is introduced which will be the central
subject of study of this monograph: the set of alternatives is assumed
to be a cartesian product. Each coordinate of an alternative describes
a relevant aspect. For making his decisions, the decision maker is to
weigh  the advantages and disadvantages of the several aspects against
each other. The cartesian product structure plays a central role, and
our work may find application, in very many fields of science. Section
II.1 gives six economic examples, amongst them decision making under
uncertainty.
In sections II.2 to II.5 we study monotonicity properties. An
alternative which is best in each aspect, should be the best alternative,
by monotonicity. In section II.6 we take up the approach, followed in
the remainder of this monograph: the only preference relation, taken
as observable, is the one on the set of alternatives. In section II.6
we then show that the only observable implication of the monotonicity
properties is "coordinate independence".
Sections II.2 to II.6 are included, firstly because they contain
new material that unifies the many versions of monotonicity occurring
in literature; and secondly, because we think these sections give the
most appropriate way to gain comprehension of coordinate independence,
a property central for all of the remainder of this monograph.
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In Chapter III topological structure is introduced. We assume
that the set of alternatives is endowed with a connected product topo-
logy. From then on, in all our main theorems, the preference relation
will be continuous and complete (, either as a presupposition, or as
a consequence of other suppositions). Section III.1 gives some comments
on the fact that the properties of continuity and completeness are of
a technical nature, and are not fully operational.
In sections III.3 and III.4 we characterize the existence of
continuous additively decomposable representing functions. Our results
generalize some well-known theorems from literature.
In Chapter IV, a further structural assumption is added. It is
assumed that all coordinate sets are identical. (This assumption will
be dropped in sections VII.1 to VII.4 only.) Theorem IV.3.3 gives a
main result of this monograph: a characterization of subjective ex-
pected utility maximization by means of a new property for preference
relations: cardinal coordinate independence. Let us, for the moment,
take for granted the, in economic contexts common, assumptions of
continuity of the utility function, and continuity, completeness, and
transitivity of the preference relation. Then Theorem IV.3.3 shows
that subjective expected utility maximization can be justified (; or
verified; or criticized; or falsified) if and only if cardinal coor-
dinate independence of the preference relation can be. This is all
done under the assumption that the state space is finite. The adap-
tation to infinite state spaces will be given in Chapter V.
In the remainder of Chapter IV, and in Chapters V and VI, many
generalizations of Theorem IV.3.3 are obtained. Also applications to
contexts other than decision making under uncertainty are given. For
instance we give, for dynamic contexts, alternative characterizations
of a representation, characterized before by Koopmans (1972).
The main result of Chapter V, Theorem V.6.1, adapts the results
of Chapter IV to infinite state spaces. Thus it provides the most
general characterization of subjective expected utility maximization
with continuous utility, presently available in literature. This is
done both for finitely additive, and for countably additive, proba-
bility measures.
Chapter VI extends Theorem IV.3.3 to "capacities", i.e. "non-
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additive probability measures". The use of nonadditive measures has
been initiated by Schmeidler (1984 a,b), where motivations concerning
decision making under uncertainty are also given. Further the applica-
bility to welfare theory has given motivation. Our contribution to
Schmeidler's work is like the contribution of our Theorem IV.3.3 to a
theorem of Anscombe and Aumann (1963): we replace the restrictive
assumption that many lotteries are available, by the restrictive
assumption that utility is continuous. Section VI.11 characterizes
strong sub- or superadditivity of the involved capacities.
In Chapter VII a further structure on the set of alternatives is
added: a mixture-space-structure. Again, the most well-known examples
are convex subsets of linear spaces. We use this structure to define,
and characterize, concave additively decomposable representing functions,
by means of the "concavity assumption". Such (representing) functions
are frequently used in mathematical programming, consumer and producers
theory, and decision making under uncertainty (to characterize risk
aversion). Still no characterization of them was yet available in
literature.
In section VII.6 we assume that the coordinate sets are convex
subsets of the set of real numbers. Thus here the alternative sets of
this monograph, endowed with most structure, are dealt with. In section
VII.6 it is then shown that assumptions on (nonincreasing) risk aversion,
current in economic literature, simplify in a surprising way the cha-
racterization of subjective expected utility maximization.
Finally, Chapter VIII gives some mathematical results on functions
on intervals, used, and referred to, at many places in this monograph.
For the most part, for the understanding of chapters, consultation
of elementary definitions in previous chapters is sufficient. Only
Sections III.2, III.3, IV.2, IV.3, and perhaps II.1, are needed for
understanding of the sequel.
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CHAPTER 0
ELEMENTARY DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIOIIS
In this chapter we give elementary definitions and notations. The
reader familiar with them may wish to skip this chapter, or only look
at the standard notations at the end, and may in case of doubt consult
this chapter by way of the subject index.
A binary reiation on a set x is a subset of X x X. For a binary
relation >o n X w e usually write x>y instead  of   (x,y)   € > . One binary
relation > extends another binary relation >', if > 3 >'.
A binary relation > on X is:
(a) transitive if  [x > y and y > z] - [x > z]  for all x,y,z E X.
(b) compZete if x>y o r y>x for all x,y € X.
(c) refzexive if X>X for all x € X.
(d) irrefZexive if  not [x > x] for all x € X.
(e) symmetric if  [x > y] - [y > x] for all x,y € x.
(f) asymmetric if  [x > y] - not [y > x] for all x,y € X.
(g) ant€symmetric if [x > y and y > x] - [x = y]  for all x,y E X.
Throughout this monograph > denotes the asymmetric part of >
(i.e. x>y iff x > y and not y > x) and Al is the symmetric part of
1)
> (i.e.x   Al yiffx>yandy>x). Further notations   are   x   <   y   for
y>x, and x<y for y>x.I f a binary relation >i s endowed with
---
1) Iff: if and only if.
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indexes, then without further mention  >,   m,   <,   and  <, when endowed
with the same indexes, are defined analogously.
A weak order > is transitive and complete. Hence it is also
reflexive, its symmetric part is an equivaience relation (i.e. is
transitive, reflexive, and symmetric), its asymmetric part is
transitive, irreflexive, asymmetric, and we have x > y iff not y > x.
Some further terminology: >i s triviat if x>y for all x,y, it
is the identity (re Zation)   if  x  > y **  x  =  y. The identity  can of course
also be considered as a function. A pair of elements x,y of X is
incomparabZe (w.r.t. >) if neither x>y nor y>x.
In Chapter I we shall deal with choice functions. A choice
function C is a function from a collection D of subsets of a set X, to
2 , such that 0 0 C(D) c D for all D € D. Of course this implies 0 e D.
An intervaZ v i s a subset of IR that is convex (11,v €V,O i l i t,
then Xy + (1-A)v € V), and that may be open, closed, or half-open, and
bounded or unbounded, both from the left and the right. By [P,v] we
denote the interval {A € IR: w i A i v}, by ]p,\1[ the interval
{A € R: p < X < v}. A nondegenerate intervaZ is an interval with more
than one (so infinitely many) elements. IR = {11 € IR: 11 1 0}, ]R++ =
{V ER: 11 > 0}.
Now let V b e an arbitrary subset of  R,  and  let  $  :V+IR.  Then
0 i s strictZy increaaing if, for all # >v i n V, 4(w) > $(v); it is
strietZy decreaBing if, for all P>v i n v, 0(0) < 0(v). Furthermore
0 i s nondecreasing if, for all U>v i n v, 0(0) 1 $(v); 0 i s non-
inereaBing if, for all U>v i n V, 0(P) i $(v).
The function $ as above is convex if, for all O l A 1 1, and V,v,
and Xy + (1-A)v in V, $(AW + (1-X)v) < A$(W) + (1-A)$(v); 0 is concave
if -0 is convex; and $ is affine if it is both convex and concave.
The function 0 i s affine iff there exist real c,T such that $ :v»
cy + T. Note that we also allow c = 0. Further 0 is positive affine if
c above is positive. The function + is quasiconvex if, for all
O f A l l, and 0, v, and AP + (1-A)v in V, $(AP + (1-X)v) <
max{$(P), 0(v)}; 0 is quas€concave if -0 is quasiconvex. A convex
function is quasiconvex, a concave function is quasiconcave.
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Let (x,T) be a topological space. x is (topoZogicaZZy) separal,Ze
if there exists a countable dense subset of X. For E c X, int(E) is
the topological interior of E. x is connected if there do not exist
open nonempty subsets V, W o f X such that V A W=0,V U W=X. This
is iff no closed nonempty subsets V, W o f X exist such that V A W=0,
V U W=X, i.e. iff the only subsets of x, which are both open and
closed, are 0 and X. If X is connected, and g is a continuous function
from X to another topological space, then g(X) is connected too. X is
arewise connected, or areconnected as we shall usually write, if, for
every x,y € X, there exists an arc from x toy, i.e. a continuous
function 0 : [0,1] + X with $(01 = x, 0(1) = y. If X is arcconnected,
then it is connected.
If X is a cartesian product Xi€Ici' where every Ci is endowed
with a topology Ti' then the product topoZogy on X is the smallest
topology containing all subsets of X of the form Ei x (Xj0iC ) with
i € I, Ei € Ti, An elementary result for this:
LEMMA 0.1. Let E C X=X
i€Ici be
open [respective Zy cZosed] with
respect to the product topoZogy on X. Let ACI, z EX. hien
v: = {x  E x   C  :E contains the e Zement v o f x which has vi -x iA   i€A i
for aZZ i € A, vi = zi for aZZ i E A}
is open [respective Zy c Zosed] with respect to the product topo Zogy on
Xi€Aci'
PROOF. Let xA € V. There must exist open Ei, for all i € I, with
Ei 0 Ci for only finite many i, such that the v, as defined above, is
in Xi€IEi' and such that the latter is a subset of E. We see that
xA € Xi€AEi c V. Only finite many Ei's being different from Ci, Xi€AEi
is an open neighbourhood of xA within V.
0
Next we give some measure-theoretic definitions. A collection A
of subsets of a set I is an algebra if I € A, and for all A,B € A also
f and A U B€A.T h e n 0€A,and for all A1'-.'Am €Aalso U  A  andj=1 j
n =1Aj are in A. A is a a-aZgebra if furthermore, for all (A )i=1 € A,
Uj=tAj is in A. A function P on an algebra A is a probab€Zity measure
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if P(I) = 1, and if furthermore P is finite Zy additive, i.e. for all
disjoint A, B € A, P(A U B) = P(A) + P(B). Note that we do not assume
"0-additivity". p is a-additive (, or countab Zy additive,) if, for
00
any (A.)-   € A with Am+1 c Am for all m and nm=1Am = 0, we have] j-1
lim P(A ) = 0. If I is finite, say I = {1,...,n}, then we usually
m
m=                                                                                         Iassume, without further mention, that A=2. Note that then the pro-
bability measure P is completely determined by (pj)  = 1 ' with p  : =
P({j}) for all j. Finally, a partition P = (Al'...'Am) of a set I is
a sequence of disjoint subsets of I, with union I. We do not exclude
A. = 0 for some j's.
j
In  a cartesian product Xi€Ici'   I is called  the  index  set,   and  the
Ci's
are coordinate sets. For an element (xi)i€I
of such a cartesian
product, xi is the i-th coordinate of x. Other indexes than those
referring to coordinates are usually indicated by superscripts.
Some standard notations in this monograph are the following. X is
a nonempty set, elements of which are called a Zternatives, and are
usually denoted by x, y, v, w, s, t, z, and sometimes by a, b, c, d.
Usually a binary relation >, called preference re Zation, is present on
X. Then x>y i s pronounced as: "x is weakly preferred to y", or: "x is
at  least  as  good  as  y" ;  x>y:  "x is strictly preferred  to y",  or:
"x   is strictly better   than  y".   And  X  ew  y:   "x is equivalent  to  y"    (even
though in general  Al  does  not  have  to  be an equivalence relation),   or:
"x  and  y are equally  good. " In Chapters  II  to  VII,  X  is a cartesian
product X C . and with the exception of Chapter V, I is the finitei€I i'
set {1,...,n}, for some n € :IN. Often all Ci's equal a set C; then we
also write a, B, y, 6, and sometimes v, 9, 0, T, for elements of C.
Subsets of I are usually denoted by A, B, C, D. By E, F, G, H we
usually denote subsets of C, or X. Real numbers are usually denoted





I.1. CHOICE FUNCTIONS, THEIR USE, AND INTERPRETATIONAL COMPLICATIONS
The following simple example of a choice problem will illustrate
several questions to be addressed in the sequel.
I.1.1. EXAMPLE
Suppose a consumer T is in a fruit-store, and has to decide
whether to buy nothing (n), an apple (a), or a pear (p). It is his
custom to buy an apple if only apples are available (so to choose a
from {a,n}), because he thinks apples look nice. Furthermore T prefers
buying a pear to buying an apple (so he chooses p from {p,a}), because
pears are more juicy than apples. Hence his first inclination is to
buy a pear (so to choose p from {n,a,p}).
However, not sure about his true motives, T strongly imagines
what his choice would be from {n,p}. There is no doubt: it would be
n, T would not buy the pear, he does not like pears enough. T's point
of view is: if from {n,a,p} I actually choose p, then from {n,p} I
should also choose pl (I.e., T wants to satisfy IIA, see Definition
I.2.8.) An introspection follows, and the conclusion is that the
choice of a from {a,n} was not truly motivated. T rather chooses n
from {a,n}. Hence finally n is chosen from {a,p,n}.
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I.1.2. ELEMENTARY FORMALIZATIONS AND SOME ASSUMPTIONS
By T we denote a decision maker, T is usually assumed to be a
single person. But also T may stand for an animal, a computer, an
extraterrestrial being, a firm, a society, etc. In the example of
subsection I.1.1, T was a consumer.
We study models for situations where from some nonempty set D
of (ava€Zab Ze) aZternatives, T chooses exactly one element. (This is
modified in subsection I.1.4, to simplify work.) It is intended that
T is completely free to choose the alternative which he wants. In
the example D was {n,a,p}. In several special contexts there are
special terms for alternatives, such as: options, prospects, acts,
securities, allocations, strategies, commodity bundles, tests,
estimators, responses, etc. If there is a possibility "choosing
nothing", then we just represent this by an element of D, such as n
above.
We shall not use sequential models. If analogous, or other,
choice situations will (repeatedly) occur, and have significance for
the one choice situation presently considered, then this significance
should appear in the appropriate places, such as in descriptions and
valuations of the alternatives. We neither assume, nor exclude,
repetitions; it is only that they are not central in our study.
I.1.3. THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS
Although our work is intended to be applicable if decision maker
T one time has to choose one element from one set D, this one choice
is not enough to build a meaningful theory. To show the meaning of
entities such as preference relations and utility functions , more
decision situations must be considered, at least as thought
experiments, and comparisons between them must be made. This is in
fact what we do by working with choice functions, (and by considering
binary relations as representations for choice functions).
It is very useful to imagine what would have happened if some
actual problem at hand would have been different in this or that
respect, to compare it to other analogous problems, and to base a
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model on this. This is a common practice in many sciences, it teaches
one what the essential parameters of the problem are.
In the example of subsection I.1.1, not only the actual decision
situation, with available alternatives {n,a,p}, is considered, but
also situations with available alternatives {a,n}, {p,a}, {n,p}, and
comparisons between these are made. If n is chosen from {n,p}, and p
from {p,a}, then n should be chosen from {n,a,p}, so was supposed
there. From the reasoning used here, and Corollary I.2.12, one may
conclude that the preference relation of T, a weak order, is an
essential parameter.
In this chapter we shall concentrate on decision situations that
differ from the actual one with respect to the set of available
alternatives. Usually in the hypothetical decision situations the set
of available alternatives, D', is a subset of D, the one for the
actual situation.
As usual in science, a "ceteris paribus" assumption must be made.
We assume that the (hypothetical) cause, restricting D to D', does
not change other relevant exogeneous aspects of the situation. For
instance in subsection I.1.1 the restriction of {n,a,p} to {n,a}
(say often the fruit-store has no pears in store) should not change
the person that T is, his desires, his knowledge, etc. We consider
IIA (see Definition I.2.8) and monotonicity (Chapter II) as concrete
expressions of the ceteris paribus condition.
As usual, the supposed changes are described accurately, but the
relevant things that should not be changed remain, at least for a
part, unspecified. The more science proceeds, the more can be said
about the "relevant things" to be controlled for the ceteris paribus
condition.
Let us compare the above to classical mechanics. The formula of
Newton, F = m.a (F force, m mass, a accelleration) is intended to be
applicable in every single situation. Essential for its significance
are comparisons to (hypothetical) analogous situations such as: if
some (hypothetical) cause would make F twice as big, then also
accelleration a should become twice as big. The ceteris paribus
condition should anyway entail that m is kept constant.
Not always does the above doubling of F have to be only a
hypothetical experiment. Sometimes it really can be achieved in an
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experiment. Such an experiment is a different event, happening at
another time and/or place. Not only is F doubled, and a too; there
is an infinity of other differences. These must then be assumed to
concern irrelevant matters.
Also, for our work the other considered choice situations are
not always only thought experiments. Also here they may have really
occurred, or have been achieved in experiments. Still we use the term
"thought experiment". A reason for this is to avoid confusion with
repetitions of choice situations. The difference between thought
experiments and repetitions is exposed in section I.3.
For the derivation of mathematical results it is often convenient
to use infinite alternative sets (usually endowed with a topology)
such as Rn Continuity assumptions can then be made to simplify the
technical work and to give convenient uniqueness results. Thus some-
times hypothetical alternatives which were not present in the actual
D, but which have informative properties, are introduced. Then the set
X of all considered alternatives contains more elements than only
those alternatives that are actually available in D.
Also it will sometimes be of use to assume that other exogeneous
aspects of the choice situation can be varied. For instance for the
binary relations  A' to be introduced in Chapter II, it is useful to
imagine that certain coordinates of the alternatives can be ignored.
This may be because a consumer is completely satisfied with respect to
the "commodities" corresponding to these coordinates; or because the
extra information is obtained that the "states of nature", corresponding
to these coordinates, are untrue.
I.1.4. THE PRELIMINARY-CHOICE-PROBLEM
For theoretical purposes it is convenient to consider the case
where T may choose a nonempty subset from D, instead of just one
element.   Such a choice is called a pre Ziminary choice, or just choice
if no confusion arises. Thus for a choice function C, the C(D)'s may
contain more than one element. C(D) is interpreted as the set of all
elements from D, which T would be willing to choose. His finally
chosen alternative is one arbitrary element from D, say Cf(D). Cf is
called a "selection function" in Basu (1980, p.50). See also Richter
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(1971, page 31, third paragraph).
We shall be interested in C(D), and shall represent this, in the
sequel. This meets the, admitted, problem, that not C(D), but only
Cf(D), is observable.
In normative applications of representation results, the
consequences of the preliminary-choice-problem are not serious. A
representation yielding the prescription to choose an alternative
from C(D), without specifying which one, is not seriously deficient
in this, because it does not matter which element is chosen. All
elements of C(D) are equally good.
Far more serious are the consequences of the preliminary-choice-
problem for descriptive applications. Here it can never be falsified
from observed choice making, that T was completely indifferent
(C(D) = D for all D € D) and made all his choices arbitrarily. Here
is a subject for further investigation, to derive "sensible" preference
relations from observed choices Cf(D), and to find out in how far
the choices must have been arbitrary. Work like Cooke and Draaisma
(1984), comparing numbers of arbitrary preference relations to numbers
of preference relations with "nice" properties, can be useful for
this. For predictive applications it is a disadvantage to obtain only
the prediction that T will choose an element from C(D), and not the
prediction which element that will be.
A way to circumvent the problem of preliminary choice is to
simply communicate with T, and ask him what his C(D)'s are. This
approach falls outside the scope of this monograph. We shall base our
representations solely on choice behaviour.
I.2. FROM CHOICE FUNCTIONS TO BINARY RELATIONS
In this section we indicate how to represent choice functions by
binary ("preference") relations.
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I.2.1. THE CONGRUENCY PROPERTY
Let X be the nonempty set of all considered a Zternatives,
D c 2X\{0} the nonempty collection of all considered choice situations.
For D E D, elements of D are ava€Zab Ze aZternatives (with reapect to D) .
X
We assume that C:D+2 is a choice function, (see Chapter 0). C(D),
the choice set for D, contains exactly those elements of D that T is
willing to choose from D. Elements of C(D) are called chosen
a Zternatives (from D).
An example of this can be found in consumer demand theory. There
T  is  a consumer,  X  = :R , alternatives are commodity bundles, choice
situations are budget sets, the choice function is the demand multi-
function, and the choice set is the demand set.
DEFINITION I.2.1. A binary relation > on X represents C if C(D) =
{xED:x>y forally€D} for all DEV.
We have chosen the term "represent" instead of the more
customary term "rationalize" for the sake of unity of terminology in
this monograph.
In the following chapters binary relations will be assumed to
represent choice functions, and will be called preference reZati
ons.
They may be interpreted to stand for T's opinion about alternatives.
In literature it is custom to let a choice function stand for choice
behaviour of T, more or less intended to actually take place, and
to consider the possibility that T's preference relation does not
represent his choice behaviour. If then the preference relation
(notation >) d6es represent T's choice behaviour, (x, >, D) can be
called a "rationalization" of T's choice behaviour. In Ruys (1981)
rationalizability is proposed as criterion for calling choice
behaviour "rational". In von Wright (1963), preference relations are
placed between the "anthropological" (acting) level and the
"axiological" (assessing) level.
The following definition shows a way to derive binary relations
from choice functions. Such relations are called "revealed preference
relations".
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DEFINITION I.2.2. We write xRy if there is a D€0 such that x€ C(D),
y€D,o r i f x=y;w e write xPy if there is a D€D such that x€ C(D),
y€ D\C(D); we write xIy if there is a D€D such that x and y€ C(D),
or if x = y.
The above definition does not forbid occurrence of both xRy and
yPx. In example I.1.1,T originally considered C{a,n} = {a}, C{p,a} = p,
C{p,a,n} = p, and C{n,p} = n. The last two choices give pPn, and nRp
(even nPp).
There are many other ways to derive binary relations from C, see
Sen (1971). Often first a relation analogous to R above is defined,
and then P and I are defined as the asymmetric, respectively symmetric,
part of R, see for instance Weddepohl (1970). We have chosen the above
definitions to achieve maximal operationality. As soon as we observe
x  €  C (D),  y  €  D\C (D)   for  some  D  €  D,  we  can now conclude  xPy.  Had  we
defined xPy by "xRy and not yRx", then for verification of "not yRx"
we would have had to observe the choices from aZZ D € D, containing
both x and y. This may be an impossible task if most of the choice
situations, involved, are hypothetical (see subsection I.1.3). In the
sequel we adapt the results of literature to our deviating definitions.
Theorem I.2.5 (vi ** i there, and iv *• i ) shows that one way to
characterize the desired representation in (i) there, is to require
that our deviating definition of P leads to the same P as in
Weddepohl (1970), where P is defined to be the asymmetric part of R.
DEFINITION I.2.3. We write xRy if there exists a finite sequence
(xl,xl'...,xn) such that xl = x, xn = y, x R x +1 for all O S j I n-1.
We write xPy if a sequence (xj) =0 as above exists, with furthermore
x Px +1 for at least one O -l j f n-1. Finally, we write xIy if xRy
and yiix.
So R is the smallest transitive extension of R, P and T are
transitive extensions of P, respectively I, but usually not the
smallest.
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DEFINITION I.2.4. The choice function C is congruent if, for all
x,y €x: [xRy - not ypx].
The congruency property, and the main result (i) ** (iii) below,
were first obtained by Richter (1966, Theorem 1).
THEOREM   I.2.5.   For   the   choice   function   C   the   foZZowing   six   Btatements
are equivaZent:
(i) There exists a weak order >, representing C.
(ii) There  exists  a   transitive  >',   representing  C.
(iii) C 18 congruent.
(iv)      R  repreBents   C,   P   is   the   asymmetric,   I   the   symmetric  part   of  R.
(V) R represent8 C.
(vi)  P is the aaymmetric part of R.
Furthermore, >of (i), and the smaZZest rej'Zexive extension of >, of
(ii), are exteneions of R. their asymmetric parts are extensions of
F,   and  their  symmetric  parts  of  i.
PROOF. First the furthermore-statement. By the definition of R, > of
(i) and the reflexive extension of >' of (ii) are extensions of R. By
transitivity they are of R. So their symmetric parts extend i, the
symmetric part of R.
Now suppose xPy. To prove x>y and x> 'y.
Let x = xORxl  . . .  Rxjpxj+IR  . . .  Rxn =y. We write >Bboth for >o f  (i)
and   for the reflexive extension   of  >'   of    ( ii) .      x    >* x +1 follows   for
all 03.j<n-1, and x  >rxt forall 0<k<lin.Were nowy >1'x,
then by transitivity x  m*x  for all O l k<g l n, contradicting
x Px +1. So x >*y, and >'must extend P.
The equivalence of (i), (ii), (iii) and (v) is derived in Richter
(1971, Theorems 5 and 8). For (vi) - (iii), suppose xPy. Then xPy, so
by (vi) not yRx. So (iii) follows.
For  (i) - (vi), first note that by  (i), xPy implies,  by the
furthermore-statement, x > y, so not y > x. Hence, again by the
furthermore-statement, not yRx. Since xPy - xRy is always true,
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xPy  4  xRy   and   not yRx follows.   And   if   xRy  and  not   yRx,   then  x    =   x
Rxl ... Rxn = y can be arranged. Now to prevent y = xn Rxn-1 ... Rxl = x,
there must be j such that x1Px +1. So xPy. So (vi) is derived, (vi) is
equivalent to  (i),  (ii),  (iii),  (v) .
Of course (iv) - (v) is direct. For (v) 4 (iv), note that I by
definition is the symmetric part of R, and that (v) implies (vi).
0
I.2.2. OTHER PROPERTIES OF CHOICE FUNCTIONS
The characterization by means of congruency, obtained in Theorem
I.2.5, was completely general. In this subsection we consider properties
for choice functions, simpler than congruency. We show that, under
certain restrictions, they imply the existence of a representing weak
order; by relating them to congruency.
DEFINITIONS.
I.2.6. C satisfies the Btrong axiom of reveaZed preference (SARP) if
no  sequence (x )n exists  such that x Px +1  for  all  0 1 1 1 n-1,  andj=0n 0x Px .
I.2.7.   C   satisfies  the  weak  axiom  of  revea Zed  preference   (WARP)   if
xRy - not yPx.
I.2.8. C satisfies independence of irreZevant aZternatives (IIA) if
for all Dl'02 € D with Dl c 02' C(02)   Dl - 0 or ((02) n Dl = ((Di)
WARP has been introduced in Samuelson (1938), and SARP in
Houthakker (1950) and Ville (1951-1952, earlier 1946). These authors
studied the special context of consumer demand theory, the origin of
revealed preference theory. There the assumption was often made that
C(D) contains exactly one element, for every D € D. Then indeed SARP
implies WARP. The extension of these notions to choice functions C
with not always   | |C (D)  I  1    =   1,   is not unique,   and  has  been   done   in
several ways in literature. In the above way SARP does not imply WARP
anymore. To the author's knowledge, Arrow (1948) was the first to
introduce IIA; see C4 in Arrow (1959). (Arrow himself uses the term
IIA for another property, in his impossibility theorem in Arrow, 1978.)
ZU
Other early references are Nash (1950a, 1950b), and Luce (1959,
section I.C.1.c.).
LEMMA I.2.9. The congruency property in:pZies SARP, WARP, and IIA.
WARP  implies  IIA.
PROOF. Congruency forbids the existence  of   (x )  =O   ,    (D )1=0   ,   such
that x1 € C(D +1), xj+1 € Dj+1 for all 0 1 j 1 n-1, and
xn € C (DO), xl € DI\C (DO) . SARP forbids this only for the special
j+1 j+1 j+1case that x €D \C(D ) for all Oljln-1. WARP forbids it
only for the special case that n = 1. IIA can be seen to forbid it
0     1
only for the special case that n=1 and furthermore D C D  or
Dl c DO·
0
LEMMA   I.2.10.   If C(D) contains   exact Zy   one   eZement   for   aZZ   D  €   D,
then   SARP  impZies   congruency.
PROOF. Assume   SARP,   and   let  C (D) contain exactly one element,   for   all
D € D. Let xlRxl ... Rxnpx . We derive a contradiction. Let jl,...,jk
be such that xl = x   = xl = ... = xjl-1 0 xjl = xjl+1 =
= x12-1 0 x]2 ... = xjk-1 0 x]k = ... = xn. We now simply leave
jo jl jk  jOout subsequent identical alternatives, to obtain x  nx   ... Rx  Px
Since C(D) contains only one element for all DE D, we must now in
jo jl Jk  Jo
fact have x  Px   ... Px  Px  . This contradicts SARP.
0
LEMMA I.2.11. If 0 containa aZZ two- and three-point subsets of x, or
if v is union-eZosed, then IIA impZies congruenty.
PROOF. Assume IIA, and let x Rxl ... Rxn. We prove that not xn pxO.
As  in the above Lpmma,  we may assume  x   0  x1+1  for  all  0  1  j  i n-1
(otherwise take again (xjl)1=0 instead of (xj)j..0) I Hence  Dl,...,Dn
exist such that x  € C(D +1), xj+1 € Dj+1 for all O i j l n-1. If
n 0 n 0 n 0x  =x,o r not x  Rx , then also not x  Px .S o let us suppose
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0     0xn 0 x  and xn Rxl, i.e. DO exists with xn € C(D ), x  €D.T o prove
00
is that x  E C(D ).
First for the case that D contains all two- and three-point
subsets of X. Since {x1, x +1} c D +1, by IIA : x  € C{x ,x +1} for
all O l j i n-1. In particular x  € C{xl,xl}, xl € C{xl,x2}. Consider
C{xl,xl,x2} 0 0. If x2 is in it, then by IIA and {xl,x2} c {xl,xl,x2},
also xl € C{xl,xl,x2}. If xl € C{Xl,Xl,x2}, then by IIA and
0 1 0 1 2 0 1 2{x ,x } c <Xl,Xl,x 2}, also xO € C{x ,x ,x }. So always x  € C{x ,x ,x }.
By IIA, xl € C{xl,x2}. Analogously we obtain xl € C{x0,x1} for
j = 3,4,...,n. Since {xl,xn} c DO, IIA and xn € C(DO) imply xl € C(DO).
Next for the case that D is union-closed. Consider C(DlUD2) 0 0.
If there is y2 € D2 such that y2 € C(Dl UD2), then by IIA and
D2 c Dl U D2, xl € C(DlUD2). So always there is yl € Dl such that
yl € C(DlUD2) . By IIA and Dl c Dl U 02, hence always xl € C(Dl UD2) .
1          j-1 for Dl, Dj for D2, x j-1      1Analogously (substitute D  U ... U D for x
above, etc.) we obtain xO € C((DlUD2U...UD -1) U D ) for j = 2,3,...,n,
and xl € C((DlU...UDn) U DO). Since DO c (Dl U...UDnUDI), by IIA :
00
x  € CCD ).
0
COROLLARY I.2.12.  If D contains aZZ two- and three-point subsets of
x. or if V is union-closed, then the foZZowing four statements are
equivaZent:
(i) There ex€Bts a representing weak order for c.
(ii)  C is congruent.
(iii) C satisfies WARP.
(iv)  C satisfies IIA.
If  C (D)   contains  exact Zy  one  e Zement  for  every  D  €  D,   then  the
fozZowing three statements are equivaZent:
(V) There exists a repreBenting weak order for c.
(vi)  C is congruent.
(Vii) C satisfies SARP.
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PROOF. By the previous theorems, lemmas and propositions in this
section.
0
For the case where D contains all two- and three-point subsets
of X, the equivalence of (i) and (iv) above can also be obtained
from the proof in Arrow (1959), which was meant only for the case
where D contains all finite subsets of X. Sen (1971, bottom of page
312), noted that this proof remains valid in our case. For the case
where D is union-closed, the equivalence of (i) and (iv) above is
given in Theorem 15.4 in Fishburn (1973), or Hansson (1968), or
Weddepohl (1970, Theorem 3.9.6, without KS and K7).
In the following chapters we shall work with binary relations,
intended to represent C, and called "preference relations". Note that
binary relations do not specify the domain of C. Also note that
representing weak orders, as in (i) of Theorem I.2.5, do not have to
be uniquely determined. Hence properties, characteristic for such a
weak order, do not have to be characteristic for C, see page 48 of
Richter (1971). If D is rich enough, for instance contains all
2-point subsets of X, then > of (i) of Theorem I.2.5 equals R (even
R) of (v) there, and is uniquely determined.
I.3. COMPARISON WITH OTHER SET-UPS
In Luce and Suppes (1965) a distinction is made between
"probabilistic" (= "stochastic") and "algebraic" approaches.   In  the
first approach there is randomness in the choices of T, for example
it is considered that T chooses C(D) = Dl c D from D with
probability ·  and  C (D)   =  D2 c D  from D with probability 23.  Our
approach is algebraic, T's choices do not involve random mechanisms.
Also there is no randomness or uncertainty in the alternatives
that result from T's choices. T can choose any available alternative
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he wants, and then be sure to obtain this alternative. We d6 consider
uncertainty in the sequel, in fact that will be the major subject
of this monograph. The uncertainty, made explicit and studied by us in
the  sequel, will concern what "consequence" will result  from  an
alternative, see Example  I I.1.1.  There  may be further, "implicit",
uncertainty in such consequences. We neither assume, nor exclude, the
existence of such uncertainty, only we do not study it. As an
illustration, suppose a person T can choose a bet in a boxing-match,
such that he gains $3 if boxer 1 wins, and he gains $-7 (i.e. looses
$7) if boxer 2 wins or the match is a tie. Then other approaches may
call the amounts of money $3 and $-7 alternatives, and say T is
uncertain about which alternative will result from his choice. For
the set-up of this monograph it is more convenient to call the bet
alternative , the amounts of money $3 and $-7 "consequence" (or
coordinate, see section II.1 and Example II.1.1). We do not exclude
or assume the existence of uncertainty about what will result from a
consequence  "gain  $3";  only such uncertainty will  not be central  in
our study.
Our set-up is ordinal in the sense that everything in the sequel
will be derived solely from the preference relation of T on the set
of alternatives (where the preference relation again is derived from
the choice function), and structure of the set of alternatives. Nothing
cardinal-like has been introduced "from outside". No strength of
preference relation is presupposed. Also no addition-like operation
on alternatives is used. For example we do not use repetitions.
A typical thought experiment for the repetitions approach, as
for instance in Shapiro (1979) or Camacho (1980; see also Wakker,
1985 c) is as follows. Let Dl = {a,p}, 02 =  P'n}, D3 - {a,n}. It is
now assumed that T has to deal with aZZ three of these choice
situations,  and for instance  he must choose between two "possibilities".
The first is that he obtains a from Dl ' n from 02' and a from D 3; the
second that he obtains p from Dl' p from D2' a from D3. The first
possibility could then be denoted as a e n e a,o r(2 e a)e n,t h e
second as p e p e a,o r(2 e p) *a. Here e and e are formal operations.
One sees that here not in each one of the choice situations Dl' D2' D3'
T is free to choose. If T wants a from Dl' then he  must take n from D2.
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In our set-up T in each single situation chooses what he thinks
best there. For instance, if in the transitivity assumption we assume
that choices a from Dl and p from D2 should imply the choice a from
D), then all these choices are intended to agree with T's freedom of
choice in each single choice situation.
Also we do not use lotteries on alternatives. For the approach





II.1. CARTESIAN PRODUCT STRUCTURE
In this section we introduce on X, the set of alternatives, the
main structure of interest in this monograph. We shall assume
throughout the sequel that X is a cartesian product X
i€Ici, with I an
index set. We shall nearly always, with Chapter V excepted, assume
that I is a finite set {1,...,n}, n € N. Many definitions and results
of this chapter are directly applicable to infinite I's.
The idea is that every alternative is described by a list of
properties, indexed by I. For instance alternative x = (xl'x2'x 3'x4)
may describe a car, where x 1 is the maximum speed, x2 the price,
x3 a description of what the car looks like, x4 the fuel consumption;
x > y means that x is thought at least as good as y. Let us emphasize
that no physical quantification of the coordinates is needed for our
work. What the car looks like may be described in non-quantitative
terms.
In applications, one of the central matters is to find an
appropriate list of properties, to be indexed by I. The list should
be large enough to contain all relevant aspects of the alternatives;
and small enough to be tractable. Also, in our set-up, each property
should have a meaning on its own. If in the above example it were
impossible to give a meaningful description of x3' what the car looks
like, independent of maximum speed, price, and fuel consumption,
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then the list of indexed properties used above would not be well-
suited for our set-up. Throughout this monograph we shall assume that
the cartesian product structure has already been obtained.
In the sequel of this chapter, we shall study monotonicity
properties. These may be considered formal reflections of the
requirements mentioned in the above paragraph.
For many fields of (economic) science the cartesian product
structure is a central matter of study. Examples:
EXAMPLE II.1.1. Decision making under uncertainty (DMUU).
Here x i s a n act, I a state space,i€Ia (possibZe) state (Of
nature). Exactly one state is the true state, the others are untrue.
Act x yields coneequence xi if i is the true state. T, the decision
maker, is uncertain about which of the states is true. Usually in this
context Ci = (1 =: C for all i. As an example one may think of a
horse race. Of n participating horses exactly one will win. Here i
indicates the "possible state of nature" that horse i will win.
Ci = R for all i, and x = (xl'.,.'xn) is a gamble (= act) that will
leave T with $x. if the j-th horse wins. See Savage (1954).
J
EXAMPLE II.1.2. Consumer Theory.
Here x is a commodity bundZe, i indicates a kind of commodity,
x. € R the amount of commodity i i n x;x>y: consumer T thinks
1+
x at least as good as y. See Katzner (1970).
EXAMPLE II.1.3. Producera Theory.
Here x is an input vector, i indicates a production factor, xi is the
input (rate) of production factor i (also xi may refer to output).
v:X+ R isa production function, assigning to every x the
(maximally attainable, one-dimensional) output V(x). x > y: x gives
at least as much output as y. See Shepard (1970).
EXAMPLE     II.1.4. Dynamic AppZ€cations.
Here x is a consumption/production path, stream of income, etc. Every
i indicates a point of time, xi is the consumption/production/income
at point of time i. See Koopmans (1972).
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EXAMPLE II.1.5. We Zfare Theory.
Here x is an aZZocation or social situation, I is a society or group
of agents/players, every i€I i s a n agent/player, and xi indicates
the wealth or utility for agent i under x. See Harsanyi (1955).
EXAMPLE II.1.6. Pr€ee Indexes.
Here every i indicates a good or service, xi is the price of good or
service i at the time, or in the place, described by x. Here a price
index v, assigning to every  x a measure   for the level of prices,   is
usually the primitive. x > y: the level of prices in time or place x
is at least as high as that in y. See Fisher (1927 b).
Of course, numerous other examples can be thought of. The
modelling of uncertainty, as in Example II.1.1, has been introduced
in economic literature by Savage (1953) and Arrow (1953). Note that
in Examples II.1.3 and II.1.6, it is custom to take a quantitative
(representing; see Definition  IIL 2.2)   v as primitive, instead  of  >.
The relation between such quantitative representations, and > , is
the central topic of this monograph.
II.2. ALTERNATIVES, SUBALTERNATIVES, CONSEQUENCES, AND PREFERENCES
BETWEEN THEM
The remainder of this chapter, with the exception of the
definition and notations of this section, and Definitions II.6.2,
II.6.3, and Theorem II.6.4, is not needed for understanding of the
follow chapters.
NOTATION II.2.1. For x € Xi€Ici' and A c I, xA is the element of
Xi€Aci with i-th coordinate xi' for all i € A. We call xA a
suba Zternative.
If one considers x as a map from I to Ui€Ici ' assigning xi to
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every i€I , then one can consider xA as the restriction of x to A.
Of course x{i} = Xi' XI = x; coordinates and alternatives are special
forms of subalternatives. We assume throughout this section, as well as
in sections II.3, II.4, and II.5:
ASSUMPTION II.2.2. For every A c I a reflexive transitive binary
relation >A on Xi€ACi is given. These > 's are called subpreference
relations. We often write >i instead  of  ><:     ,  and  also call these
binary relations coordinate   preference   re Zations; further we also write
> instead of  I' this is the
usual
preference   re Zation .    A,    <A,    <1,    xA
are as usual (see Chapter 0). For all these binary relations, we often
leave out index A if no confusion is likely to arise.
Note that, for the time being, we do not assume any connection
between different  > 's.   They   do   not   have   to be derived   from  >I   in   any
way. The monotonicity properties, considered in the sequel, will enable
such a derivation, see Proposition II.6.1. Also note that we
emphatically do not assume completeness for the >Q's. (Recall that
in (v) of Theorem I.2.5, we found a representing R, that was transitive,
reflexive, but not necessarily complete.) Thus, the assumption of the
presence of all these > 's does not have to be considered a serious
restriction: some of them may simply be the identity relation.
The assumption that all these > 's are given, deviates from the
main strategy in this monograph, to consider only > on X as given. One
reason for this deviation  is that the work under this assumption
serves as a preparation for the work in section II.6, where we again
assume that only > is given. But we also hope that our work under this
assumption has interest on its own.
The interpretation of xA  A yA is something like: for as far as
only the coordinates with indices from A are concerned, alternative x
is weakly preferred to alternative y. In consumer theory, one may
imagine that attention can indeed be restricted to the coordinates
C
with indices from A, if the coordinates with indices from A (say in a
thought experiment) are fixed at some standard level, for example a
level of total satisfaction. In DMUU, coordinates with indices from AC
can be left out of consideration if AC is untrue (i.e. every state of
nature in AC is untrue) and furthermore this has become known to T by
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the acquisition of extra information. The ceteris paribus assumption
should entail that the fixation at AC, or the extra information that
C
A  is untrue, does not affect other essential matters.
DEFINITION II.2.3. Let Al' ...' Ak be mutually disjoint subsets of  I,
xl , ..., x  subalternatives . The
subalternative, compounded of
1
1                   ]C
, notation
414  . . .  4]C  ,  is
the subalternativeXA , ..., X
1
assigning x1 to i € A , j = 1, ..., k.
NOTATION II.2.4. Let Al' ...' Ak be mutually disjoint subsets of I,
x an alternative, x;l , ..., x 
subalternatives. Then we write
1
1kx           for x , and x           x  , ..., x   for the
-Al'...,Ak (Alu...UAk)c -Al'...,Ak  Al        Ak
alternative x
(A,U...UA ) C XA, ... XA .
If necessary, we add parentheses in the above notations. And as
often, we write i instead of {i}. Thus for instance:
X-ivi is (x with xi replaced by vi)· (II.2.1)
and, for i 0 j,
(x   .    ,  v. ,w. )   is   (x  with xi replaced  by  vi '  x.  by w. ) . (II.2.2)-1,1  1 J J        J
I I.3.  TERMINOLOGY FOR MONOTONICITY
Throughout literature one finds very many forms of monotonicity
properties, and properties closely related to them, with widely
varying terminologies and meanings. We think it would be useful if a
unifying terminology for these would be developed, and if the several
logical relations for them would be mapped out.
The terminology, developed below, should be considered only as
a first indication that such a unification may be possible. We would
welcome alternative approaches from other authors. In special contexts
one may adhere to (small) deviations from a unified terminology, to
1n
increase tractability. For instance in a context where never any form
of monotonicity occurs other than cA monotonocity (see (II.3.1), and
Definitions II.3.7 and II.3.8) one may for convenience leave out "cA"
from terminology.
Let us first give the most simple and well-known example of
monotonicity:
If xi > Yi  for all i, then x > y. (II.3.1)
We shall vary this monotonicity in three aspects. Firstly, the
involved preferences can be varied. We can have strict preferences
instead of weak preferences, etc. Secondly, we can replace coordinates
and/or alternatives by subalternatives. Thirdly, we can vary what may
be called the "direction of aggregation". We can for instance assume
that [x. > y. for all i > 2, and x < y] implies [xl < yll. Then the11
preference concerning x and y (or, more generally, the "longest",
"most aggregated", subalternatives)   is  not   in the conclusion,   but   in
the premise.
The abbreviations that will be used in the terminologies, are:
ABBREVIATIONS: c stands for coordinate, A for alternative, s for
(" short") subalternative,   and  S   for ("long") subalternative;   mon
stands for monotonicity.
We also use capital A to denote subsets of I; this is unlikely
to give confusion. The general form of the terms, introduced in
subsection II.3.1 below, is
(9El)mon (II.3.2)
Here   is the generic variable for "direction of aggregation".
This is either aggregated, or disaggregated. Further 2 is the generic
variable for the kind(s) of involved preferences, weak, strict, or
equivalence;  2  may also stand for "strong". Finally 1 refers to the
2
Length of subalternatives, and stands for sS, cS, sA, cA, or s S.
In the aggregated monotonicities we often leave out the term
aggregate. Also we often leave out the term disaggregate, and then
show this by replacing cA by Ac, sA by As, and sS by Ss.
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Further we often use symbols instead of words for 2 above; then
disaggregated monotonicities are distinguished from the aggregated
ones by a dash through a symbol.
II.3.1. DEFINITIONS
First we give the strongest monotonicities, with sS for 1. We
start with aggregated for   in (II.3.2).
DEFINITIONS II.3.1. (Aggregated) 8 (ubatternative)  8 (uba Zternative)
monotonicities. Add after every definition below:
for all B C I, partitions (Bl'...'B ) of B, (II.3.3)m
alternatives x,y.
We say {>A :A c I} satisfies:
(a) (> 82) mon (or strict BS mon) if:
xB   > yB   for all k - x    yB
kk
(b) (> sS) mon (or Weak BS mon) if:
xB  > yB  for all k - xB   yB
kk
(C) (= sS) mon (or  equivaZence   BS  mon)   if:
XB  =  yB  for all k 4 xB - YB
kk
(d)  (>> BS) mon (or strong ES mon) if:
xB]   b  yBk   for  all  k,   xB]      yBIC   for   some  k  =D  xB     YB
(e) totaZ sS mon if:
(a), ..., (d) above are all satisfied
One  may add "aggregated"  be fore every definition above.   Next  we
will  let  d  in   (II. 3.2) be disaggregated. Each disaggregated
monotonicity property is closely related to the corresponding
aggregated monotonicity property. The only difference between the two
can be caused by incomparability, as will be demonstrated in
Proposition II.4.1. This may have been a reason that the disaggregated
monotonicities, to the author's knowledge, have not yet appeared in
1.
-.
literature. Still, they will be an indispensable tool for our work in
the sequel (as we shall see in the comment after Theorem II.6.5).
DEFINITIONS II.3.2. Disaggregated 8 (ubaZternative) 8 (ubaZternative)
monotonicities. Add after every definition below:
for all B CI, partitions (Bl'...'Bm) of B (II.3.4)
, 1 L jim, and alternatives x,y.
We   say   {>A :Acl} satisfies:
Ca)   (* Ss)  mon    Cor  strict  Ss  mon,  or disaggregated  strict  sS  mon)   if:
XB   yB  for all k 0 j, xB < yB - xB. 4 yB
kk J         j
(b)   9  Ss)  mon     (or  weak  Ss  mon,  or  disaggregated  weak  sS  mon)   if:
*B   1 y B   for  all k  0  1,  XB <y B-x B.  <   B.
kk J        J
(c)    (-  Ss)   mon      (or  equivaZenee  Ss  mon,   or  disaggregated  equiva Zence
SS mon) if:
x     .y_  for  all  k  0  j,  [xB 2-yBor  xB < YBl  A  [xB,-YB.  or  xB .< yB .l
Bk Bk j J J      J
(d)  (> * Ss) mon (or strong Ss mon, or disaggregated strong BS mon) if:
x31<   YB]c  for all k 0  j,  xB <y B- xB   < yB 
(e) totaZ Ss mon (or disaggregated totaZ BS mon) if:
(a), ..., (d) above are all satisfied
Pronounciation does not distinguish between sS and Ss, hence we
think for spoken language the second terms in (a) and (d), and the
first term in (e), are less suited.
The following, weaker, versions of monotonicity are straight-
forward variations on the previous ones, so are not written out. The
idea is, to replace in the (dp(sS)) monotonicities above s by c, and /
or S by A.
DEFINITIONS II.3.3,(a) to (e). (Aggregated) c Coordinate) 8 (ubalternative)
monotonicities. Obtained from Definitions II.3.1 by substitution every-
where  of  c  for  s,  and by restriction  to  B c 's with  B k l l   =  1,   so  to
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coordinates KB ' YBk'
DEFINITIONS II.3.4, (a) to (e). Disaggregated c(oordinate)
8(ubaZternative) monotonicities. Obtained from Definitions II.3.2 in
the same way as Definitions II.3.3 have been obtained from Definitions
II.3.1.
DEFINITIONS II.3.5,  (a)  to  (e) . (Aggregated) 8(ubalternative)
a(Zternative) monotonicities. Obtained from Definitions II.3.1 by
substitution everywhere of A for S, and by restriction to B equal I,
so to aZternatives xB = x, YB = Y•
DEFINITIONS II.3.6, (a) to (e). Dieaggregated 8(ubalternative)
a(Zternative) monotonicities. Obtained from Definitions II.3.2 in the
same way as Definitions II.3.5 have been obtained from Definitions
II.3.1.
Since the monotonicities, introduced in the following two
definitions, only involve the >i's, and > , we sometimes ascribe them
to {>.: i€I}U {>}, instead of to all of {>A :A C I}. Definition1
II.3.7.b equals (II.3.1).
DEFINITIONS II.3.7, (a) to (e). (Aggregated)   c (oordinate)a(Zternative)
monotonicities. Obtained from Definitions II.3.1 by substitution
everywhere of c for s, A for S, and by restriction to B equal I,
m = n, and Bk = {k} for all k; i.e. by restriction to coordinates
XBk = xk' YB  = yk, and alternatives xB=x, YB= Y
DEFINITIONS II.3.8, (a) to (e). Disaggregated   c Coordinate)a(lternative )
monotonicities. Obtained from Definitions II.3.2 in the same way as
Definitions II.3.7 have been obtained from Definitions II.3.1.
We shall show in Proposition II.4.3 that the (dp(sS))
monotonicities are implied by those that are restricted to m = 2. So
we define:
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DEFINITIONS II.3.9, (a) to (e). (Aggregated)    twofold   8 (ubalternative)
s (uba Zternative ) monotonicities. Obtained from Definitions II.3.1 by
restriction to m = 2, and with this indicated by an index 2 above the
2
small s, so (> s S) mon, etc.
DEFINITIONS II.3.10. (a) to (e). Disaggregated twofoZd 8(ubaZternative)
8(ubaZternative) montonicities. Obtained from Definitions II.3.2 in
the same way as Definitions II.3.9 have been obtained from
2Definitions II.3.1; this gives (94 Ss ) mon, etc.
In following chapters we shall deal with cases where all
monotonicity properties, introduced so far, are satisfied. Hence we
define:
DEFINITION II.3.11.  {>A: A C I}
satisfies totaZ monotonicity if
Definitions II.3.1 to II.3.10 are all satisfied.
II.4. ELEMENTARY CONNECrIONS BETWEEN MONOTONICITIES
In this section some elementary logical relations between the
several monotonicity properties are given. It is not our plan to
elaborate this extensively. We mainly aim at minimal assumptions
to guarantee total monotonicity. Let us repreat that throughout we
make Assumption II. 2.2, i.e. every >A is transitive, refZexive, not
neeessar€Zy compZete. First we relate aggregated monotonicities   to
disaggregated monotonicities.
PROPOSITION II.4.1. Let every   >A  be   compZete.   Then    (aggregated  21)   mon
hoZds if and onZy if (disaggregated 21) mon hoZds.
Here one can substitute strict, weak, equivalence, strong, or
2
total for £; and for 1 one can substitute sS, cS, sA, cA, or s S.
PROOF. We only give the proof for 2: strong, and 1: cA. The other cases
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are similar. In the definition of (> 2 Ac)mon, let xi > Yi for all
i  0  j.  Now  [x  <  y  *  x   4 y ]
is
equivalent  to   [not  x   K  y   "  not
x < y]. By completeness this is equivalent to [x > y  ] - Ix > y].
This gives (> > cA)mon.
0
Since every coordinate and alternative is a subalternative, we
immediately have:
PROPOSITION II.4.2. (42(es))mon impjies (421) mon,    for   every
Z    €    {sS,    cS,    BA,    eA}.
Here one can substitute aggregated or disaggregated for d, and
for 2 one can substitute  > , > ,0, >>,or total .
0
PROPOSITION II.4.3. ( 2 82S)mon   hoZb   €f  and  on Zy   if   (6  sS)mon   ho Zds.
Here one can substitute aggregated or disaggregated for  , and
for  2  one can substitute  >  ,  >  ,  st: ,>>,or total .
2
PROOF.  That an sS mon implies the corresponding s S mon, is direct.
9
So we assume (dps-S)mon, and derive (dpsS)mon. We do it for two cases
only:   d is aggregated  and  2 is strong ;   or  d is disaggregated,   and  2  is
equivalence. In either case, let (Bl'...'B ) be a partition of B c I.
Now assume first  that   (> > s2S) holds, and
assume  xB      YB   for
all k, xB  > yB  for some k, say k = l. To prove is, for (> > sS)mon,
kk
that xB > yB. By (> > s2S)mon, xBixB    yBly32 follows. If now for
i < m we have proved that x81 "' XBi   Y81 YB , then we take
i
( (B U . . . UB ) - B   ) as partition in two parts of Bl U . . . UB1        i ' i+1 i+1'
apply (>> s2S)mon, and
obtain that xB    ...  xB      > YB   "'  YBi-+11      i+1
We end up with xB > YB' which is what (> > sS)mon requires.
For the second case we first give a new notation, for this proof
only. For any s,t € X, C C I, we write scatc if [sc > tc or sc < tcl
2
We now assume   that    (86  s   S) mon holds,   and  want to derive    (26  sS) mon.
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So  let  xB   w yB    for  all  k  0  j,and  x  B. To prove  is  xB SYB ' Suppose
kk j     j
j = l. Since B = (BlU ... UBm-1) U Bm ' xB Al YB  ' and xB9B '
m
(m S2S)mon gives that  #8   . . -  xB     )2(YB m...  YB     ) .  If  now for
1                  m-1 1 m-1
i > 1 we have proved that xB   ,  xB VB  -" Y . then we write
1       i   l      Bi'
 BlU ... UBi) = (BlU ... UBi-1) U Bi; xB x YB ' and (4 s2S)mon give
ii
that x ... XB       Bi- 13181 "' YBi-1' We end up with xBis'Bl,
which is
1
what (4 sS)mon requires.
0
We now turn to the logical relations between the  21 monotonicities
that differ with respect to 2 , and have d and 1 the same.
PROPOSITION II.4.4.
(a) (/ strong 1)mon «pliee  (d strict 1)mon.
(b)   (  weak  1)mon  implies   (  equivalence  Pmon.
(c)  (d strong 1)mon and (d equivaZence i)mon together impZY (d weak i)
mon.
Here one can substitute aggregated or disaggregated for  , and
2
for 1: sS, cS, sA, cA, or s S.
PROOF. (a) is trivial. For (b), we consider first (aggregated) weak
cA mon, and derive equivalence cA mon. If now xk x yk for all k then
[xk > Yk and Yk > xk] for all k so, by twofold application of weak
cA mon, [x>y andy > x], i.e. X x y. This is what equivalence cA
mon requires.
The second, and final, version of (b) that we derive, is the
version where   stands for disaggregated, and 1 again for cA. Let
disaggregated  weak  cA  mon be satisfied.   Let  xk  w  Yk  for  all  k  0   j,
[x > y or x < y]. Say x > y. Then by disaggregated weak cA mon
x  > y  follows.
So
certainly [x  > yj or yj > xj],
which is all that
disaggregated equivalence monotonicity requires.
For (c), we again consider two cases, again both with 1 = cA.
First we assume (aggregated) strong cA mon and equivalence cA mon.
To derive is weak cA mon. So let xk   yk for all k. If xi > Yi for
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some i, then by strong cA mon x > y. So certainly then x > y, which
is  what  weak  cA mon requires.   If  xi  >  Yi  for  no  i,  then  xi  X yi  for
all  i.   Here we apply equivalence  cA  mon, to obtain  x  x  y. So certainly
X > Y, which is what weak cA mon requires.
Finally,  as a second  case  of (c), we assume disaggregated strong
cA mon and disaggregated equivalence cA mon, and derive
diseogregated' weak  cA  mon.   So  let  xk     yk  for  all  k  0  j,  x  <  y.   Of
course x<y,s o disaggregated strong   cA mon gives  x   < .y  .I f  now
xk  x yk  for  all  k  0  j, then disaggregated equivalence mon (since
x   > y   cannot hold) gives x  < y , which  is what disaggregated weak
cA mon requires. So suppose xi > Yi for some i. Now x  st; y cannot
hold: then we would have xk >Y k for all k t i (also for k= j), which
together with x<y b y disaggregated strong cA mon would imply
xi  4  Yi , This contradicts  xi  >  Yi .   Apparently  x   sti  y    does  not  hold,
and x  < y  follows. This is what disaggregated weak cA mon requires.
0
II.5. TOTAL MONOTONICITY
In this section we give sets of monotonicity properties,
sufficient to imply total monotonicity (i.e. all other monotonicity
properties). Again, throughout we make Assumption II.2.2. First one
preparatory result, less elementary than those of the previous
section.
PROPOSITION II.5.1.
(a)  (> BA)mon and (> 0 As)mon together imply   (>  EIS)mon  and  (>*  Ss)mon.
(b)  (> > sA)mon and (4 As)mon together in;pZy (> > eS)mon and (PA Ss)mon.
PROOF. Throughout let (Bl'  - 'Bm)  be a partition of B c I. We write
B  := BC. Always z is an arbitrary fixed alternative. In the proof we
shall often change subalternatives into alternatives by compounding
them with pieces of z.
GB
For   (a) , we first derive   (>  sS) mon   from the assumptions there.
So let x81   YBl' "" XB > YB .m m
By  (> sA)mon, (zBOXBl  '  '  xBm)     (zBOXI3l      '  xBm 
* Now, since
ZBO < zBO,  (>
DA As)mon implies  (xB  . . .  xB )     CYB   '  ' YB ), which
1                                            m
is what (> sS)mon required.
Next,   for   (a), we derive   (>  44  Ss)   from the assumptions there.   So
let x
82   y82' "" XBm   YI'In' and x3 < 78
This latter, and
ZBO  <  zBO,   by    (>  sA)
mon implies
zBOXB  <   zBOYB     This,   and   xBk     yBk
for k = 2,...,m, implies by (> 7 As)mon
zBOXBl < zB YB1  From this,
ZB < zB  for all k 12, and (> sA)mon, follows ZBOXB 1282 "  ZB <kk      n
ZB YB ZB
...
ZB . Finally, this, zBk > zBk for all k 0 1, and012  n
(> 7 As)mon, give xBl < y81 . This is what  (> 4 Ss)
required.
The proof of (b) is analogous, and left to the reader.
0
THEOREM    I I.  5.2. The fozzowing four (sets of) conditions for {,A : A c I}
are equiva Zent:
(i) totaZ monotonicity.
CiR   (>> sZS) -,  (>+ SBZ) _,  (0 BZS) -, and (6 Ss )mon.
(iii)  (> aA) -,  (4 AB) -,  (> > BA) -, and (>   As)mon.
(iv) (- sA)  -,  (0 As)  -,  (> > BA) -, and (> P As)mon.
PROOF. (iv) 4 (iii) is by Proposition II.4.4.c. (iii) - (ii) (even
the stronger version of (ii) without indices 2) is by Propositions
II.5.1, and II.4.4.b.
For (ii) - (i), first we see that by Proposition II.4.3, (ii)
implies its stronger version without indices 2. That this implies aZZ
sS monotonicities, is by Proposition II.4.4. This of course
(Proposition II.4.2) implies (i).
Of course, (i) - (iv) is by definition.
0
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Under special circumstances it may be possible to weaken the
properties in (ii), (iii), (iv) above, such that (i) is still implied.
For instance, if all > 's are known to be complete, then Proposition
II.4.1 enables us to leave out the disaggregated monotonicities. We
give a result, useful for the case of antisymmetry:
PROPOSITION II.5.3. If every  A €8 antiaymmetrie, then (ft Strong 1)mon
impZ€es d weak 1 mon.
Here one can substitute aggregated or disaggregated for 9, and
2
for 1: sS, sA, CS, CA, s S.
PROOF. We consider only the case where 1 = cA. First we assume
aggregated strong cA mon. To derive is aggregated weak cA mon. So
assume xk >Y k for all k. If xk =y k for all k, then x=y, and x>y
follows. If xk 0 Yk for some k, then by antisymmetry of >k we have
in fact xk > Yk. By aggregated strong cA mon then x > y, so certainly
again x > y. x > y, as required by aggregated weak cA mon, always
follows.
Next we assume disaggregated strong cA mon. To derive is
disaggregated weak cA mon. So assume xk   yk for all k 0 j, x < y.
Then x < y, and by disaggregated strong cA mon x. < y. follows. The
J       j
proof is completed if we derive contradiction from the assumption that
not x. < y.. If not x. < y., then x. 0 y., i.e. x. = y.. Further then
J ] ] J J J 1       J
for  any   i,   from  x  <y,   x      yk  for  all  k  0   i   (also  k  =   j)   and
disaggregated strong cA mon, xi < Yi follows. So xi > Yi and xi < Yi
for all i. Then apparently xi = Yi for all i, so x = y, in contra-
diction with x < y.
0
The above proposition shows that antisymmetry enables one to leave
out, in Theorem II.5.2, the weak and equivalent monotonicities in (ii),
(iii) and (iv).
Note that it depends on the involved cartesian product, whether
a subalternative can be called consequence or not. Suppose that
(Bl, ..., Bm) is a partition of I. We can write Xi€Ici as
X =1(Xi€Bkci), and consider only the cartesian product over k. Then
4U
XBk is considered a consequence, whereas originally it was not if
Bk 1 1>1.I n contexts, where any cartesian product structure
X =l (Xi€B  Ci)   is as natural  as the original Xi€Ici' the subalternative
k
alternative monotonicity properties may be considered to be as natural
as the consequence alternative monotonicities. For those contexts (iii)
and (iv) of Theorem II.5.2 are useful characterizations of total
monotonicity. This is the more so in view of the main strategy in
this monograph, to formulate as much as possible all conditions in
terms of the preference relation > on the alternatives: (iii) and (iv)
at least partly involve > .
II.6. COORDINATE INDEPENDENCE AS THE OBSERVABLE CONTENT OF TOTAL
MONOTONICITY
In this section we want to return to the main strategy of this
monograph, to consider only the preference relation > on the set of
alternatives X as observable, together with structure of X. Then the
 A's, for ACI, are not directly given. The most we can do is derive
0
them from >  , under the assumption of total monotonicity (, see
Proposition II.6.1). And the most we can do about verification or
falsification of total monotonicity, is to find properties of > that
enable a verification or falsification  of the existence  of  > ' s.   for
all A   I, such that {>A: A c I} satisfies total monotonicity. The
necessary and sufficient property  of  >  for the existence  of   such  >A' s,
is "coordinate independence", see Definition   I I.6.3, and Theorem
II.6.5. The following proposition shows that, under total monotonicity,
all > 's can be derived from >.
PROPOSITION II.6.1. Let { A: A C I} satisfy totaZ monotonicity. Let z
be an arbitrar€Zy fixed eZement of x. 19:en xA , yA if and onZy if
XAZAc ) YAZAC .
PROOF. Since  z c>z c'  IxA > YA]  by  (> s2S)mon implies [xAZAc , yAz  c]
A A
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For the converse implication, since z >z [y < x] by (> 4 Ss2)
Ac    Ac '
mon implies [yA < xAl'
0
Since >A is independent of the particular z c that we fixed in
Athe above proposition, we see that the following property of > is
necessary for total monotonicity:
DEFINITION II.6.2.  > satisfies independence of equat subaZternatives
if:
[„Al«    >   YAYA«    „   „A"Ac        yA"A« 1
for all x, y, v, w € X, A c I.
For the idea of the above definition let s := xAv c' t := YAv cA           A
Then, as soon as we know that s and t are identical in AC, we do not
have to consider the particular common value s c=t c=v c i n A C any
A     A    A
further. It does not matter if this is v or  w     , or whatever.  The
Ac     Acepreference between 8 and t i a independent of the A  c I where a and t
are identicaZ.
For finite cartesian products, there is a simpler, equivalent,
formulation for independence of equal subalternatives.
DEFINITION II.6.3.  > satisfies independence of equaZ coordinates, or
shortly coordinate independence (CI), if:
[X-ivi > y-ivi w x-iwi > Y-iwil
for all x, y € X, vi' wi € Ci' i € I. Also we then say that > is
coordinate independent (CI).
THEOREM II.6.4. > satisfies independence of equaZ subaZternativeB if
and on Zy if it sat€8fies CI.
PROOF. Since any coordinate is a subalternative, independence of
equal subalternatives implies CI. For the converse implication,
assume > is CI. Let x, y, v, w, A be as in Definition II.6.2. Let
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 |Acll =m i n. For m=1 the result is direct. Now suppose m 1 2, and
for   m- 1 the result is proved.   Let   j€A.   Then    [xAVAc      YAvAc ] * *
[((xAw c)-jvj) > ((YAw c)-jv )]. Now by CI the latter preference holds
if andAonly if xAwAc >AYAWAG.
0
The above two properties are central in our work and will nearly
always hold in following chapters, Chapter VI excepted. A related
property was introduced in Sono (1945, 1961) and Leontief (1947 a,
1947 b) in terms of derivatives of a (presupposed, representing (see
Definition III.2.2)) function. See also Samuelson (1947, pp 174-180).
Already Fleming (1952), for the context of welfare theory, formulated
essentially the independence of equal subalternatives of length n-2
in terms of a (presupposed, representing) function, but without using
derivatives. In Debreu (1960) CI was formulated in its present , more
appealing, form, in terms of the preference relation, thus again
without differentiability assumptions. Before, Savage (1954) had
introduced the "sure-thing principle" for DMUU. This principle is in
fact identical to independence of equal subalternatives, as is well
known nowadays.   It  can  be   seen to underly the "likelihood principle"
in statistics, which is central in the discussion about Bayesian
statistics. See Berger and Wolpert (1984). Debreu, and some other
authors, have used the term independence. A further usual term is
(strong/strict) separability. Katzner (1970) uses the term additivity.
For an extensive study of generalizations, and many applications of
CI, see Blackorby, Primont, and Russell (1978). See also Mak (1984,
1985). Gorman (1976, p. 212, 224) argues for the importance of CI in
economic theory. Krantz  et  al. (1971) mention Fisher   ( 1927  a,   p. 175  ff)
as an early place where the basic idea of CI can be recognized.
THEOREM   I I.6.5. Let >o n x b e transitive   and  refLexive. Then there ex€3t
transitive refZezive  >A' 8
On
Xi€A(i (A c I) such that {>A: A c I}
satisfieB totaZ monotonicity, if and on Zy if > is CI.
PROOF. The only-if part is by Proposition II.6.1, Theorem II.6.4,
and the remark above Definition II.6.2. So, we next assume that > is
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CI, and we derive existence of > 's as in the theorem. Let z be an
arbitrarily fixed element of X. We define xA >A  A whenever
xAZAc > yAZAc. Note that >I thus coincides with >. Reflexivity and
transitivity of > imply the same for any >A. Finally we must derive
total monotonicity. By Theorem II.6.4 we have independence of equal
subalternatives.
First  note  that  xA :1 YA  iff  xAZAc   YAZA :,  xA RiA yA  iff
xAZAc X YAZAC
. By Theorem II.5.2,  (ii) 4 (i), it is sufficient to
2                             2                    9                                  2derive (> > s S) -,  (> 76 Ss ) -,  (- s"S)  -, and (,6 ss )mon. So let
Bl n 8 2=0'B l U 8 2=B c I.W e write B  = Bc.
For (> > s2S)mon, suppose that x   >  y  ,x   n  y  •T o prove:
Bl  Bl  Bl   B2 D2  B2
xB xB   B UB  yB YB   We have xB  B  YB -zB xB zB >zB yB zB "
1 2 1 2 1 2 111 012 012
(by independence of equal subalternatives):
zB xB xB > zB yB xB ' (II.6.1)
012 012
Further ,w e have xB   B  YB -z  z  x   >z  z  y_  =* (by independence
2   2   2    BO 81 82    BO 81 82
of equal subalternatives)
zB YB xB > ZB  B  B' (II.6.2)0 1 2 0 1 2
(II.6.1) and (II-6.2) imply zB xBlx82 > z80YBly82' i.e'
x81x82 >81UB2 Y81YB2'
, as desired.
(0 s2S)mon is analogous, and not elaborated.
For (> y Ss2)mon, suppose x81 >Bl Y81, x81X82 <#lU82  81 82'  ' 
prove is x82  2 y82' We have yBi  1 xB 1 - ZB0 1 82 <  80 81 82  
(by independence of equal subalternatives)
ZB yB VB  < zB XB yB ' (II.6.3)012 012
Further,  we have
x81' 82 <Bl"BQ YBly82 -  280xBlx82 <  Z80YBly82'
This and (II.6.3) imply zBOXBlx82 < ZBOXBly82 . By independence of




(0  Ss   ) mon is analogous,   and not elaborated.
0
Observe in the above theorem that the disaggregated monotonicity
-
properties are essential. For any arbitrary binary relation > on X
that is reflexive, there exist >A's to make {>A :A C I} satis
fy all
aggregated monctonicity properties, with >  = > : simply let for any
A 0 I, xA >A YA if and only if xA = YA'
Of course, should all > 's be complete, then matters are
different. By Proposition II.4.1 the disaggregated monotonicity
properties can then be left out. That independence of equal
subalternatives   then is sufficient   for the existence  of  > ' s to fulfil
aggregated monotonicities,    (and that independence of equal
subalternatives for finite cartesian products is then equivalent to
CI,) is known, see Krantz et al. (1971, Lemma 6.1.4.1, (iv) there
resembles   (>  /  cA  mon) ),   or,   when a representing function (Definition






This chapter, and following chapters, can be read independently
of the previous two chapters. Only some definitions of the previous
two chapters are used. When needed, we shall mention these.
In the first three sections of this chapter we give some well-
known results from literature. In section III.4 new results will be
presented.
As before X, the set of alternatives, is a cartesian product
Xi€Ici. With the exception of Chapter V, I will be a finite set
{1,...,n}. By> , a binary relation on X, we express the "preference
relation" of decision maker T on X. As before, > shall always, in our
main results, be transitive, and from now on always complete, either
as an assumption, or as consequence of other assumptions.
Furthermore, we shall from now on assume that every Ci is a
connected topological space. E.g. Ci is a convex subset of a Euclidean
mi
space, such as R , or R. X is always endowed with the product+
topology, hence is connected too (see Kelley, 1955, Chapter 3, problem 0).
In our main results > will be continuous (Definition III.2.1), either
as explicit assumption, or as consequence of other assumptions.
In section I.1.3 we indicated that the set X would sometimes
contain hypothetical alternatives, not present in actual situations.
In the set-up of Chapters I and II it was not harmful to let X be "too"
large. We could then simply let the preference relation ignore the
redundant part of X, by letting every redundant alternative of X be
incomparable to every other alternative, or by adding only those
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preferences, involving redundant alternatives, that are necessary to
maintain monotonicity and transitivity. Since we, from now on,
usually deal with complete preference relations, "ignoring by
incomparability"   is no longer possible.
A consequence of our topological assumptions is that, if not all
of the alternatives are equivalent, then X must be uncountable. This
will   follow  from the remark after Theorem  nL 3.1    (,combined  with  the
fact that the y chere is separable, if countable).
The above two paragraphs indicate that the combination of
completeness and continuity of > can be a serious restriction. In
Schmeidler (1971) it is shown that transitivity of > , and continuity
(defined appropriately) with respect to a connected topology imply
completeness or symmetry of >. Sonnenschein (1965) gives conditions
under which completeness and continuity imply transitivity. A further
indication of the restrictiveness of completeness and continuity of >
may be the implication (ii) 4 (i) in Theorem III.3.7 
in the sequel;
this usually is conceived as a surprisingly strong result.
In Krantz et al. (1971), instead of topological assumptions two
other assumptions  are  made, the so-called "Archimedean" and "restricted
solvability" (see Definition III.2.12) assumptions. These are less
restrictive than our topological assumptions, but still allow the
derivation of the results in the sequel of this monograph. We have
chosen to use the topological assumptions because they are more
customary in literature. Our Proposition III.2.15 will enable the
application of the theorems of Krantz et al. (1971) in our topological
set-up.
III.2. ELEMENTARY DEFINITIONS AND RESULTS
In this section we give elementary definitions and results from
literature. Since we will sometimes use them for other binary relations
than just the preference relation > on X, we formulate some of them
for a general binary relation >' on a general set Y.
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DEFINITION  III- 2.1.A weak order  >'   on a topological space  Y i s
continuous if {x €Y:x> 'y} and {x €Y:x< 'y} are open for all
y CY.
A weak order >' is, of course, continuous if and only if
{x €Y:x< 'y} and {x €Y:x> 'y} are closed for all y€Y; this
follows by taking complements.
DEFINITION  III. 2.2.   A  function  V   :   Y  + R represents a binary relation
>'  on Y if,  for all x,  y € Y,  [x >'  y ** V(x)  1 V(y)].
For the above function V, the term utility function is most usual
in literature. We shall however reserve this term for a somewhat
different notion in decision making under uncertainty. (See Definition
IV.2.2.) Throughout the sequel of this monograph we shall study
preference relations for which (special kinds of) representing functions
exist. Obviously these preference relatiors must  be weak orders.
We shall almost exclusively study representing functions of the
following kind:
DEFINITION III.2.3. A function V : Xi=lci + m is additive Zy decomposab Zeif there exist Vi : Ci + R, i = 1,...,n, such that V(x) = Ii=lvi(xi)
for all x € X =lci. If this V represents > , then (Vi) =1 are called
additive vaTue functions (for  >)  ,
Usually we are not only interested in the existence  of  a (n array
of) function(s) having certain properties, (such as being representing,
continuous, additively decomposable, or whatever a context requires),
but we are also interested in uniqueness results.
TERMINOLOGY III.2.4. A function V is ordina Z [respectively continuousZy
ordinaZ]    (with  respect   to some properties)   if the class  of all functions
having these properties, consists of all strictly increasing
[respectively continuous, strictly increasing] transformations of V.
TERMINOLOGY III.2.5. A function v is cardinaZ (with respect to some
.-
10
properties)   .:   ..,a  c.._s  of all functions having these properties,
consists of ali _Dv:1.-4: affine transformations of V.
An ariai ci  -.....iw.0 41 ) =1 is aimuZtaneous Zy cardinaZ (with
respect to :sme  · cM·e. les; if the class of all arrays of functions
(Wj)1-1 havi,ig La.e _Lop:Icies, consists of those (W ) =1 , for
which real T., 1 =  ,.. ,n, and positive a exist such that W  = T +CV J
for all j.
To give e..aa,ile., we define v : R2 + IR by V : (xl'x2) 4* xl+x2'
and we let ) or, 7- 03 represented by V. We shall refer in these
examples tc, their».ts: given in the next section. V is ordinal with
respect to the propercy of being representing, as is easily derived
from the observaL.ons Vix) 1 V(y) u x>y, and x>y# W(x) 1 W(y),
for any representing W. V is continuously ordinal with respect to
the  properties  Of  ve ing continuous and representing, as follows  from
Theorem III.3.1. 9 is -ardinal with respect to the properties of being
continuous, repi essicing,  and  additively  decomposable,  as  can  easily
be derived from Thecrem III.3.6. Finally, with Vt' V2 : IR + IR being
identity, (Vl'V2) is simultaneously cardinal with respect to the
properties cf bel g continuous and being additive value functions,
again by Theorem  iii . 3.6.
In the sequel we shall use Notations II.2.1 (subalternative xA'
for A c I), and I..2.4  (x-AYA ' etc., and lines below
this Notation) ;
Definitions II.2.3 (xAlyA2 is compounded of xAl and y  ). II.6.2A2
(independence   of   e Tual subalternatives)  ,   II.6.3   (CI) ; and Theorem
II.6.4 (equivaien-s of last two notions). With these we define, deviating
in a harmless way from Chapter II, some binary relations on Xi€Aci
DEFINITION III 2.,- Scr every A C I, and xA' YA in Xi€Aci ' we write
XA  >A  YA I respect -vely  KA  >A   YA   '   or   xA  <A  yA   '   or   xA     YA   '   or







0- XAZAG < YAZAc  ' or xAzAC 4 yA2 C  '  or xAzAc w YAzAC 
If  >  is  CI,   the  main  case of interest  in this monograph,   then  the
binary relations defined above coincide with those in Chapter II,
denoted in the same way (by Theorem II.6.5 and Proposition II.6.1).
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Furthermore,  >A    is  then the asymmetric,  and  -A the symmetric,  part
of >A, as usual. As always, >, = >r., , and > => .1    ill        I
LEMMA III.2.7. Let > be CI. If > is a weak order, then 80 is any ,A
If further > is continuous, then 80 €s any ,A.
PROOF. Let A c I,z€X i s arbitrarily fixed. Let >b e CI. By CI,
xA >A yA iff xAZAc   yAZAC. If > is complete, then xAZ c   YAz c or
A 
 Az c > xAZAc  ,  so xA  A YA or yA )A xA'  for all  xA,  yA.  Completeness
of >A follows.
If > is transitive, then xA  A YA and yA  A vA (i.e. xAz c )  Az c
A       A
and   yAZAc  >  vAZAc )
together imply
xAZAc     "Az c '    i.e.   "A   A  vA '
Transitivity of >A follows.
The above observations about completeness and transivity show
that > being a weak order implies that any >A is a weak order.
Next suppose that > is continuous. We derive continuity of  A.
{xA  :   xA  A  yA   =  {xA :
xAZAc     YAZAc }  =  {xA   : xAzAc
€ C}, with C the
closed set {w :w> YAZAC}
By Lemma 0.1 the set {xA : xA  A YA} must be closed too.
Analogously  {xA   :  XA  <A  YA} is closed. Continuity  of >A follows.
0
The following definition of inessentiality of i expresses the
idea that a coordinate has no influence on the "desirability" of any
alternative, so that this coordinate may just as well be ignored for
the preference relation.
DEFINITION III.2.8. Coordinate (or index) i is inessentiaZ (with
respect to >) if
X-ivi - x .w. for all x € X, v., w. € C.. Otherwise-1 1            1  1   1
i is essentiaZ (with respect to >).
For a weak order > ,i i s essential if and only if v. >. w.
111
for some vi' wi
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LEMMA  III.2.9. Let -be an equival ence Ailation. L.'t· x. = y. for aLZ
J        J
essential   j .   Then   x  w  y.
PROOF. Let there be k inessential coordinates, say {1,...,k}. Then
x e, (x-1Yl) RS (x-1,2yl' 2) Ri ... m (x-1....,kYl '...f  k  = Y· Apply
transitivity of *1.
0
The above Lemma shows that the inessential coordinates may just
as well be suppressed from notation. That we shall sometimes do.
LEMMA III.2.10. Let m be an equivaZence reZation. ghen > is triviaZ if
and onZy if no coordinate is essentiaZ.
PROOF. If no coordinate is essential, then Lemma III.2.9 gives
triviality  of  >.   If >i s trivial,   then  x-ivi  x  x-iwi  for  all  x,i,v i'
w. : no i is essential.
1
0
We now formulate the topological assumption that we shall mostly
use in the sequel.
ASSUMPTION III.2.11. (TopOLOgicaL Assumption.)
Every Ci is a connected topological space.
X = X =lci is endowed with the product topology.
If exactly one coordinate i is essential, then furthermore C. is
1
topologically separable.
DEFINITION III.2.12.  > satisfies restricted soZvab€Zity if, for every
x-isi >Y> x-iti' there exists zi such that x-izi x Y.
LEMMA III.2.13. Let the topo Zogica Z assumption III. 2.11 hoZd. Let >be
a continuous weak order. Then > satisfies restricted so Zvab€Zity.
PROOF. Let x-isi >y> x-iti. Let V: = {v. €C. :x .v, > y}, and1    1    -1 1
W := {wi € Ci : x-iwi < y · Then si € V and ti € W, so V and W are
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nonempty. By Lemma 0.1 they are closed. Their union is Ci. By
connectedness of Ci' v n W 0 0. Let z. €v n w.1
0
LEMMA III.2.14. Let the topoZogicaZ assumption III.2.11 hoZd. Let >
be a continuoua weak order. Let x-ASA >Y> x-AtA. Then zA ex€Bts With
x-AzA  - Y
PROOF. Apply Lemma III.2.13 to the cartesian product
(Xj€Acj) x (Xi€Aci)
0
The following proposition will be used as a supplement to results
of Krantz et al. (1971, Chapter 6), so that we can use their results
in our topological set-up, where we need continuity.
PROPOSITION III.2.15. Let the topoZogicaZ assumption III.2.11 hoZd.
Let > be continuouB, and Zet at Zeast two coordinates be essent€aZ.
Let   (v.)         be  additive  vaZue  functions.   Then  aZZ  vj '8  are  continuous.J J=1
PROOF. Suppose Vl is not continuous. Contradiction will follow. Say
v 11(]U, 00[) is not open; then neither it is empty, nor does it equal
i .0
in ]w. =[Cl. Also there  can  be no sequence   (Vl (xi) ) j= 1 , converging
to w. because then Vil(]11, -[) would equal Uj{zi : zl >1 xl} and so
be open by the easily verified CI, and Lemma III.2.7. So
inf (41(Cl) fl ]11, -I) =: v € m must be greater than u. We now show:
0< V (x ) - V (y ) <v- 11 for no j 0 1, x , y . (III.2.1)
If, to the contrary, j 0 1 and 0< V.(x.) - V.(y.) < 9-u, then,
J J J   J
with z€X arbitrarily fixed, and al such that V.(x.)-V.(y ) >
Vl(al)-v 1 0, cl such that Vl(cl) i v, we obtain:
(z-1'jcl'xj) < (z-1,jal'Yj) < (z-1,jal'xj),
by substitutions of inequalities in terms of the V 's. By restricted
solvability (Lemma III.2.13), (z-1,jbl'x ) 0 (z-1,jal'yj) for some bl
This would imply v > Vt (bl) > 11'in contradiction with the definition
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of v. (III.2.1) is derived.
Now j 0 1 exists that is essential, so has V  not constant. Say
V.(x ) > V (y ). There must, as a consequence of (III.2.1), be a z.J
such that V (x ) > V (z ), and V (x ) > V (v ) > V (z ) for no v  € C .
This finally gives a partition ({v. : v. <. z }, {v  : v  >  x }) ofJ       ]J





III.3. BASIC RESULTS ON ADDITIVE DECOMPOSABILITY
The representation theorems from literature, given in this
section, underly all results in the sequel.
III.3.1. LESS THAN TWO ESSENTIAL COORDINATES
The following theorem, proved in Debreu (1954, 1964) does not
consider cartesian product structure.
THEOREM III.3.1. (Debreu). Let Y be a connected separabZe topoZogicaZ
Bpace. For a binary reZation >' on Y the foZZ·owing two statements are
equivaZent:
(i) : There   exiats   a   continuous   representing   junction   0    :   Y  +   R.
(ii) : >' is a continuous weak order.
Fwrthermore, 0 in (i) ia cont€nuousZy ordinaZ.
0
From this one sees that, if 0 is not constant, then $(Y) is a
nondegenerate interval, and Y must be uncountable. That the connected-
ness condition above cannot be dispensed with, is indicated in
Fleischer   ( 1961) and Wakker ( 1985a). We shall  use the following small
variation of the above Theorem.
53
COROLLARY III.3.2. Let at moBt one coordinate be essentiaZ. Let the
topoZogicaZ   assumption   III. 2.11   hoZd.   For   the   binary   relation  >  on
Xi=lci , the foZZowing   two   statements   are   equivaZent:
(i)      There   exist   continuous   additive   vaZue   functions    (vj)  =t   for  >.
(ii) > is a continuous weak order.
Furthermore, the v  9 in (i) are continuousZy ordinaZ, and > in (ii)
satisfies CI·
PROOF. (i) - (ii) is straightforward. So we assume (ii), and derive (i)
and the Furthermore-statement. If no coordinate is essential, then >
is trivial by Lemma III.2.10. Then we can, and must, let all V 's be
arbitrary constant functions, and everything follows.
So suppose one coordinate i is essential. By Lemma III.2.7, >. is1
a continuous weak order. By Theorem III.3.1 there exists a continuous,
end continuously ordinal, function   $   :   Ci  +  IR that represents  >i ·   We
can let Vi = *°0 for any continuous strictly increasing * : $ (Ci) + ]R ;
and for all j t i let V  be any constant function. Then, for any
x, y € X. In  V (x ) > In  V (y.) iff Vi(xi) 1 Vi(yi)' which is iffj=1 j  j  - j=1 j  J
xi >i Yi. The latter is iff there exists z such that z-ixi > z-iyi-
Inessentially of all j 0 i, by Lemma III.2.9, gives z-ixi z x and
Z-iyi -Y·W e conclude that In  V(x) >I n V(y) #x>y. Indeed,j=1 j  j  - j=1 j  j
(v )n are additive value functions. They are continuous too, and (i)j j=1
follows.
For the Furthermore-statement, note that any V  must represent
> . Hence for all j 0 i, V  must be constant; and Vi must be a strictly
increasing, by Lemma VIII.5 continuous, transformation of 0. Finally,
that > in (ii) satisfies CI, follows from (i), and the observation
that x_ia >. Y-:La *• Ij0iVj (xj)  1 Ej0ivj (yj)  *• x-iB > y-iB.
0
III.3.2. EXACTLY TWO ESSENTIAL COORDINATES
The previous subsection, with at most one essential coordinate,
hardly dealt with the cartesian product structure. In essence, we only
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had to deal with the essential coordinate. In this subsection we con-
sider the case of two essential coordinates. It turns out, as in Krantz
et  al.    ( 1971) ,   that  then the requirement of topological separability  can
be dropped. In this section we give the, completely straightforward,
adaptation of results in literature for the case of exactly two
coordinates, both essential, to the case of n coordinates, two of them
essential. The following property is illustrated in Figure III.3.1.
DEFINITION III.3.3. If > has exactly two essential coordinates i,j,
then > satisfies the Thomsen condition if (x-i,jai'tj) 0 (x-i,jbi'Sj)
& Cx-i, jbi,vj) w (x-i,jci'tj) together imply (X-i,jai'Vj) m (X-i,jci'sj) ;
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FIGURE   I I I.3.1.   The  Thomsen  condition   for  n  =   2,   i   =   1,   j   = 2. Curves
indicate equivalence classes. The solid curves through 0-points are
presumed; the broken curve through O-points is implied. One can inter-
pret (al't2) w (bl's2) to mean: substitution (1) of t2 for s2 is as
good as substitution (2) of bl for al. And (bl'v ) N  (cl,9  :substitution   ( 3)   of  v:2  for  t2   is  as  good as subs itution   (4)   of  c 1   for
bl. The conclusion   (al'v2)  .  (cl's.,)   : the "concatenated" substitution[5]   of  v2   for   s2'   is  as  good  as th& "concatenated" substitution  [ 6]   of
Cl for al
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At first sight the above definition may seem asymmetric  for  i and j .
Interchanging i and j, and interchanging the first two equivalences x,
shows that symmetry for i and j does hold.
LEMMA   III.3.4.   If  >  has   exactly   two   essential  coordinates   i  and   j,   and
if  additive   vaZue   functions    (v   ) n        erist   for  >,   then   >  satisfies   thek k=1
Thomsen condition.
PROOF. Ik#i,jvk(xk) + Vi(ai) + Vj(tj) = Ik*i,jvk(Xk) + Vi(bi)
+ V,(s ) and I V(x) +V(b) + V.(v.)=Sk#i,jvk(xk) + Vi(ci) +J j k#i,j k  k     i  i     J  j
V.(t.) together imply
Vi(ai) + Vj(tj) = Vi(bi) + Vj(sj) and Vi(bi) + vj(vj) = vi(ci) + vj(tj).
Summing and cancelling gives:
Vi(ai) + Vj(vj) = Vi(ci) + Vj(sj), or :
Ik#i,jvk(xk) + Vi(ai) + Vj(vj) = Ik0i,jvk(xk) + Vi(Ci) + Vj(sj),
0
The following property is a preparation for cardinal coordinate
independence (Definition IV.2.4) and is illustrated in Figure III.3.2.
DEFINITION III.3.5. If > has exactly two essential coordinates i, j,
then > satisfies tripZe eanceZZation if (s . .a .x ) < (s b .Y ) &
-1, J i j -i,j i  j
13-i,jci'xj) > (s-i,jdi,Yj) & (s-i':lai,vj) > (s_i,jbi,wj) together
imply (s-i, jci'vj) > (s-i, jdi'wj).
Again, the property can be seen to be symmetric in i and j, by
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FIGURE III.3.2. TbipZe cance ZZation for n = 2, i = 1, j = 2. Curves
indicate equivalence classes. A point above or on an equivalence class
is at least as good, a point below or on it at least as bad, as the
points on the equivalence class. The solid curves through and above/
below 0-points are presumed, the broken one through and above 0-points
is implied. One can interpret (al'v,) > (b ,w,) to mean: substitut
ion
(1)o f v 2   for  w     is at
least  as  gooa  as su] stitution (2)o f b l   for  a i·
And  Cal'x:2)  <  (   'Y2)  substitution   (2')  of  b,  for  a    is
at least  as
good as substitu ion  3  of  x2  for Y2 Further tct,x2) 1>   (dl'Yn)   :
substitution (3') of x  for y  is at least as good as substitution (4)
of dl for cl- The conc usion  cl,v2) > (d ,w2)
: substitution [1'] of
v2  for  w2   is at least  as  go
od as substitu ion   [4']   of  dl   for  c t·
Again it can easily be demonstrated that existence of additive
value functions implies triple cancellation. The term "triple
cancellation" comes from Krantz et al. (1971). In Keeney and Raiffa
( 1975)   the term "corresponding tradeoffs condition"   is  used  for  the
same property with X instead of > or < everywhere. This is closely
related to the "Reidemeister condition" in Blaschke and Bol (1938).
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THEOREM III.3.6. Let the topoZogica Z assumption III.2.11 hoZd. Let
exact Zy   two   coordinates   be   essentiaZ.   For  the   binary   re Zation   >  on
Xi=lci,
the foZZowing three statements are equiva Zent:
(i)   There exist continuous additive va Zue junetions (v ) j=1 for >.
(ii)  > is a continuous weak order that satisfies CI and the Thomsen
condition.
(iii) > is a continuous weak order that satisfies tripZe canceZZation.
Furthermore. (V )n in (i) is simuZtaneously cardinaZ.'   j j=1
PROOF. (i) =* (ii) and (i) - (iii) are straightforward. For (iii) =* (i)
and   (ii)  -  (i),  let  i  and  j  be  the two essential coordinates.  The
other coordinates do not affect the preference relation, e.g.
(s   .a ,x.) > (t b.,y ) iff (ai'x.) > (bi,yj), for all s,t.-i,J i j -i,j 1 J   {i,j}
Hence, the Thomsen condition (respectively CI; or triple cancellation)
for > implies the same condition for >, .. So by Lemma III.2.7, (ii)
1,1
(respectively (iii)) for > implies (ii) (respectively (iii)) for
>{i,j}'
Now (ii) for > implies the existence of simulaneously
{i,j}
cardinal additive value functions (V . V.) for >
on Ci x C , asi. J {i,j}
can be derived from Theorem 2 of section 6.2.4 of Krantz et al. (1971),
in the same way that Theorem 14 of section 6.11.1 of that book is
derived from Theorem 13 there. The reasoning of section 6.2.13 there
applies literally for n = 2. See also exercise 34 of chapter 6 there.
Also (iii) for > implies the existence of simultaneously
{i,j}
cardinal additive value functions for > A hint in this direction
{i,j}.
is given at the end of section 6.2.4 of Krantz et al. (1971).
For every k 0 i,j we can, and must, let Vk be any constant
function. It then follows that indeed
(Vk)k=l are simultaneously
cardinal additive value functions  for  >,   if   (Vi' V  )   are   for  >.1,]
Continuity is by Proposition III.2.15. So (ii) implies (i), (iii)
implies (i) too; and the Furthermore-statement holds.
0
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III.3.3. MORE THAN TWO ESSENTIAL COORDINATES
Surprisingly, when there are three or more essential coordinates,
the structure turns out to be rich enough to enable a further weakening
of the conditions which we met in the previous subsections.
The following theorem is essentially due to Debreu (1960). We
give it in a slightly stronger form, by leaving out the assumption of
topological separability, an assumption made and essentially used in
the proof by Debreu. Krantz et al. (1971, Theorem 6.14) showed that
without that assumption, still additive value functions exist. Combined
with Proposition III.2.15, this gives:
THEOREM III.3.7. (Debreu, 1960). Let the topological assumption III.=.11
hoZd. Let three or more coordinates be essentiaZ. For the binary
reZation > on x =tci, the fo ZZowing two statements are equivaZent:
(i)      There   exist   cont€nuous   additive   vaZue   functions (vj) =1 for>·
(ii) > is a continuouB CI weak order.
Furthermore.  (v )n   of (i) u 8€muztaneousZy card€naZ.
'   j j=1
PROOF. By Theorem 14 of section 6.11.1 of Krantz et al. (1971), and
Proposition III.2.15.
0
III.4. SOME FURTHER RESULTS ON ADDITIVE DECOMPOSABILITY
The results of this section are from section 3 in Wakker (1985b),
and will be used only in section IV.4. They may have interest of their
own, since they can be considered stronger than previous results
(Theorems III.3.6 and III.3.7) in this Chapter.
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DEFINITION  III .4.1. > satisfies Weak separab€Zity  if  x_ivi  >  x-iwi  4
y-ivi > Y-iwi for all x, y€X,1 l i I n, vi' wi € Ci·
The above property expresses some sort of monotonicity of > with
respect to the >i's (> cA mon, in the terminology of Chapter II , see
(III.4.1) in the sequel). It is well-known that the above property is
necessary, and under some further assumptions sufficient, for the
existence of functions 0   :  C  + IR, and a function F that is strictlyincreasing in each variable, such that x » F(01(xl)'  "' 0n(xn  
represents > . Also weak separability is implied by CI; it is in fact
the independence of equal subalternatives property, restricted to equal
subalternatives of length n-1.
DEFINITION III.4.2. > satisfies equivaZence-coordinate independence
(eq-CI) if: [x-ivi x y-ivi " x-iwi w Y-iwi] for all x, y, i, vi' wi
To   see  that  this is implied  by  CI,   let  x-ivi  0  Y-ivi *   Then
X-ivi > Y-ivi and y-ivi > x-ivi ' by twice CI we obtain x-iwi >
y-iwi   and  y-iwi  >  x-iwi   '   i.e.   x-iwi  x  y-iwi·
For the property defined below, in view of Definition II.6.3 (CI),
III.4.2 (eq-CI), and also in view of Definitions IV.2.4 (CCI) and
IV. 2.6   (eq-CCI) of Chapter  IV,   the name "equivalence-triple
cancellation", derived from "triple cancellation" (Definition III.3.5),
could have been chosen for it. We deviate slightly from literature by
formulating it for the case of two essential, instead of two,
coordinates. Also in literature the property is usually formulated in
terms of a (representing) function, instead of in terms of > .
DEFINITION III.4.3. If > has exactly two essential coordinates i, j,
then > satisfies the Re€demeister condition if (s-i,jai'xj) x
(S-i'4bi,yj) & (s-i,jci'xj) Ai ( s-i,jdi'yj) & (S-i,jai,vj) - (s-i,jbi'wj)
together imply (s-i,jci,v ) m M   .d .w.) for all s. a  b  c  d-i,J i' 1 '  i'  i'  i'  i-
Xj, yj, Vj, Wj.
Again, this is implied by triple cancellation: The first three
equivalences z, Ai , . imply < , > , > , and hence, by triple
6U
cancellation, give (s C ,V.) > (S .d.,w.), and they also imply-i,j i ] -i,] 1  ]
> , < , < ,t o give, by triple cancellation, (s-i,jci'vj) <
(s   ,d.,w.).
-i,] 1  J
LEMMA III.4.4. Let the topoZogicaL assumption III. 2.11 hoZd. Let >
be a continuous weak order. The foZLowing two statements are
equivaZent:
(i) > satisfies CI.
(ii) > satisfies weak separab€Zity and eq-CI.
PROOF. We have already seen above that (i) implies (ii). So we assume
(ii), and derive (i).
First let us show:
If  v   >  w   for  all  j,  then  v > w. (III.4.1)
This follows, by repeated application of weak separability, from v >
V-lwl > (v-twl)-2 ,2 > ((v-lwl)-2w2)-3w3 ) ' •   w
Now suppose x-ivi > y-ivi. To derive is x-iwi > Y-iwi  Let A =
{j #i:x  >  y }. Say A={1, ..., k}, andi=n; with O l k<n.
For  all  j  9  A,  not  x   >   y ,   so  z_ x   >  z- y   for  no  z,  and  x   <    y 
follows for these  j. By (III.4.1) we obtain (x-AyA) -nvn < y-nvn  <
0           1     1-1
x  v. Let x =x-nvn, X  = (x-1 yl) for all l i l l k.B y weak-n n
separability x-nvn =x >x l> ... >x k= (x-AyA) -nv . Let now l b e
1-1
such  that  x        >  y-nvn >x l.B y restricted solvability (Lemma  III.2.13)
1
there exists   zl   such   that  xllzl  Q  Y-nvn.   Now  x-lzl  has n-th coordinate
vn'   so  by   eq-CI we obtain  y-nwn  w   (xilzl) -nwn'   That  xl  >1 zl follows
from xllxl = xl-1 &* y-nvn= xllzl, Apparently (x-nwn)j  j ((xllzl)-nwn) j
for all j. By (III.4.1), (x-nwn)   (xilzl)-nwn ' the latter was
equivalent to y-nwn'
0
The implication (ii) 4 (i) above does not have to hold if the
continuity assumption does not hold. This can be seen from > , defined
as follows. First,  let  V  :  ]R3 +  IR be defined by
V : x 2 xl+x2+x)+min{xl' x2, x3 Then define x>y whenever V(x) >
V(y), or V(x) = V(y) and x 1 > Yi, or V(x) = V(y) and xl = yl and
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x2 > Y2' or x=y. Then x .y only if x=y, and eq-CI is trivially
satisfied. For every i, >i =1, and weak separability follows. But
(9,1,1) > (5,5,1) and (9,1,9) < (5,5,9) violate CI.
LEMMA III.4.5. Let the topo ZogicaZ assumption III. 2.11 hoZd. Let >
be a continuous weak order, and Zet exactZy two coordinates i, j
be essentiaZ. The foZZowing two statements are equivaZent:
(i) > satisfies   tripZe   cance ZZation.
(ii) > satisfies   weak   separab€Zity   and  the   Re€deme€ster  condition.
PROOF. The implication (i) 4 (ii) can be obtained by elementary means;
or as a corollary from Theorem III.3.6. So we assume (ii), and derive
(i). We suppress inessential coordinates from notation. Say the first
two coordinates are essential. Let now (al'x21 < (bl'92)'(cl'x2) >(dl,y-), (al'v2) > (bl'w2). To derive is (cl'v2) > (dl'w2)'
If  we  can  find  a;  >1  al'  b;  <1  bl'  c;  <1  cl'  d;  >1  di,  v:  <.  v„L           L           6
w  > 2 w2' such that (a;,x2) . (b;,Y2)' (c;,x2) Z (d;,Y2)' (a;,v ) =2
(b;,w:),   then  we may conclude  from the Reidemeister condition  thatL
(c;,v ) m (d;,w ), and, by weak separability that (cl'v2) > (c;,v ) x
(d;,w ) > (dl'w2)' which is what is desired. So all that remains is
to find a;, ..., w  as above.
First we use (al'x2) < (bl 'y2) and (cl'x2) > (dl'y2) to find
a;,  b;.   I f   (cl'x2)  >  (bl'Y2) '   then by restricted solvability (Lemma
III.2.13) from (al'x2) < (bl 'Y2) < (cl'x2) we conclude that ai must
exist  such  that   (a;,x2)  - (bl 'Y2) •  Here  a;  >1  al.  We  then take b;  = bl.The other case is (cl'x2) < (bl'y2). Then we take a; = cl if (cl'x2) >
Cal,x2)' and a; = al if (al'x2) > (cl'x2). We then, in any way, have
(dl,Y2)  <  (a;,x2)  <  (bl'y2) ' Restriced solvability gives existence  of
b; such that (b;,72) - (a;,x2)' Again here b; <lbl' also a; >1 al  So
always a;, b; are found such that a; >1 al' b; 41 bl' and (a;,x:1) RS
(b;,y2).
Analogously one uses
(dl 'y2) < (cl'x2) and (bl'y2)   (al'x2) to
find d; and c; as desired.
Analogously (exchange the role of the first and the second
coordinate), one uses (b;,w2) < (a;,v2) [since a; >1 al' bl  1 bi] and
(b;,y2) > (even .) (a;,x2) to find v  and w as desired.
0
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A straightforward consequence of the above Lemmas is the
following theorem.
THEOREM III.4.6. Let the topoZogicaZ assumption III.2.11 hoZd. For
the binary re Zation > on xi=ici, the foZZowing two statements are
equivaZent:
(i)      There   exist   continuous  additive   vaZue   functions    (v )  =1   for  >   .
(ii) > is a continuous weak order that satisfies weak separab€Zity,
eq-CI, and, in the case of exactZy two essentiaZ coordinates,
the Re€demeister condition.
The foZZowing uniqueness resuZts hoZd for (vj)j=l of (i) .
If two or more coordinates are essentia Z, then (III.4.2)
(v.)9   -   is  simuZtaneousZy  cardinaZ.
J J=l
If exactZy one coordinate is essent€aZ, then (III.4.3)
the v 's are continuousZy ordinaZ.
PROOF. By Corollary III.3.2, Theorems III.3.6, III.3.7, and the Lemmas
III.4.4 and III.4.5.
0
III.5. HISTORICAL REMARKS ON ADDITIVELY DECOMPOSABLE REPRESENTATIONS
In Blaschke and Bol (1938) the following problem of "web theory"
was studied: suppose Fl' F2' F3 are three families of curves in the
plane, such that through every point of the plane, for every family Fj,
exactly one curve from F  goes through this point. When can continuous
transformations Vl and V2 be applied to the first and second
coordinates, to transform the three families of curves into three
families of parallel straight lines7 If one now lets Fl correspond to
lines with constant first coordinate, F2 to lines with constant second
coordinate, and F3 to equivalence classes of the preference relation,
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then the matter is closely related to the problem that we addressed in
subsection III.3.2, for the case that n=2,C l= (2=R, and where >
should satisfy, for example, strong cA monotonicity.
In Blaschke and Bol (1938) conditions like the Thomsen condition
already appeared.
Debreu (1960) showed the way, with Theorem III.3.1 as a starting
point, to use the above results to obtain characterizations of
continuous additively decomposable representations for binary relations
on cartesian products of separable connected topological spaces. He
proved that coordinate independence (together with continuity,
transitivity and completeness) is the necessary and sufficient con-
dition for the case of three or more essential coordinates. By this,
Debreu also extended earlier work of Leontief (1947 a,b),who considered
Euclidean spaces, presupposing the existence of "smooth" representing
functions, and then obtained conditions requiring that rates of
substitution of pairs of coordinates be independent of other
coordinates. Results as those of Leontief had earlier been obtained
by Sono (1945, 1961), but this had not been well-known. See also
Samuelson (1947, pp. 174-180). Further already Fleming (1952; treated
in section 4.9 of Harsanyi, 1977) had obtained a derivation of additive
decomposability, on R . His main characterizing property was even
weaker than coordinate independence, it was, essentially, independence
of equal subalternatives of only length n-2, formulated in terms of a
(presupposed, representing) function, already without the use of
derivatives ;  see his Postulate E.
Gorman (1968,a,b) showed, for cartesian products of topologically
separable arcconnected  spaces, how in fact coordinate independence
can be weakened, still remaining strong enough together with the other
assumptions, to imply coordinate independence. His weakening requires
the independence of equal subalternatives condition for only certain
subsets A of I. In Vind (1971) the extendability of Gorman's Theorem
to cartesian products of separable connected (instead of arcconnected)
topological spaces is indicated. See also Gorman (1971) and Murphy (1981).
Another result can be found in Krantz et al. (1971, chapter 6).
They   use an algebraic approach, employing a theorem of H6lder    ( 19C 1)
on the possibility to embed archimedean ordered groups into the reals.
First they use reasonings such as those below Figures III.3.1 and
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III.3.2 to derive differences or concatenation - like operations on
every coordinate set Ci. Next they use this and results such as the
Theorem of H6lder to construct the additive value functions on the
coordinate sets. They ascribe their method of proof to Holman (1971).
For further history on their approach, see section 6.2.5 of their book.
In Keeney and Raiffa (1975, sections 3.4 to 3.6) one finds, for
Euclidean spaces, an appealing sketch of the main ideas of the proofs.
Another appealing proof for Euclidean spaces is provided in Koopmans
(1972). For the case of two essential coordinates, there is a proof
in Roberts (1979).
Many results on weakenings of coordinate independence for Euclidean
spaces   in the spirit of Gorman' s weakenings are given in Blackorby,
Primont and Russell (1978).
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of additively
decomposable representations, without any restrictive assumptions, have
been obtained in Jaffray (1974). For the case of finite Ci's, such
conditions have longer been known, see Scott (1964, section 1). They
can be obtained from separating hyperplane theorems, and standard ways
of application of these to the solution of systems of inequalities.
Jaffray used an Archimedean-like strengthening of Scott's conditions,





nIn this chapter we shall assume that X=C  for some connected
topological space C; so, in comparison with previous chapters, we add
the assumption that Ci = C for all i. We shall study representations
of the form x M I =tA U(x ). Our main intended application lies in
decision making under uncertainty (DMUU). Hence we shall use
terminology of DMUU in this chapter, and chapters V and VI; with the
exception of section IV.4 and part of section IV.5. For DMUU, Theorem
IV.3.3 (given in Wakker, 1984a, for C=R; and in Wakker, 1986 , for
C any connected topological space), the central result of this and
following chapters, shows for the case of a finite state space, that
a person with a continuous weak order as preference relation maximizes
subjective expected utility, if and only if his preference relation
satisfies cardinal coordinate independence (Definition IV.2.4). The
more complicated conditions for infinite state spaces are given in
Chapter V. Thus we have characterized subjective expected utility
maximization under only one restriction: continuity of the utility
function, with respect   to a connected topology    (e.g. a Euclidean
topology). Like Savage (1954) we derive probabilities and utilities
simultaneously, without supposing that any of them are known in
advance.
In section IV.4 we characterize the above representation for the
case where some of the X 's may also be negative. This result, and
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applications to the theory of economic indexes, are given in Wakker
(1985b). Here we indicate an application to dynamic contexts: a
characterization, alternative to the one in 1<oopmans  (1972) , of a
representation of the form x F+ IA U(x ).
In section IV.5 we obtain a stronger result than Theorem IV.3.3,
by restricting the involved indexes i and j in cardinal coordinate
independence. Again we apply this to the dynamic context, to
characterize a representation as in Koopmans (1972), mainly by letting
every point of time be "CCI-related" to the previous point of time, and
by letting the amount $a at a point of time, in preference equivalent
to $1 at the previous point of time, be the same for all points of time.
In section IV.6 several other ways to strengthen Theorem IV.3.3
are suggested without elaborations. One could investigate how to
combine the many ways, mentioned above, to strengthen Theorem IV.3.3.
Because of the size of this task, we do not take it up.
In section IV.7 we compare our derivation of SEU maximization to
the most well-known other derivations, available in literature.
IV.2. CARDINAL COORDINATE INDEPENDENCE
Let us first repeat the terminoly of DMUU.
TERMINOLOGY IV.2.1. We use the term (possible) state (of nature)
instead of index, and act instead of alternative. Elements of C are
called consequences, and denoted by Greek characters a, 8, y, 6;
sometimes they are also called coordinates, and denoted as xi' v , etc.
The following definition gives the most known approach to DMUU.
DEFINITION IV.2.2. We say [C , >. (P )n- . u] is a subjective expected
j j-1.
ut€Zity (SEU)   model    (for   >)    if   the   pl' s are nonnegative real numbers
that sum to one, and U:C+R i s a function, such that
Ix >y *• Ij=lpju(xj) 1 El=tp U(y )] for all acts x,y: Then p  is
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called the subjective probab€Zity for state j, u the (subjective)
utiLity  function,   and  I =lp U(x )   the  subjective  expected  ut€Zity  of
act x.
A notation, only applicable in the present context, where all
coordinate sets Ci are one same C:
NOTATIONS IV.2.3. For a € C, E € Cn is the act with all coordinates
equal to a. We write a>B i f a>B.
The act a with certainty gives consequence a. Note that, by the
above notation, the binary relation > on C  induces a binary relation
on C, also denoted by >. This notation will not cause confusion.
The remainder of this section is devoted to elucidations, and
elementary results, for the following property.
DEFINITION IV.2.4.  > satisfies card€naZ coordinate independence (CCI)
if:
X-ia  < y-iB   and   v_ a  > w_ B
and x-iY > Y-i6
imply  v_ y >  w_ 6
for all acts x, y, v, w, all consequences a, 8, y, 6, all states j,
and all essential states i.
ELUCIDATION. Replacement, in x-ia < y-28, of a,B by y,6, changes <
into  >,   to  give  x-iY  >  Y-i6. We imagine that replacement,   in
v- a > w_j B, of (a,B) by (y,6) , should thus kind of "reinforce" >,
to v_ y > w_ 6. So the replacement should certainly not induce a
reversal of preference, into v_ y < w_ 6.
Let us emphasize that the above Definition does not have a
restriction i 0 j, or i = j. If exactly two coordinates are essential,
then putting i=j essential, in Definition IV.2.4, gives triple
cancellation. The proof of Lemma IV.2.5 in the sequel may serve as
a further illustration of the meaning of CCI.
To obtain an example of a binary relation > , satisfying CCI, we
E8
let n€ N be arbitrary, C = IR++,al'...'an € :R++ ; further let>be
represented by the "Cobb-Douglas" production function  (xl '-  - 'xn)  ++n  a,
Hj=lxjl.  Then, with p  := a / =lai, j = 1,...,n; and U : p # 109 p,
> is also represented by x 5 I D U(x.). Lemma IV.2.5 will show that
j=l. j   j
indeed > satisfies CCI.
An example of a continuous weak order, satisfying CI and triple
cancellation, but violating CCI, is obtained by taking n = 2, C = ]0,1[,
and  >  represented  by   (xl'x2)  5  xl-xlx2    One may think  of the inter-
pretation where x 1 is a share of total income before tax, allocated to
a person, x2 is tax rate, and x 1-Xlx2 is the share of total income
after  tax.  Here  >  is also represented by (xl'x21  » log xl+log (1-x2)'
so by Theorem III.3.6, > is a continuous weak order satisfying CI and
1 1 2 3triple cancellation,   and the Thomsen condition.   We have (3'2-)   <   (-3-'4)'
1 1 13 11 2 2 1 1 2 1
(8'6)  >   (4'4) '   (5'3)  >  (5,3),   but   (-5,8)  <  (·5,4),   so  by  i  -1,   j   =2,
c' = .5' B = .5, Y = *, 6 = i, .2 -  F' "2 -  ' .1 . .5' .1 = 25 this gives
a violation of CCI.
Lemma IV.2.5. If an SEU modeZ [Cn, >, (p )n  , U] exists for> then
j j=1
>  satisfies   CCI.
PROOF. Suppose:
i is essential. (IV.2.1)
Then there must exist z, 0, T such that z .a > z .T, i.e.-1     -1




X-ia < y-iB and x-iY > Y-i6 (IV.2.3)
Then Ek#ipkU(xk) + Piu(Ot) 1 Ik0ipku(yk) + Piu(B) and Ek#ipkU(Xk) +
Piu(Y) 1 Ek#ipku(Yk) + Piu(6) ' Taking these together: Pi[u(a) - u(B)]
1  Ek0iPk[U(Yk)   -  U(xk)]   i  Pi[U(y)   -  U(6)].   By   (IV.2.2)   we may conclude:





Then Ik0jpku(vk) + PjU(a) 1 Ek0jpkU(wk) + PjU(B), or pj[U(a) - U(B)]
1 Ik0jpk[U(wk) - U(vk)1· By (IV.2.4) we obtain p [U(y) - U(6)] 1
Ik0jpk[U(wk) - U(vk)1' or Ik0jpkU(vk) + PjU(Y) 1 Ik0jpkU(wk) + PjU(6)
This means:
v_ y > w_ 6.
(IV.2.6)
So indeed (IV.2.1), (IV.2.3) and (IV.2.5) imply (IV.2.6), as is
required by CCI.
0
Formula (IV.2.4) is an indication that comparability of utility
differences underlies cardinal coordinate independence. The following
property is obtained from cardinal coordinate independence by replacing
< , and all >'s, by At .
DEFINITION IV.2.6. We say > satisfies equivatence-card€na Z coordinate
independence (eq-CCI) if for all acts x, y, v, w, all consequences
a,   B,   Y,   6, all states   j,   and all essential states  i,   x-ia  Al  y-iB  &
x-iy N y-16  &  v_ja N w_j B  imply v_jy w w_j6.
This property will be studied extensively in section IV.4. For
the next section, we now only need:
LEMMA IV.2.7.  CCI in;pZies eq-CCI.
PROOF. Replacing, in Definition IV.2.6, the first three equivalences
by  < , > ,   and > , shows   that,   by   CCI,   v_ y> w_ 6. Interchanging
everywhere left and right sides of the equivalences, and writing again
< , > and > instead of the equivalences, gives by CCI that
w  6>v.y.-j      -J
0
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IV.3. THE MAIN THEOREM
Let us first note that the existence of an SEU model
 Cr ,  , (P ) =1' U] for > implies the existence of additive value
functions (V ) =1 for >, by the definition V  := p U for all j. In
section III.3 we saw that CI, and triple cancellation for the case of
exactly two essential coordinates, were necessary (and sufficient)
for a continuous weak order to have additive value functions existing,
under the topological assumption III.2.11. So CCI, the property of a
continuous weak order that will be shown to be necessary and sufficient
for the existence of an SEU model, must imply CI and triple cancellation.
LEMMA  IV.3.1.  Let  w be  an  equivaZenag reZation.   Then  CCI  €mpZies  CI.
PROOF. Let x_ a > y_ a, and B € C. To derive is x_ B > y_ B. If no
coordinate is essential, then by Lemma III.2.10 indeed x .8 > y .8.
-J -J
So let i be an essential coordinate. Then, for arbitrary z, z-ia <
z-ia, z-i B > z-i B, x_ a > y_ a, and CCI imply x_ B > y_ B.
0
LEMMA   I V.3.2. Let exact Zy two coordinates be essentiaZ. Then CCI
impZies tripZe canceZZation.
PROOF. Substitute, in Definition III.3.5, x = (s a ,x.), a = a.,-i,j i  J        1
y = Cs-i,jbi'yj)' B = bi' Y = ci' 6 = di' v = (s-i,jai'vj),
w = (s . .b.,w.), and let both i and j of Definition IV.2.4 correspond
-1,J 1  J
to the i of Definition III.3.6.
0
Before we formulate the main theorem, Zet Us repeat that the
topological assumption III.2.11 entails that C is a connected
topological space which is topologically separable for the case of
exactly one essential coordinate.
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THEOREM Iv.3.3. Let the topoZogicaZ assumption III.2.11 hoZd. For the
binary reZation > on Cn, the foZZewing two statements are equivaZent:
(i)  There exists an SEU mode Z [Cn, >, (pj)  =1, u] for >, with u
continuous.
(ii) > is a continuous weak order on Cn that satisfies CCI.
The foZZowing uniqueness resuZts hoZd for u. Cp.)    of (i):
J j=1
If two or more states are essent€aZ, (IV.3.1)
then (p ) =1 is unique Zy determined; and u is eardinaZ.
If exact Zy one state i is essent€aZ, (IV.3.:)
then pi = 1, pj = 0 for aZZ j 0 i; and u ia continuousZy
ord€naZ.
If no Btate is essent€aZ, (IV.3.3)
then    (p )  =1   can be taken arbitrari Zy,    as    Zong   as
pj 2-0 for aZZ j, Ep =l: u can be any constant function.
PROOF.  For  (i) 4 (ii), suppose  (i) . Then the function, assigning to
every act x its expected utility Ip.U(x.), is continuous, and
J     ]
represents >. So certainly > is a weak order. For every y,
{x : x > y} = {x : Ep U(x ) 1 Ip U(y )} is closed; so is {x : x< y}.
Consequently > is continuous. By Lemma IV.2.5 > satisfies CCI. So
(ii) follows.
Next, let (ii) hold. We derive (i), and the uniqueness results.
First the case of no essential i. Then by Lemma III.2.10, > is trivial.
We  can   let   (p )  =t be completely arbitrary,   as   long  as   they  are
nonnegative and sum to one. Further we can let U be any constant
function. Also, U must be constant, U(a) > U(B) would imply a > B.
So for the case of no essential state, (i) and the uniqueness result
(IV.3.3) hold.
Next  the  case of exactly one essential i.B y Corollary  III.3.2
there exist continuous additive value functions (V ) =t for >. From
x-ka > x-kB *• Vk(a) > Vk(B) we see that Vi must be nonconstant, and
that Vk is constant for all k 0 i. By the uniqueness result of
Corollary III.3.2, for PiU, hence for U, of (i), there must exist a
continuous strictly increasing transformation $ such that U = 00 Vi· So
U  must be nonconstant. For every  k  0   i,   P]CU  must be constant,   so  Pk
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must be zero. Consequently Pi= 1. Further, any continuous strictly
increasing transformation U of Vi ' together with Pi = 1, Pk
= 0 for
all k 0 i, gives additive value functions
(PkU)k=t
for >, so makes
(i) valid. So for the case of exactly one essential coordinate, (i)
and the uniqueness result (IV.3.2) are verified.
Finally, the case of two or more essential states. First we show:
There exist continuous simultaneously (IV.3.4)
n
cardinal additive value functions (V ). for >-
j J=1
For the case of two essential coordinates, this follows from
Lemma IV.3.2 (giving triple cancellation for >) and then from Theorem
III.3.6. For the case of three or more essential coordinates, it
follows from Lemma IV.3.1 (giving CI for >) and then from Theorem
III.3.7. Now Zet i be essentiaZ. We next show:
For all j : V. = 4. 0 V., for a continuous (IV.3.5)JJl
nondecreasing 0,.
J
Suppose Vi(a) 1 Vi(B) . Then, for arbitrary x, v, x-iB < x-iB,
X-ia > x-iB, v_j B > v_j B, and CCI imply v_ a > v_j B. So Vj(01) 1 vj(B) .
Now (IV.3.5) follows from Lemma VIII.4.
Our following step is to show:
Every 4. is affine. (IV.3.6)
]
If j is inessential, then V. is constant, and affinity of $.
J J
follows. Of course, if j = i, then $  is identity, so affine too.
So let j 0 i, j essential. V, and V, are not constant, so the1        J
connected Vi(C) [respectively V (C)] must contain an interval with
length Oi >0 I respectively 6  > 0]. Let now Vi(a) € int(Vi(C)) be
arbitrary. Since 0. is continuous, there exists E>O s o small that:
J
E i Sj; W := ]Vi(a)-E, Vi.(a)+E[ C Vi(C); and
*j(Vi(a)+E) - 0j(Vi(a)-E) 1 6i'
Now let a<T€W. There exist B, y, 6€C such that:
v. (B) = c, Vi(6) = r, vi(Y) = (C+T)/2.1
We can take a ,b  € C such that:
V (b ) - V (a.) = V. (B) - Vi(Y) = Vi(Y) - Vi(6) 1 E i tj'3 1
And we can take ci' di such that:
Vi(di) - Vi(ci) = Vj(B) - Vj(y) 1 6i*
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All these choices lead, for arbitrary fixed s € Cn, to:
(S-i'j B,a j) w (s-i'jY'bj) & (s_i,jci,B) su (s_i,jdi,Y) (IV.3.7)
& (S .y,a.) R, (s 6 b)
-i,] 1 -i,j ' j
as follows from substitution of
(Vk)k=l Equivalence-CCI (Definition IV.
2.6) with s_ a  in the role of x,s_ b  in the role of y, (B,y,y,6) in
the role of (a,B,y,6), s-ici in the role of v, and s-idi in the role
of w, gives (S-i'jci,Y)=(s-i,jdi'6) . This implies Vj(y) - Vj(6) =
V. (di) - V. (ci)· We have chosen d. and ci to have the latter equal1           1                             1
to V.(B) - V (y). So V.(B) - V.(y) = v,(y) - v (6) has been derived.J j J J J j
This means: 0 (a) - 0.((0+T)/2) = 0.((0+T)/2) - 0.(T), or:
$j((a+T)/2) = [$j(c) + 0 (t)]/2. By Corollary VIII.3, with v for
Vi(a),p=  , affinity of $ follows:  (IV.3.6) is demonstrated.
So   now  we have nonnegative    (a ) ;= 1,   and   real    (·[ .) I          ,    such   thatJ J=1
V. = T.+C,Vi for all j. We can now define:J       J J
U := Vi; pj := aj/(Ik=lak) for all j. (IV.3.8)
(Note that ai = 1, so Eak > 0·) Because of simultaneous cardinality,
this gives additive value functions   (p U)  =1   for  >.   Thus (i) follows.
For the uniqueness result (IV. 3.1), let [Cn, >, (p:): ., U'] be
J J=l
another SEU model. Then (p;U') j=l are additive value functions for >
too.By simultaneous cardinality,    (T ) =1   and a>0 exist   such   that
p U'= ap U + T  for all j, i.e., with a arbitrarily fixed:
p [u'(B)-U'(a)] = ap [u(B)-u(a)] for all B. (IV.3.9)
Since U is not constant, we can take B such that U(B) 0 U(a). Then
pj = pi . [u, (B) - U'(a)] / (a.[U(B) - u(a)]) for all j. Since
Ip  = Ip  , p  = pi for all j follows. For p  > 0, (IV.3.9) now shows
that [U'(B)- u'(a)] = a[U(B) - u(a)]. Hence u'(·) = a[U(·)-u(a)]+u' (a)
must hold: U' is derived from U by multiplication with a positive c,
and addition of U'(a) - CU(a), as (IV.3.1) requires it.




IV.4. EQUIVALENCE-CARDINAL COORDINATE INDEPENDENCE
In this section we give a characterization of the representation
x » I =lA U(x ) with some A 's possibly negative. Our characterization
is an alternative for the one in Krantz et al. (1971, Theorem 6.15).
Our eq-CCI is stronger than their "standard-sequence-invariance". BY
this, we only have to add weak separability, instead of the stronger
coordinate independence; and we do not have to treat the case of two
essential coordinates separately.
For DMUU, this representation as such has little interest, since
negative X 's are not suited to be interpreted as probabilities. For
other contexts it may be desirable to allow negativity of some X 's,
see Wakker (1985b). The interest of this representation for DMUU lies
in the possibility to apply it in special contexts where the preference
relation has further properties (such as monotonicity) that imply the
X 's, mentioned above, to be nonnegative after all. We then obtain,
for these special contexts, a characterization of SEU-maximization by
means of weaker properties than in the previous section. See Corollary
IV.4.4.c.
The main property used to derive the desired representation is
eq-CCI.
LEMMA IV.4.1. Let w be an equivaZence retation. Then eq-CCI impZ€es
eq-CI.
PROOF. As in Lemma IV.3.1, with all preferences replaced by
equivalences.
0
LEMMA IV.4.2. Eq-CCI impZies the Reideme€ster condition.
PROOF. With the same substitution as in Lemma IV.3.2.
0
The main theorem of this section:
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THEOREM IV.4.3. Let the topoZogicaZ assumption III. 2.11 hoZd. For the
binary reZation > on Cn, the foZZowing two statements are equivatent:
(i)  There exist reaZ A , j= 1,...,n, and a continuous U:C+ IR,Buch
that x H E =tx U(xj) represents >.
(ii) > is a continuousLy weak Zy separabZe weak order that satisfies
eq-CCI.
The  foZZowing  uniqueness  resuZts  hoZd  for u,   j j=l of (i):
If two or more coordinates are essentia Z, (IV.4.2)
((A.) n     . .u)     can be repZaced by (( l'j) =1,W), if andJ J=l
on Zy if reaZ v, a, T exist with vo > 0, such that
uj = VAj for aZZ j and w = T+Qu.
If exactZy one coordinate is eBsentiaZ, then (IV.4.3)
((x )n  ,u) can be repLaced by ((pj)1=i,w), if andj j=1
on Zy if positive v and continuous atI€et Zy increasing
0,    or  negative   v   and  continuous,    strictZy   decreasing   0,
exist such that Uj = vAj for aZZ j and w = tou.
If no coordinate is essentiaZ, then aZZ A '8 are 0, (IV.4.4)
or U is constant.
PROOF.  (i) 4 (ii)  is, as usual, straightforward, so we assume  (ii),
and derive (i) and the uniqueness results. The case of no essential
coordinate is direct. If exactly one coordinate i is essential, then
X  = 0 for all j 0 i, and everything follows from Corollary III.3.2.
In the sequel we shall assume:
Two or more coordinates are essential. (IV.4.5)
There now exist simultaneously cardinal additive value functions
(Vj) =1 for >, by Le=na IV.4.1, IV.4.2, and Theorem III.4.6. As usual,
we suppress inessential coordinates j from notation, they get assigned
X. =0.S o all (remaining) coordinates are essential,   and  the  V. 's
J                                                                                              J
are nonconstant. If now, for any i, Vi(a) = Vi(B), then, for any
j,x,by eq-CCI,{x .a Aix ,a & xia ex .B & x .a ex .a} imply-1     -1 - -1     -]     -J
x_ a w x_ B, i.e. V (a) = V (B). This means that for any i, j,
Vi = 4ij o Vj for 0ij : V (C) + Vi(C). Here ti  is the inverse of
0ji, so all 0   are bijective. By Corollary VIII.10 they areij
/6
continuous. The derivation that they are affine, by Lemma VIII.8, is
completely analogous to the derivation of (IV.3.6).
We can, for arbitrary a € C, set V (a) = 0 for all j; existence
of (Aj) =1 such that V  = A Vt for all j, follows. Take U := Vl. The
uniqueness result (IV.4.2) follows from the simultaneous cardinality
of the additive value functions.
0
Below we make some observations that follow straightforwardly
from substitution in (i) above. First note that, in the above theorem,
we can always arrange I =txj 10; if EX  < 0 we replace ((A ) =1'U)
by ((-A ) =t'-U) . We then havea > 8 - U(a) > U(B). The assumption
in the beginning of the following Corollary IV.4.4 serves to avoid
uninteresting cases such as triviality of >, or negativity of
5-1'j which would make U some kind of "anti-utility" (or "loss")
function. The following corollary shows that the above theorem can be
used to characterize several representations, studied in literature,
which in  fact are special forms  of (i) above.  This  is  done  by  the
addition of, usually weak, conditions to (ii) above.
COROLLARY IV.4.4. Let (i) of Theorem IV. 4.3 hoZd. Assume that a,B € C
exist with 0>8. and Zet u(a) > u(B). Then we have, for every j:
(a)  A  >o i f and onTy if there exist 9>3 and x such that
x_17 > x_ 6.
(b)   Aj l o if and onZy if there exist 9>3 and x such that
x .y > x ,6.
-1     -]
Furthermore,
(c) There exist8 an SEU-mode Z for > if and on ZY if x .a > x_j B-J
for azz x.j.
0
The characterization of subjective expected utility maximization,
obtainable from (c) above and Theorem IV.4.3.(ii), is preferable to
the one in Theorem IV.3.3 in the sense that all conditions used here
follow straightforwardly from those in (ii) of Theorem IV.3.3, whereas
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the converse derivation is not elementary since it essentially needs
continuity, see the text after Lemma III.4.4.
Characterizations of > on (2 by (xl'x2) '+ U(xl)-U(x2) ' with >
interpreted as strength of preference re Zation [ i . e . (x l 'x 2) , (Yl 'Y2) i
x1
is preferred to x2 more strongly than yt to Y2] have received much
attention, and have often been discussed, in literature, see Frisch
(1926), Lange (1934), Alt (1936), Scott and Suppes (1958), Debreu
(1958), Suppes and Zinnes (1963), Fishburn (1970, Chapter 6), Krantz
et al. (1971, Chapter 4), Shapley (1975), and Fuhrken and Richter
(1985).
A new characterization of the above representation can be obtained
as a corollary of Theorem IV.4.3:
COROLLARY IV.4.5. Let n = 2. Let (i) in Theorem  IV. 4.3  hoZd.   We  can
obtain Al = 1, 12 = -1, if and onZy if one of the foZZowing hoZds:
(a) (a,B) > (Y,6) 4 (6,y) > (B,a) for aZZ a, B, y, 6.
(b) (a,B) > (B,y) - CY,B) > (B,a) for aZZ a, B, y.
(c)  a w B for azz a. B.
(d)  If there exist a, B, y such that (a.y) > (B,y), then there a Zso
exist   such   a,    B,   y with furthermore R x B.
0
Finally, in dynamic contexts (see Example II.1.4) representations
of the form (xl'...'x )1+ I  .11U(x.), with 0<A l l, have receivedn     ]=1     J
attention. There  X is interpreted  as a discount factor. A well-known
 N
characterization, for the case of an infinite cartesian product C
by means of a "stationarity assumption", has been obtained by Koopmans
(1972). We can characterize, for our finite cartesian product (so only
finitely many points of time) the analogous representation.
COROLLARY IV.4.6. Let (i) in Theorem IV. 4.3 hotd. There exists
0 < A < 1 such that we can take A  = x1 for aZZ j, if and onZy if >
is tr€Via Z or it satisfies a weak stationarity assumption. i.e. there
exist x, a>B>Y such that x-i,i+lB,y Ri X_i,i+1 Y'a for aZZ O s i<n.
0
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The weak stationarity assumption above is weaker than the one
used by  Koopmans (1972), mainly because we only have "there exist
x, R, 8, 9,...", whereas Koopmans' stationarity assumption requires
analogous things "for all ... ." Of course, this weakening is possible
only  because  in   (ii) in Theorem  IV.4.3 we require properties  for  >,
far stronger than those which Koopmans uses next to his stationarity
assumption.
IV.5. CCI-RELATED EVENTS
In this section we consider relaxations of cardinal coordinate
independence that moderate  the   "for  all   i,j"  part   in the def
inition
(IV.2.4) of cardinal coordinate independence. This weakening will be
used to strengthen Theorem IV.3.3. The next definition will also be
of use in Chapter V. First we introduce a notation in the spirit of
Notation II.2.4; see also (II.2.1).
NOTATION IV.5.1. For A c I, x € X, a € C, x-Aa denotes (x with xi
replaced by a, for all i € A).
With this we can define:
DEFINITION IV.5.2. Let A, B C I. We say A is CCI-re Zated to B if for
all x, y, v, w, a, 8, 7,6 : x-Ba < y-BB & x-BY   y-86 & v-Aa > w-AB
imply v-AY > w-AB.
The binary relation, introduced on the set of events by the above
definition, usually is not symmetric or transitive or reflexive. With,
as usual, i instead of {i}, every nonessential i is CCI-related to
every essential j, and a coordinate j is CCI-related to a nonessential
i if and only if j itself is nonessential, as one can see. CCI holds
if and only if every j is CCI-related to every essential i.
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LEMMA IV.5.3. Let > be refzexive.    Let   i be CCI-re Zated  to   some   j .   Then
IX-ia > y-ia *0 x-iB > y-iB] for aZZ x, y, a, B.
PROOF. z .a < z .a & z_ B > z_ B & x_ a > Y-:i.a must imply x-i.B > Y-i.B.-J   -J
0
THEOREM Iv.5.4. Let the topological assumption III.2.11 hold. Let
n  1 3,  and  Zet  aZZ  coordinates  be  essent€aZ.  For  the  binary  reZation
> on Cn, the foZZowing two statements are equivaZent:
(i)  There exists an SEU modeZ [Cn, >,  (pj) =1, u] for >. with u
continuous.
(ii) > is a continuous weak order on C , every i , 2 is CCI-reZated
to i-1, and 1 is CCI-re Zated to itsetf or some other j.
PROOF. CI follows from Lemma IV.5.3. By Theorem III .3.7, additive
value functions
(V1)1=1
exists for >. To show that V is an affinei+1
nondecreasing transformation of V,, for i = 1,...,n-1, is exactly as1
the derivation of (IV.3.5) and (IV.3.6) (take j = i+1 there). We can
give all Vi's a common zero. Vi = wivi-1 for some Wi 2 0, follows for
all i 1 2, i.e. Vi = Aivl' for some Xi 1 0 follows, for all i 1 1.
By essentially of all coordinates, Xi > 0 for all i. We take U = Vl'
p. = A,/(En  A ) for all j.
1    1   1=1 i
0
The above theorem  also  can be derived  for  n  =  2,  but  then  a  more
complicated proof is needed. The main complication is that only a weak
version of triple cancellation can be derived, so that the additive value
functions cannot be obtained directly from Theorem III.3.6. Further
the assumption of essentiality of all coordinates can be omitted, if
in (ii) we require the first essential coordinate to be CCI-related
to some other essential coordinate, and every other essential coordinate
to the preceding essential coordinate. Also in (ii) above we could
have assumed that every coordinate was CCI-related to coordinate 1,
or that, for an appropriately chosen sequence of subsets (Al'...'Al)
of I, A +1 is CCI-related to A  for all k < 1-1. We do not elaborate
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these matters.
Let us formulate a corollary of Theorem IV.5.4 that gives another
characterization of the representation of Koopmans (1972), adapted to
our finite cartesian product. Our main requirement is that every
coordinate (point of time) is CCI-related to the previous coordinate
(point of time), and that the consequence a (say amount of dollars) on
some point of time, equivalent to one dollar on the previous po
int of
time, is independent of that point of time.
COROLLARY IV.5.5. Let n 1 3. Let >· be a binary reZation on R ,  that
is strongZy eA monotonic (i.e.  x>y i f x j Z.yj for aZZ j and xj >y j
for   some   j) .   The   foZZowing   two   statements   are   equivaZent:




(ii)  > is a continuous weak order, every  i 1 2  is  CCI-reZated to  i-1,
1 i s   CCI-re Zated  to   some   i    (e.g..i=1,ori=   n),   and  a l l
exists such that (8-il) 0 (5 a) for aZZ i 1 n-1.-(i+1)
PROOF. (i) 4 (ii) is straightforward. Let (ii) hold. All condition
s in
(ii) of Theorem IV.5.4 hold, so a representation x » Ip .U (x .)
exists
1     j
for >. By strong cA monotonicity, positivity of the p 's and strict
increasingness of U can be arranged. Now A = [U(1)] / U(a) is chos
en.
0
IV.6. FURTHER WAYS TO RESTRICT CARDINAL COORDINATE INDEPENDENCE
In this section we briefly suggest further ways to strengthen
Theorem IV.3.3, by weakening the cardinal coordinate independence
property in (ii) of Theorem IV.3.3. A first way may be to require
cardinal coordinate independence only "locally", i.e. only to require
that for every x€X there exists an open neighbourhood of x, such
that cardinal coordinate independence holds in this neighbourhood. The
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main problem then seems to be, to strengthen the results on additive
decomposable representations of Chapter III by considering the local
versions of the involved characterizing properties. That this may be
possible, has been mentioned in Debreu (1960, page 17, lines 2-4).
First one uses the local properties to obtain local additively
decomposable representations. Next these local representations must
be made to fit together to give a global representation. This however
seems to be a complicated operation (compare subsection VI.7.3) and
additional requirements as local connectedness of C are maybe needed
here. (Debreu, 1960, considered Euclidean spaces). Finally,
proportionality of the additive value functions is obtained by using
the local cardinal coordinate independence property for the certain
acts a.
A second way to weaken cardinal coordinate independence is by
weakening   the  part   "for all a,B,Y,6" .I t   i s for instance sufficient
to require it for only one a. This does not complicate the proof of
coordinate independence, so, for more or less than two essential
coordinates, additive value functions must exist. For two essential
coordinates matters are slightly more complicated because triple
cancellation (Definition III.3.5) then no longer directly follows.
Once additive value functions have been obtained, the derivation of
proportionality of them is as in Theorem IV.3.3. Analogously one may
restrict the B's, or y's, or 6's, in Definition IV.2.4. Whether it
is sufficient to require Definition IV.2.4 for only those a, B, y, 6,
for which B = y, or a = 6, is an open question. In such a case no
readily available results on additive decomposability are present
in literature.
A third way to weaken cardinal coordinate independence is to
restrict the involved x, y, v, w. Maybe it is sufficient to require
matters for only a dense subset of X.
Also the question has been considered whether it is sufficient
to require cardinal coordinate independence on every two dimensional
subspace (obtained by keeping all but two coordinates fixed). The
following example, communicated to the author by A. Tversky in 1985,
shows that this does not work: Let C= IR , n = 3. Let > be++




fixed, > is represented by x ,+ 109(xl+x:3) + 109(x2+x3)' so
satisfies CCI. But > has no additive value functions, since (1,7,1) Rs
(3,3,1)   and  (1,7,2)  > (3,3,2) violate coordinate independence.
Requiring cardinal coordinate independence for every three - or more
dimensional subspace, seems to be sufficient.
IV.7. COMPARISON OF OUR RESULT TO OTHER DERIVATIONS OF SUBJECTIVE
EXPECTED UTILITY MAXIMIZATION
A really satisfactory characterization, with appealing conditions
that are both necessary and sufficient, for subjective expected
utility (SEU) maximization in the context of DMUU (with "unknown"
probabilities) is not yet available in literature. Shapiro (1979),
Richter and Shapiro (1978), and Richter (1975), indicate how difficult
this may be. SEU provides however the most used (and criticized)
approach in DMUU. Hence derivations (giving sufficient conditions)
are useful.
The best known derivation of SEU maximization, like ours not
presupposing any probabilities or utilities, is the one given in
Savage (1954). Savage's assumption P3 allows the derivation of a
"qualitative probability relation" ("more probable   than")   on  the   set
of events, from the preference relation on the set of acts. Mainly
Savage's assumption P4 (the "sure-thing principle") guarantees
"additivity" (condition  2,  at  the  top  of  page  32)   of this qualitative
probability relation. The main restrictive assumption in Savage's
approach is P6, some sort of continuity condition, requiring structure
for the state space. For example this must be infinite, though not
necessarily uncountable, contrary to what is sometimes thought. The
major step in the proof of Savage is to use this qualitative
probability relation, and the structure on the state space, to derive
the probability measure. (Wakker (1981) pointed out some misunder-
standings in literature about this part of Savage's work.) Once the
probability measure has been obtained, the utility function is derived
analogously as this was done in von Neumann and M6rgenstern (1947,
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1953, Chapter 3 and Appendix). For the consequence space Savage
hardly needs restrictions. Mainly must the utility function be bounded.
(This was discovered after publication of Savage (1954), see Fishburn
(1970, section 14.1).)
In economic contexts the consequence space is usually assumed to
mbe  endowed with topological structure; for example  it  is  IR . Hence+
in economic contexts derivations of SEU maximization, employing thls
structure, such as our Theorem IV.3.3, and Theorem V.6.1 in the sequel,
may be valuable. Note that we did not use a qualitative probability
relation as intermediate in the derivation of the probability measure.
Our probabilities resulted from the "scale parameters "  c ,  in the proof
J
of Theorem IV.3.3, (see (IV.3.8)); they are proportional to the scales
of the additive value functions (V ) =1 there.
Another derivation of the same representation as ours, in terms
of  a  derived "mean groupoid operation"  on the consequence space,   is
given in Grodal (1978).
An early derivation of SEU maximization has been given in de
Finetti (1931; see also 1937, 1972, 1974). De Finetti assumed that
consequences were real numbers (amounts of money) . His "coherence
condition" requires the impossibility of a "Dutch book" to be made
against the decision maker, i.e. no positive linear combination of
bets, favourable in the view of the decision maker, should result in
a bet, giving with certainty a negative yield. This entails linearity
of the utility function. A major advantage of de Finetti's approach
above most others (including Savage's and ours) is that it gives useful
results for preference relations that are not complete.
Other approaches assumed consequences to be lotteries, or more
generally elements of a mixture space (see Definition VII.2.1). See
Anscombe and Aumann (1963), Fishburn (1982). Also Ramsey (1931) can
be placed in this group, if his "neutral event" is considered as a
1      1
2   -2- lottery. These approaches used linear (affine; von Neumann   -
Morgenstern) utility. The involved mathematics is in fact quite similar
to those of de Finetti. Compared to these, our Theorem IV.3.3 no longer
needs lotteries on the consequence space, or linearity of the utility
function.
Extensive surveys on expected utility are provided in Fishburn




FOR ARBITRARY STATE SPACES
V. 1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we extend the characterization of continuous
subjective expected utility maximization, given only for finite state
spaces in Theorem IV.3.3, to arbitrary state spaces. This is the only
chapter where the index (= state) set I is not assumed finite. We
shall only consider acts which are in some sense bounded. In this way
we avoid the main complication for infinite state spaces: how to
handle acts with infinite, or even undefined, expected utility. In
our apprach the utility function itself is not necessarily bounded,
this contrary to Savage's approach.
The present chapter closely follows Wakker (1984c). We slightly
generalize the latter work by leaving out the condition that D, the
algebra on the consequence space C that we shall introduce in the
sequel, should contain all one-point subsets of C. This we achieve
by a small variation in the definition of "simple" acts. In this
chapter terminology will be as in decision making under uncertainty,
the primarily intended field of application of our present work.
The strategy in this chapter is to first, as much as possible,
assume properties and derive results for > on the "simple" acts,
which have finite range. The results then are extended to acts with




Acts, consequences, and states of nature, are as in Example
II.1.1 (DMUU; see also Terminology IV.2.1). To stay close to
probability theory we generalize our set-up by introducing measure-
theoretic structure. We assume  that an aZgebra   A  on  I is given,   i.e.
I
A c 2  contains 0, is closed with respect to finite union and
complement taking; hence contains I, and is closed with respect to
finite intersection taking. Elements A,B of A are called events. Also
an algebra D on C is given, with generic  elements E,F.
As an example, A may contain all subsets of I. Then all measure-
theoretic requirements, made in the sequel, are satisfied, and can be
ignored. This shows that the introduction of measure-theoretic
structure really is a generalization.
By F we denote the set of acts x that are (D- A-)measurabZe, i.e.
for every E E D, {i€I:x i€E} €A.I f A,2 I, then F= CI.
we say > is a weak order on a subset F' of X, if the restriction
of > to F', as binary relation on F', is a weak order. Then, in the
same  way,  0  is an equivalence relation  on   F' .
Throughout this chapter a partition   P  = (Aj)j=l will, without
further mention, be assumed to consist only of events. We then write
Ij=lajlA  for
the act,
assigning consequence a  to every i € A ,
j - 1,...,m, and call such an act simpZe. Simple acts are elements
of F. The notation for simple acts is just a suggestive notation; it
does not designate any addition or scalar multiplication operation.
Fs denotes {x €F:x i s simple}.
By Fb we denote {x €F: 11,v €C exist such that xi >U and
v      for all i}. Its elements are
called strongZy bounded. If > is
a weak order on F, then FS c P. Note that, if I = N, C = ]0,1],
x. = 1/i for all i, then x is bounded in the usual sense, but not1
strongly bounded. Also note that, for any a€C,x€F [respectively
Fs; or F ], and A € A, x-Aa (Notation IV.5.1) is an element of F
[respectively FS;  or P if > is a weak order on Fb].
Next we adapt a definition, given earlier for finite I, to the
present situation.
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DEFINITION V.2.1.A n event A i s simpZe-inessentiaZ,or  8-inessentiaZ
(with respect  to  >)   if  x w  y  for  all  x,y  €  FS for
which  xi  =  Yi  for
every i € Ac. Otherwise A is simp Ze-essent€aZ (or 8-essent€a Z) (with
respect to >).
The following assumption will be used throughout this chapter.
I
For finite I (with A=2)i t comes down to the topological assumption
III.2.11. It adds to this some measure-theoretic structure.
ASSUMPTION V.2.2. C is a connected topological space. D contains all
open subsets of C. If I is s-essential, and no two disjoint s-essential
events exist, then C is topologically separable.
The case where no two disjoint s-essential events exist, will be
treated in Lemma V.3.1. This case can be interpreted to be the case
of certainty. Of course D also contains all closed subsets of C. A
further adaptation of an earlier definition to the present situation:
DEFINITION  V. 2.3. >i s simpZe-continuous,   or  8-continuous   if,   for  any
partition (A )m   and any act x = E 8.1 we have closedness of
j j=1
< Wl'  *,am) € Cm : Ej=lajlA. > x} and {(a ....,am) € Cm: Ij=lajlA < x 
with respect to the product  opology on Cm.
One may formulate s-continuity as: the binary relation >' on C 1,
defined by (al'*,''am)   (81 '...., Bm) if d a.1  >E:  8 1  .i s continuousJ=l J Aj  j=l j Aj
with respect to the product topology on Cm. The assumption of this
"finite-dimensional" continuity is not unusually strong since a finite-
dimensional product topology is not coarser than other usual topo-
logies. If C is a metric (for example Euclidean) space, then the finite-
dimensional product topology is equal to the sup-metric topology (for
example to the usual Euclidean topology). Koopmans (1972) uses a sup-
metric topology on a denumerable cartesian product.
The main topological complications occur for infinite dimensions.
Then the product topology is coarser than other usual topologies, and
continuity with respect to this is then too strong for our purposes.
It would imply countable additivity of the probability measure P,
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to be derived in the sequel, and would quickly lead to boundedness of
the utility function U, to be derived in the sequel, if > is not
restricted to an appropriately chosen subset of X. In section V.4 we
shall deal with infinite-dimensional aspects. For that we use:
IDEFINITION V.2.4. > is constant-continuous on F' c C  if
{a€C:a>x}and {a€C:a<x}are closed for all x€ F'.
Again, as s-continuity, this continuity is implied by the sup-
metric continuity assumption of Koopmans (1972), also by continuity
I
of > with respect to the producttopology on C . In fact the only
consequence of it, that we shall use, is that there exists, for every
x  which  has  a  >  x  >  B   for  some  a,B  €  C, a "certainty equivalent"  y  Rl  X.
The main tool in this chapter for the characterization of
subjective expected utility maximization is the following adaptation
of the CCI-relatedness property:
DEFINITION V.2.5. Event A is simpZe-cardinaZ coordinate independent
related, or 8-CCI-related, to event B, if for all a, B, y, 6 € C, and
all x, y, v, w E FS : x-Ba < y-BB & x-BY   y-86 & v-Aa & w-AB imply
v-AY > w-AO.
For finite I every act is simple, and Definitions V.2.1, V.2.3,
and V.2.5, without "s- ", coincide with the old ones; under the, for
finite I usual, assumption that A = 2 I.
V.3. RESULTS FOR SIMPLE ACTS
First we handle the "degenerate" case where one state,  or  an
"ultrafilter" of states (see (V.3.4)) is "certainly true".
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LEMMA V.3.1. Let there not exist two disjoint 8-essentiaZ events.
Under Assumption V.:.2 the foZZowing two statements are equivaZent:
C i)      There   exists   a  finite Zy   additive   probab€Zity   measure   p  on   A,   and
a continuous U:C+ IR, such that Ej=lajlA. > Ik=lsklB **
I -lp(Aj)U(aj) 1 Ekt=lp(Bk)U(Bk) for aZZ al':..,Bt.     k
(ii) > is an 8-continuous weak order on Fs.
Furthermore, if (i) holds, then every event is 8-CCI-reZated to every
8-essentiaZ event.
The foZZowing uniqueness resuZts hoZd for u. p of (i):
If > is not triviaZ on FS, then p(A) = 1 for aZZ (V. 3.1)
8-eseentiaZ A, P(A) = 0 for aZZ 8-ineaaentiaZ A,
and u is continuousZy ordinaZ.
If > is triviaZ on FS, then u must be constant, (V. 3.2)
and P is arbitrary.
PROOF.  (i) 4 (ii) is straightforward. So we suppose (ii), and derive
(i), and the results below (ii).
There exists no s-essential event  iff x w y  for all x,y C Fs,
i.e. > is trivial on FS. In this case all of (V.3.2), and (i), follow.
So from now on we assume:
There exists an s-essential event. (V.3.3)
To derive P, we show:
The collection of all s-essential events is an (V.3.4)
uZtraf€Zter, i.e.
(a) I is s-essential.
(b) Event A is s-essential iff A
C
is s-inessential.
(C) If events A and B are s-essential, then so is An B.
Were I s-inessential, then > would be trivial on FS, contra-
dicting (V.3.3). So (a) above follows. Were, for an event A, both A
and AC s-inessential,   then  x  w  X.y      x y would follow  for  all
A Ac sx,y € FS, and > would be trivial on F . This cannot hold, and (b) now
follows from the assumption that no two disjoint s-essential events
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can exist.
If events A and B are s-inessential, then so is A U B, since for
all x,y € FS with x = y we have x x X cyA 0 y. This and
AcABc Ac ABC                     A
(b) imply (c).
We define P(A) = 1 for all s-essential events A, and P(A) = 0
for all s-inessential events A. One easily checks that this gives a
finitely additive probability measure P.
Let U represent > on C, as defined in Notation IV.2.3. By Theorem
III.3.1 such an U indeed exists, and is continuously ordinal.
(i) is demonstrated if we show that:
s tx=I j=lajlAj > Ek=lBklB =  Y  **  I s.P(A, )U(a   )    >k J=1   J    j  _
Ikt=lp(Bk)U(Bk) ' (V.3.5)
Of the mutually disjoint (A  n Bk)1=l,k=l
exactly one is
s-essential, say Al fl Bl. Then x w al' y R, 81' P(Al) =1= P(Bl)' and
(V.3.5) follows.
Now (V.3.1) follows from the observation that a U as in (i) must
represent > on C, and that P as in (i) must assign probability 0 to
every s-inessential event, thus 1 to every s-essential event.
The "furthermore-statement" in the lemma is by simple substitution
in (i).
0
The next lemma shows how, on a "finite-dimensional" subspace of
the form {x €C I:x= I =ta lA,6, for a fixed partition (Al'...'Am '
the results for finite cartesiaA products can be applied.
LEMMA V.3.2. Let Assumption V. 2.2 hojd. Let > be an s-continuous weak
order on FS. Let every event be 8-CCI-re Zated to every 8-essentiaZ
event.  Let  Pl  =  (Al'...'As)  be  a partition with  at  Zeast  two
8-essentiaZ  events. Then there exist  nonnegative   (pl) ;=1,  summing  to   1,
and a continuous ul :C+ ]R, such that:
I =la jlAj > E;=18 jlAj ** I =lp Ul (a j)3.I;=lp ul (Bj) .
The   pl's   are   unique Zy   determined,   and  ul   is   cardinaZ.
91
PROOF. Define >'  on Cs by (a.)s   >' (B.)s   if Is  a.1   >Is  B.1
J J=1 J J=l ]=l J Aj    J=l j Aj




Next we show that for two finite partitions P  and P , each with
at least two s-essential events, the representations resulting from
the previous Lemma, "fit together",   i.e. the utility functions  can  be
taken the same and events occurring in both partitions, have the same
probability in each representation. This we do by comparing Pl and P2
3                   1               2
to a partition P , finer than P  and than P , and by showing that the
2representations  of  Pl  and  P "fit together"  with  that  of  P.3.
LEMMA   V.3.3. Let, under the assumptions  and  notations   of  Lemma   V.3.2,
1,2  =  (Bl ....'Bt)  be  another partition  with  at  Zeast  two  8-essent€a Z
9t
e ents. Let appZ€cation of Lemma V. 3.2 to 1'2 give (p ) =1 and u2. Then
u  =0 0 U l for a positive affine 0, and if Ai =B j for some i,j, then
«%««  pl  -  pi ··
PROOF. Define   P3   : =   ( ( (A,   n  B   )t     )s ) First  we   show  that  P3  must
J    k k=1 j=1
have two or more s-essential events. Say Al and A2 are s-essential.
Now s-inessentiality of all At A Bk' k = 1,...,s, would imply, by a
reasoning as used to derive (V.3.4.c), s-inessentiality of At. So of
the Al n Bk's, at least one is s-essential. Analogously of the
A2 n Bk's at least one is s-essential.31
So we can apply Lemma V.3.2 to P instead of P , yielding
( (pjk) =1) =1 and U 3. Now, defining p  := Ek=lpjk for all j, and
U := U3, we obtain an array (p ) =1 and a U, that satisfy all require-
l n        1
ments for (p ) =1 and U in Lemma V.3.2. The uniqueness results of
1                               113that Lemma imply p. =p. for all j, and U  =0 0 U  for a positive
J      J
affine 01.
Analogously p2 = I: .p.. for all i, and U2 = 020 U·3 for a positive
1-1 1122affine $ .S o U  =0 0 U l for a positive affine 0. And if A. =B. for
12 1     J




Now we are ready for the main result of this section, a
characterization of a subjective expected utility representation on FS.
THEOREM V.3.4. Under Assumption V.:.2, for the binary reZation > on
C  the foZZowing two statements are equivalent:
(i)      There   exist   a   finiteZy   additive   probab€Zity  measure    P,   and  a
continuous  function  u   :   C  +  m ,  such  that  Im    a   1    »  Im    p(A. )u(a. )
j=1 j A.   j=1   J    J
J
represents > on Fs.
(ii) > is an 8-continuous weak order on FS, and every 
event €8 8-CCI-
reZated to every 8-essentiaZ event.
The foZZowing uniqueness reauZts hoZd for u. p of (i):
If wo disjoint 8-essential events exist, then P is (V.3.6)
unique Zy determined, and u is cardinaZ.
If I is 8-essential, but no two disjoint 8-essential (V.3.7)
events exist, then p assigns 1 to every 8-essentiaZ
event,   0 to every  8-inessentia Z event,   and  u  €8
continuousZy ordinaZ.
If I is s-inessentiaZ, then p is arbitrary, and u (V.3.8)
can be any constant function.
PROOF. As always, (i) - (ii) is straightforward. So we assume (ii),
and derive (i) and the uniqueness results. For the case (V.3.8), I
s-inessential, everything is straightforward. The case (V.3.7) is
covered by Lemma V.3.1. So we assume that there exist two disjoint
s-essential events. By Lemma V.3.2 there exist, for every partition
P = (Al'...,At) with at least two essential events, a probability
measure P  on the algebra of events, consisting of unions of events
from  P,   and a utility function   U :C+I R, continuous,   such   that
It     a   1       »  It=. Pp(A.) Up(a ) represents  >  on the elements  of   FS,   thatj=l j Al    J 1   tl
can be wkitten as E =la 1Al. By Lemma V.3.3, Pp and U  can be taken
independent of P. That we do, and we leave out indexes P.
First we show that P is a probability measure P(0) = 0, P(I) = 1
are obvious. Let A,B be disjoint. To show is: P(A U B) = P(A) + P(B).
We define Al := A, A2 := B, A3 := AC n BC. Let C,D be two disjoint
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s-essential events. Define Bl := C, 82 :- D, 83 := CC A DC. Let P =
(((Ai n Bj)i=l)j=t)· This P has, by a reasoning as in the proof of
3    3
Lemma  V.3.3, at least two s-essential events.   Let   (p,  . ) ,   . , ,        and  U
3     ij J=1 1=13
be as resulting from Lemma V.3.2. Now P(A) = Ej=1Plj' PCB) = Ij=lP2j'
and P(A U B) = E =t(plj+P2j)'
That now Es a t  >I t  8 1  ** Is  P(A )U(a.) >E t  P(B )U(B )
]=l j Aj    k=l k Bk
j=1 j 1  - k=1   k    k'
follows from consideration of a P, both finer than (A )  =1 and (Bk) k=l ,
The uniqueness result (V.3.6) follows from Lemma V.3.2.
0
The following Corollary, a simple consequence of the above
theorem, gives properties which > has on FS, but in general not on all
of   F,   or   f.
COROLLARY V.3.5. Let > satisfy (i) of Theorem V. 3.4. rhen, for a ZZ
x,y € FS,  Ixi >y i for aZZ i€I 4 x>y] . And > is coordinate inde-
pendent on Fs.
V.4. RESULTS FOR STRONGLY BOUNDED ACTS
In this section we want to extend the representation of Theorem
bV.3.4 (i) to more general acts, mainly those of F . We have in mind
an expected utility representation by means of some sort of integral
of U with respect to P. The approach to integration for measures that
are only finitely additive, as adopted in section I.III.2 of Dunford
and Schwarz (1958) or section 4.4 of Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao
(1983) does not seem to be suited for our purposes. This is because
we see no easy way to reformulate the properties of P and U o x, used
there in the definition of an integral, in terms of our primitive,
i.e.  >.   The less general Sti#Ztjes   type  integraZ, as exposed   in
section 4.5 of Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao (1983) does serve our
purposes. In this, an integral, notation EU, of a bounded measurable
function U o x o n I i s obtained as a "lower integral", equal to
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sup{EU(fs) :f s:I+R has finite range and is measurable, fs e
U o x}, with <P pointwise dominance, i.e. fs <P U o x whenever fs(i)
1 u(x.) for all i € I; or the integral is obtained as an upper
integral, which is analogous and yields the same result for bounded
functions. If U o x i s bounded below (above) but unbounded above
(below), one may still define the lower (upper) integral, and see if
this is useful. Of course, what we have in mind is to let the fs above
be of the form U o xs for xs E FS. We handle pointwise dominance as
follows:
I
DEFINITION  V. 4.1. >i s pointwise monotone   on   F'   c C     if  x>y   for
all x,y € F' for which xi > yi for all i € I.
Note that, in the terminology of Chapter II, this is weak cA
monotonicity, if we take >i = > for all i, and allow for infinite
cartesian products. Suppes (1956, A9) and Ferreira (1972, Cl) also
used this kind of monotonicity. Note that it uses comparisons of
consequences xi to consequences Yi, only if these consequences are
assigned to the same state of nature. This differs from assumption
"P7" in Savage (1954). The latter requires something lik
e: x>y
whenever xi > y for all i, or x > Yi for all i. An advantage of our
set-up with pointwise monotonicity, over Savage's set-up with his P7,
is that in our set-up the utility function does not have to be
bounded, where in Savage's set-up it must be, see section 14.1 in
Fishburn (1970). An advantage of Savage's set-up is that, once
utility is bounded, Savage's set-up handles all acts, whereas our's
only handles all strongly bounded acts. For a further illustration
of this the reader is referred to the example (1) in section 5.4 of
Savage (1954), where no expected utility representation exists, but
where pointwise monotonicity can be seen to be satisfied.
The following example illustrates that pointwise monotonicity
b
on F  is not implied by the other properties, introduced:
EXAMPLE V.4.2. Let I = 10,1], C = IR, A the Borel a-algebra on ]0,1],
D the Borel a-algebra on  ,U identity, and let P b e Lebesgue measure.
Let  >  on   Fb be represented  by a linear functional   V   from   F   to   P.,
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with V(1A) = P(A) for all events A. Then > is a constant- and
bs-continuous weak order, even > is coordinate independent on F . Every
event is s-CCI related to every s-essential event. Yet, without point-
wise monotonicity we are still completely free to let V assign to x,
with x. = i for all i, any real number, such as -1 since x is not in1
the linear subspace, spanned by the indicator functions. Then x. > 0
1
for all i, but not x > 6, so pointwise monotonicity is violated.
LEMMA v.4.3. Let > be a constant-continuous pointwise monotone weak
order on P. Then for every x€F b there exists a€C such that x w a.
PROOF. {B €C:B>x} and {B €C:B<x} are closed by constant-
continuity, and nonempty   if x€F b, because   then   [D>x i>  v   for   all
i] and pointwise monotonicity imply U to be in the first, v in the
second, set above. These sets, with union C, must have nonempty
intersection by connectedness of C. Let a be in this intersection.
0
bWe can now, for x€F, simply take a a s above, and define
EU(x) := U(a), with U as in Theorem V.3.4, under the appropriate
assumptions  for  >.  Then  x >  y ** EU (x)   1  EU (y),  and  for  any
x = Ij=lajlA ' EU(x)  = Ij=lp(Aj) U(aj). Question remains whether EU
can be consi ered a (Stieltjes-type) integral outside FS. Below we
shall see that it can.
THEOREM V.4.4. Under Assumption V.2.2, for the b€nary re Zation  >  on
C , the foZZowing two statements are equivaZent:
(i)     There  exist  a  finite Zy  additive  probab€Zity  measure  P,  and  a
continuous u:C+R, such that, on F , x" fu(xi)dP(i)
represents >, with the integral. well defined.
( ii)   >  is   a   constant-  and  8-continuous   pointwise   monotone weak order
on   P.   such  that every event  is  s -CCI-reZated  to  every
8-essentiaZ event.
Uniqueness results for (i) are as (V.3.6), (V.3.7), and (V.3.8) in
Theorem V. 3.4.
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PROOF. We only show (ii) - (i). Let P,u be as provided by Theorem
V.3.4. Let x € F , U > x  > G for all i € I. Let E N x, such an a
exists by Lemma V.4.3. Let EU(x) = U(a). We have to show that EU is
-   - -      -    -
an  integral.   If  u  w  v  then by pointwise monotonicity  x  %  p'   SO  a %  P,
U 9 x is constant, and EU(x) = fU(xi)dP(i).
-    -
Now suppose U > v. For notational convenience we shall suppose
that U(W) = 1, U(v) = 0. We now construct a sequence of pairs of
simple functions (xm,ym) m=1 '   such  that:
U(x.)-1/m i U(xi) i U(xi) i U(yi) 1 U(xi)+1/m (V.4.1)1
for all i,m.
For any m, and 0<k< m-1,--
Ak := {i €I: k/m < U(x.) < (k+1)/m}-1
is an event. Since U is continuous, and C connected, also U(C) c R
is connected. So for any O f k i m there exists ak such that
U(a ) = k/m. We define
k
xm := I - aklAk + am-ll{i:u(xi)=1}' and
m     m-1
Y  := Ek=0ak+11Ak + aml{i:U(xi)=1}.
We  then  have  U (x )  1 U (xi)  1 U (yT) ,  so  x  <  x-7 < yT   ,   for  all  i.
By pointwise monotonicity  xm <  x  < ym Hence  EU (xm)  f- u (a)   L EU (ym).
But also EU (ym) - EU (xm) = 1/m for all m. (See lines above the
theorem.) We conclude that EU(x) = U(a) = lim EU(xm) = lim EU(ym).
In-+00 III+..
Indeed EU(x) can be considered to be an integral of U w.r.t. P.
0
V.5. COUNTABLE ADDITIVITY
We shall give a continuity assumption, necessary and sufficient
for countable additivity of the probability measure P of Theorems
V.3.4 and V.4.4. This adapts the known results, as presented in
section 6.9 of de Finetti (1972) to the more general case where
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C#R; with everything formulated in terms of the preference relation
>. Property F7 in section 10.3 in Fishburn (1982), and the "monotone
continuity" assumption of Villegas (1964), also used in Arrow (1971,
Lecture 1), are analogous.
DEFINITION V.5.1. A probability measure P on an algebra A is countabZy
00
(or 0-)additive if, for any sequence of events (Am) m=1 with Am+lcAm
00
for  all  m, and f"LI=lAm  =  0,  we  have  lim  P (A )   =  0.In-+I.
The following lemma gives an equivalent formulation that is
well-known.
LEMMA  V.5.2.  p  is  0-additive  if  and  on Zy  if,  for  any  sequence   (Bm) m·=1
of mutuaZZy disjoint events, with B = U-  8  in A, we have p(B) =
m=1 m
Em. lP (Bm).
PROOF. Substitute  Am  :=  B\(U =1Bk)'  or  Bm  :=  A  Am+1'
0
The following definition will only be used in the definition
thereafter.
DEFINITION V.5.3. A set of acts {x1} is uniforn,Zy strongZy bounded
j€Jif there exist 11, v€Csuch that W>x  >G for a l l i€I,j€J.
With this we define the property, characterizing c-additivity of
P. We could below have restricted attention to all simple xJ's, and
even to all acts with only two consequences in the range. This is the
only thing needed in the proof of Theorem V.5.5.
DEFINITION   V.5.4.     >i s  boundedZy   striet Zy   continuous   if   for   any
uniformly strongly bounded sequence   of   acts    (xl)   =1    ,   and   any  pair   of
acts x,y, for which xl > y [respectively xJ < y] for all j, and
lim x  =x i for all i, we have x>y [respectively x< y].
i-+co
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Note that the above definition is weaker than continuity with
respect to the product topology, i.e. pointwise convergence. For we
only consider uniformzy strongzy bounded converging sequences (and
no uncountable converging   "nets")  .
THEOREM V.5.5. Let (i) in Theorem   V.4.4   hold.    Then   p  can   be 
  chosen
0-additive if and on Zy if > is boundedZy BtrictZy continuous.
PROOF. First we assume bounded strict continuity, and derive
c-additivity. If I is s-inessential, then U is constant, and we can
let P be any c-additive probability measure, e.g. let P(A) = 1 if and
only if A contains some fixed i € I.
Next suppose I is s-essential. Then a,B exist such that a > B,
otherwise pointwise monotonicity (or s-CCI relatedness)  would imply
CO
s-inessentiality of I. Now let
(Am)m=l be a sequence of events, such
that Am D Am+1 for all m, and nAiji = 0. Define xm := alAm+ BlAI 'x=B.
m+1
By pointwise monotonicity xm > x > B for all m, so lim EU(xm) 1
u(B). (EU: see above Theorem V.4.4.) We now first show i at the last
inequality is in fact equality.
Suppose lim EU(xm) > U(B). U(a) > U(B), so U(B) is not maximal
in U (C) . Sinc U (C) is connected, a y must exist with lim EU(xm) >III+©°
U (y)  > U (B). Now 21 >y for all m, so B=x>y b y bounded strict
continuity. This contradicts U(y) > U(B). It follows that
lim EU(xm) = U(B).
tlr"» The last equality, and EU(x ) = P(A )U(a) + (1-P(Am))U(B), implym
lim P(A ) = 0; as required for a-additivity of P.
m
m+30
Conversely, let P be a-additive. Then bounded strict continuity
follows from continuity of U and the dominated convergence Theorem
of Lebesgue (e.g. see Corollary 16 in section I.III.6.16  of Dunford
and Schwartz, 1958). This theorem is usually formulated for a-algebras.
It can be applied to our context by taking the smallest c-algebra
containing A, and taking the unique 0-additive extension of P to this,
guaranteed by Royden (1963,  section 12.2). The values of the involved




V.6. THE MAIN RESULT, CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER COMMENTS
First we formulate our main result, combining the previous
results. Let us repeat that I is a nonempty set, A an algebra on I,
elements of A are "events", C is a connected topological space, D an
Ialgebra of subsets of C that contains all open subsets of C. F c C
b
is the set of acts that are A- D measurable, F  is the set of all
strongly bounded (section V.2) acts in F. > is a binary (preference)
I
relation on C .
THEOREM V.6.1. Under Assumption V. 2.2, for the binary re Zation > on
C , the foZZowing two statements are equivaZent:
(i)       There   exists   a  finite Zy   additive   probab€Zity   measure   p  on   A.   and
a continuous u:C+ IR, such that, on Fb, x # fu(xi)dP(i),
(integraZ   we ZZ-defined)   represents  >.
(ii) > is a constant- and 8-continuous pointwise monotone weak order
on   F ,  for  which  aZZ  events  are   8-CCI-reZated  to  a ZZ  8-e8sent€aZ
events.
Furthermore, in (i) we may repZace "finite Zy " by "countab Zy ", if we
add  in    (€i)   the   requirement   that  >  is   boundedZy   strictZy   continuous.
Uniqueness resuZts for (i) are as in Theorem V. 3.4.
PROOF. See Theorems V.3.4, V.4.4, and V.5.5.
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To our knowledge this is the most general characterization of
subjective expected utility maximization with continuous utility, now
available. The special case where C= IR , and U i s identity, is treated
in de Finetti (1972), a major source of inspiration for our work.
Theorem 3 of Grodal (1978) derives a representation as in (i)
above, so also for a possibly infinite state space, under the
supposition that a triple of disjoint s-essential events exists. The
conditions used there employ a (presupposed) measure on A, and a
luu
derived mean groupoid  operation. Grodal's results also treat the case
where the set of acts is a subset of F (or Fb), as long as it is
closed under a certain mixture operation, and contains the constant
acts.
For not strongly bounded acts a representation as in (i) above
meets new complications. Say x is not strongly bounded. Of course,
if x w a for some a€C, which always occurs if P>x>v for some
u, v€C (under appropriate assumptions), we would still like to define
EU(x) = U(a). But now there is no justification to consider this as
an integral of U o x. If x is strongly bounded below (there is y such
- -
that x, > y for all i) an integral value for U o x, its "lower inte-
1
gral",   exists. This integral value  is not greater   than  EU (x)  ,   may
equal EU(x), but may also very well be smaller than EU(x). If x w a,
but now x strongly bounded above , we can obtain an upper integral
value  that  may  be "too" large.
Conditions for >, strong enough to guarantee that > can be repre-
sented by an integral for all acts, are usually undesirably strong,
for instance they may simply imply boundedness of U, as turned out to
be the case in Savage  (1954) . They may even lead to impossibility
results, for instance if C = ]0,1] = I, > maximizes Lebesgue integral,
I
and one would let A = 2  and require continuity of > with respect to
I
the product topology on C . Then this would require a c-additive
extension of the Lebesgue measure to 2 , which is known not to
]0,1]
exist, see Banach and Kuratowski (1929), or Ulam (1930). Finally,
such conditions for > may restrict the set of considered acts strongly.
The integral representation can be extended to those acts x,
equivalent to some a, that have, for every B < x, a "sufficiently good"
consequence y to ensure that the "above truncation" x' of x at y (i.e.
x  = xi if xi < 9, xi = y if x  > y) has B < x, and that have, for
every  p >x,a "sufficiently bad" consequence  v to ensure  that  the
"below truncation" x" of x at v (i.e. xi = xi if xi > G, xi = v if
x. < v) has x" <  D.  This is the way to extend > to the class of all
1
acts with finite expected utility, a desirable result for instance for
statistical applications (see De Groot, 1970, end of section 7.9). For
brevity this is not elaborated here.
Other acts are difficult to handle. One quickly runs into problems,
related   to   the "St. Petersburg paradox".
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The application of our results of course is not restricted to
DMUU. For instance one may think of welfare theory, with agents in-
stead of states of nature, and with P interpreted as power index.
A major application of our results lies in dynamic contexts. Our
theorems are general enough to apply both to continuous and discrete
time. One may characterize "constantness" of the "discount factor" P,
where P corresponds to weights of a form ke , by the addition of
-Pt
an extra stationarity assumption. Such a thing is done in Theorem 4
of Grodal (1978). Compare also Corollary IV.4.6, or Corollary IV.5.5.
Dr&ze ( 1982) emphasizes the analogy between the "I=set of states" and
"I=set of points of time" interpretations.
We end with two conjectures:
CONJECTURE V.6.2. If C is topologically separable, then s-continuity
is implied by the other properties of > in (ii) of Theorem V.6.1.
CONJECTURE V.6.3. In Theorem V.6.1(ii) one may weaken pointwise mono-
tonicity to:  [i- > FI for all  i= •x>y for all x,y €  P].
The property in Conjecture V.6.3 is more closely related to the







In this chapter we shall characterize, in Theorem VI.5.1, sub-
jective expected utility maximization with continuous utility for the
case where the probability measure no longer has to be additive. The
main characterizing property will be "comonotonic cardinal coordinate
independence". The "nonadditive probability measures" will be called
"capacities", see Definition VI.2.1. Choquet (1953-54, 48.1) has
indicated, for a special class of capacities, a way to integrate with
respect to these capacities. We shall adopt this way of integration.
For an alternative way to integrate with respect to capacities see
Gilboa ( 1985a).
Capacities play a role in cooperative game theory with side
payments, where  I  is  a  set of "players", a subset  of  I  is a "coalition",
and the capacity is a "characteristic function", or "game", indicating
productivity, power etc. See von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Luce
and Raiffa (1957), Driessen (1985). Capacities also play a role in
the study of robustness in statistics, see Huber (1981, section 10.2),
Huber and Strassen (1973).
Schmeidler (1984 a,b,c) applied capacities in decision theory.
One motive was to vary on expected utility maximization so as to avoid
A-
paradoxes such as the "Ellsberg paradox" (see Ellsberg, 1961) or the
"Allais paradox" (see Allais, 1953, or Savage, 1954, pp. 101-103),
paradoxes that are often used to criticize or falsify expected utility
maximization. Another motive   is the applicability in welfare theory.
Special kinds of capacities are the "belief functions" in Shafer
(1976, 1979), or the "plausibility" in Reschner (1976).
In this chapter we shall again use terminology of decision making
under uncertainty. Schmeidler (1984a) has characterized subjective
expected utility maximization with nonadditive probabilities, for the
case where consequences are lotteries. He could start with an
application of the theorem of Herstein and Milnor (1953), and thus
immediately obtain a cardinal representing function for the preference
relation on the set of acts. (This induces "linear" utility for the
consequences.) After that he could apply to this representing function
the characterization of functionals that can be considered Choquet
integrals, as given in Schmeidler (1984c). See also Anger (1977,
Theorem 3).
We adapt, under the simplifying assumption that the state space
is finite, the work of Schmeidler to the case where the consequence
space is a connected topological space, and utility is continuous,
not necessarily linear. In our work a (cardinal) representing function
is not easily available, and a derivation of it will be the main
mathematical difficulty.
One can consider Schmeidler's work the adaptation of Anscombe
and Aumann's (1963) characterization of subjective expected utility,
to the case of nonadditive probability, and the results of this
chapter the adaptation of our characterization of subjective expected
utility, given in Theorem IV.3.3. Gilboa (1985b) adapts the
characterization of subjective expected utility maximization of
Savage (1954) to the case of nonadditive probability.
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VI.2. CAPACITIES AND THE CHOQUET INTEGRAL
Throughout this, and following, chapters, I is the finite set
{1,...,n}.
DEFINITION  V I.2.1. A function  v   :   2·I  +  IR   is  a  capacity   if:
V(0) = 0. (VI.2.1)
v(I) = 1. (VI.2.2)
A c B- v(A) 1 v(B) (monotonieity). (VI.2.3)
Note that the range of v must be a subset of [0,1]. In literature
capacities  are also defined  when  I is infinite ; thal usually continuity
with respect to increasing and decreasing sequences of events is
required. For our finite I this is trivially satisfied. Also the domain
of the capacity in literature is often taken to be the collection of
compact subsets of I, with I a (Hausdorff) topological space, or it
is taken to be an algebra on I. To follow this, we could of course
I
endow I with the topology, or algebra, 2 . Finally, the normalization
(VI.2.2) is sometimes left out.
The following definition was essentially first given by Choquet
(1953-54, 48.1).
I
DEFINITION VI.2.2. Let v:2  +R b e a capacity. Then, for any
f:I+ :R, the Choquet integraZ of f with respect to v, fIfdv, is:
0
7 v({i€I : f (i) 21 r})dr + f- [v({i€I : f (i) 1 T})-l]dr.   (VI.2.4)0
Note that for nonnegative f the second term vanishes. And note
that for additive v the Choquet integal coincides with the usual
expectation of f with respect to v, as follows from integration by
parts. I being finite, (VI.2.4) can be written as a sum. To this end
let 1 be a permutation, dependent on f, on {1,...,n}, such that
f(TT(1)) Lf(TT(2)) 2-··· 2-f(Tr(n)).So 17 assigns to every i, con-
sidered as a ranking number, the state of nature with this ranking
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FIGURE VI.2.1.(b). f fdv = (VI.2.5)  = A(///) + A(\\\) + A(·-) +
000.
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FIGURE VI.2.1.(c)  fIfdv = (VI.2.6)  (Rewritten in (VI.2.7)).
FIGURE VI.2.1. The Choquet integra Z.
I= {1,2,3,4,5}, f:I+ IR, f(2) > f(3) > f(1) = f(5) >0> f(4).
 (1) = 2, Tr(2) = 3, T(3) = 1,  (4) = 5, TT(5) - 4. We could also have
taken ir (3) = 5, 7T (4) = 1.
A doubly marked part belongs to two areas. For example     in (a)
000belongs both to  I l l   And  to 000 I
A = "area". We always take area positive. In (a), A(///) = [f(2)-f(3)]
v ({2}); AA\\) = [f(3)-f(5)] v ({2,3}); f(1) = f(5), hence-is an
empty   set,   A (-)    =   0.
Area is additive in the IR-axis, so in (a), ACE U 111 ) =  ACE) +
A(Ill) . Area does not have to be additive in the I-axis,   so in  (a) ,
ACE) 0  f(1)[v({1,2,3})   +  v({5})]   may  very  well  hold.
1.0
equal f-value mutually can be ranked in any arbitrary way. Now (VI.2.4)
can easily be seen to equal (see Figure VI.2.1, (a) and (b)) :
I =i[ ft,T(j)) -f(11(j+1))].  v({TT(1),...,ir (j)}) + f (Tr(n)). (VI.2.5)
Note from this expression that the mutual ranking of states with
equal f-value is immaterial. After a reordering of terms, (VI.2.5)
becomes (see Figure VI.2.1 (c)):
I8 .f(11(j))[v({Tr N),...,Tr(j)}) - v({71(1),...,I(j-1)}]. (VI.2.6)
J=i
And this will lead to the expression that will be most useful for
our work in the sequel. For this a new definition is needed:
DEFINITION VI.2.3. For a capacity v, and a permutation A on {1,...,n},
and 1<j<n,--
.T
P (j):= v({i€I : 1-1(i) 1 A-1(j)}) - v({i€I : A-1(i) < A-1(j)}).
Dependency of P (j) on v is not expressed in the notation. One
may interpret P (j) as the marginal contribution in capacity of j to
those states of nature which are ranked before j, by  . By this  we
can, with 1 as above formula (VI.2.5), rewrite (VI.2.6) as:
Ej=lP (j)f(j).
(VI.2.7)
Note that, for fixed r (and v), the P (j)'s above are nonnegative
and sum to one. One may consider ffdv as the integral of f over I with
respect  to the (additive) probability measure  P  ,   induced  by  the
'IT
P (j)'s. This will lead to the main strategy of our approach to derive
the main result, Theorem VI.5.1: We shall consider subsets of acts,
that induce a same "ranking" permutation A. On such subsets we can
proceed as if we were dealing with additive probability Pr, thus we
can apply well-known techniques there.
Let us now give some elementary properties of the Choquet integral,
that follow from the above expressions.
flfdv = Affdv for all A 1 0  (positive homogeneity). (VI.2.8)




If f (i) 2- g(i) for all i, then Jfdv 1 fgdv (monotonicity).  (VI.2.10)
The latter is most easily seen by taking X+f and A+g with X so
large that X+f and X+g are positive, and by applying (VI.2.9), and
(VI.2.4). Finally, if we consider the Choquet integral as a function
from  R 1    to   1-    with   (Al'...'X   )   € Rn interpreted  as the function,n
assigning X. to every j, then we obtain the well-known:
J
PROPOSITION VI .2.4. The Choquet integraZ is continuous.
PROOF. First we derive continuity in each variable. Let 1< i< n.
By (VI.2.10), the Choquet integral is nondecreasing in its i-th
variable.   Let   x  €   IR ,   and   E   >   0.   Let   A   be as above    (V I.2.5) . Since   the
mutual ranking, by A, of states j with value x  equal to xi ' can be
-1
chosen arbitrarily, we may assume that of these, A (i) is the
-1
smallest. Let 6 = min{E, xk-xi} where k is such that A  (k) =
-1                                                -1
TT  (i)-1, if the latter is positive; let 6=E i f 7T (i) = 1. Then
for all x .(x.+A) with 0<1<6,i n the calculation of the Choquet
-1 1    - -
integral through (VI.2.7), we can use the same Tr, and thus Plr(j),s,
as for x. Thus fx . (x.+A)dv - fxdv < PT'(i)6 16<E.-1 1   -
Analogously one shows that 6>0 exists such that for all
0  <  A  1- 6, every  x-i (xi-A) gets assigned Choquet integral,  not  more
-1
than E smaller than x. (This time let A (i) be as large as possible.)
The Choquet integral is nondecreasing and continuous in each
variable. It must be continuous.
0
We shall need the following observation (VI.2.11) in the proof
of Theorem VI.8.8. Note that the P (i) of Definition VI.2.3 uniquely
determine v : for any A c I, we take a A such that A = {A(1),...,Tr(i)},
1  T
then we have v(A) = I P (w(i)). This also shows that if one takes
j=1
an arbitrary collection of real numbers P (j), j = 1,...,n, A €
{permutations on {1,...,n}}, then: there exists a (necessarily unique)
capacity v such that any P (j) can be derived from v as in Definition
V I.2.3,   if  and  only  if  for  all  i,   Tr ,   A' :
PT,(i) 21 0; I =  piT(j) = 1 ; { ,T (1),...,7T (i)} = (VI.2.11)
7T '
{Tr'(1),...,A'(i)} - Ej=iPT,(j) = Ij=tp  (j)·
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VI.3. COMONOTONICITY
In the previous section we saw that for the Choquet integral, an
ordering  on the states of nature,  by the "ranking" permutation  1,
plays a central role. Hence we define, with  >on  C  as in Notation  V I.2.3:
DEFINITION VI.3.1. For x € Cn, >  is the binary relation on I, defined
X
by i >x j whenever xi > xj.
If > is a weak order, then so is > .X
DEFINITION VI.3.2. For S C C , >s :=  n >x ·
XES
Thus i >sj if and only if xi > x  for all x € S. The following is
a central notion:
DEFINITION VI.3.3. A set C c Cn is comonotonic if no x,y € C, i,j E I
exist such that xi > xj, Yj > Yi'
The following sets are "maximal" comonotonic sets, as will follow.
DEFINITION VI.3.4. For a permutation A on I,
C" := {x € Cn : x >X > .>X }
A(1) 7,(2)        -         TT (n)
id    7T
C   = C  with A identity.
We now obtain, with an ordering a weak order for which no
different elements are equivalent, the following Lemma. We shall use
only (i) and (iv) of it. Statement (iii) is added because it shows the
way to proceed in case I is infinite, a case for further research. (ii)
is added because it is used in the proof; and because it may be
clarifying.
LEMMA VI.3.5. Let S c C . Let > be a weak  order.  The  foZzowing  four
statements are equivalent:
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(i) S is comonotonte.
(ii) > €8 a weak order.
S
(iii) There  exists  an  ordering  f on  the  state  space  I  Buch  that:
[i  f  j  -  xi  > x j] for aZZ i,j € I, x € S.
(iv) s c c1 for some permutation w on I.
PROOF. (iii) follows   from   ( ii) by letting  f be any ordering  such  that
i  f j  -i  >s  j ·Such an ordering exists by Szpilra jn   ( 1930), or Richter
(1966, Lemma 2) (applied to 0).
(iii) =* (iv) follows by taking A such that A(1) f b(2) f ... f A(n).
If (iv) holds, then for x,y € S, x, > x. and y. > Yi would imply1 J J
7T(i) > 7T(j) and 7T( j) > 7T(i), which cannot hold. So (i) follows.
Finally, (i) is assumed, and (ii) is to be derived. Transitivity
of >s is from transitivity of >. So completeness of >s remains to be
derived. If not j>s i, then there must be x€S with x. > x.. By
1     J
comonotonicity y  > Yi for no y € S, i.e. yi > y  for all y € S. So
i  S  
0
DEFINITION VI.3.6. Let C c Cn. Then i is inessent€aZ (with respect to
>) on C if z-ia Al Z-iB for all z-ia, z-iB € C. If i is inessential on7T
C , then we also call i w-inessentia Z. If A is the identity, we write
id-inessentia Z. The opposite of inessential always is essent€aZ.
The proof of the following lemma is more complicated than that of
its "additive" analogue, Lemma III.2.9. The reason is that we are now
no longer "free to cross borders" from one C  to another. This is the
main complication in the work of this Chapter. A preparatory notation:
NOTATION VI.3.7. For a,B E C,a v B [respectively a A B]i s a i f a>B
[respectively a < B], B otherwise.
Note that a v 8 0 8 v a i f a m B and a 0 B.I f>i s a weak order,
then a v B A'B v a for all a, B. Same things hold for A.
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LEMMA VI.3.8. Let > be a weak order. Let x,y E c ,  and xj = yj for
aZZ H-essentiaZ j. Then x w y.
id          0       0
PROOF. Suppose x,y €C  . Define x  := x,y  := y, and inductively,
for j = 1,...,n, x1 :=  xlit(xjv yj), y1 := ylil(x  v y ). Note that,
for all id-essential j, x  =y. =x  v y,. Note also that, for all
j > 1, x:  v y  < x _  , a d xj Jv y  < y _  , so that x ,y1 € Cid for
all j. We conclude:
x - xls:txl e ... xn = yn w yn-1 % ...Aly =y.0
0
LEMMA VI.3.9. Let > be a weak order. Let aZZ i be 1-inessentiaZ for
aZZ A. Then > is triviaZ.
PROOF. Let x,y € Cn. Take any a € C. Since G € C  for all A, there
are #, A', such that x,a € C , and y,a € C  for some w'. By the
previous Lemma,   x  R,  a  m  y.
0
VI.4. COMONOTONIC CARDINAL COORDINATE INDEPENDENCE
The definition of A-essentiality, given in the previous section,
is the key tool for the adaptation of cardinal coordinate independence
to the present context with (nonadditive) capacities:
DEFINITION VI.4.1. > satisfies comonotonic cardina Z coordinate
independence (Com. CCI) if for all permutations A,T' on {1,...,n},
all j and A-essential i, and all x-ia, y-iB, x-iy' y-io € CW, and
finally all s_ a, t_ B, s_ y, t_ 6 E C":
Ix-ia < y-iB & x-iy > y-io  & s_ a > t_18] - [s_ y > t- 6].
A way to obtain intuitive insight into the condition, is to
consider the elucidation to Definition IV.2.4 (CCI), and to study the
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proof in section VI.5, in the sequel. The remainder of this section
is devoted to the study of consequences of Com. CCI. For this we
assume throughout this section, without further mention:
ASSUMPTION VI.4.2. (For this section). > is a weak order that satisfies
comonotonic cardinal coordinate independence.
The following is the analogue of coordinate independence. It is
more convenient to formulate it now in the spirit of independence of
equal subalternatives (Definition II.6.2).
DEFINITION VI.4.3. > satisfies comonotonic coordinate independence
(Com. CI) if for all comonotonic {x-ASA' Y-ASA' x-AtA' y-AtA} we have
[x-ASA > Y-ASA ** X-AtA   y-AtA) '
LEMMA VI.4.4. > satisfies comonotonic coordinate independence.
PROOF. First we consider the special case that ||A|| = 1, say A = {k}.
Let x-ksk' Y-ksk' x-ktk' y-ktk € Clr. If k is A-inessential, then
x-ksk  x  X-ktk'   and  y-ksk  w  y-ktk' and everything follows.   So  let  k  be
Tr-essential.  Then   [x-ksk  < x-ksk  &  x-ktk  >  x-ktk  &  X-ksk    y-ksk]  by
Com. CCI imply x-ktk > Y-ktk
idNext the general case. Say x-ASA' Y-ASA' x-AtA' Y-AtA € C
Define:
0               0               0               0
a  := x-ASA' b  := y-ASA' c  := x-AtA' d  := y-AtA'
Then define, inductively, for j = 1,...,n:
If j € A, then (a ,b ,c ,d1) := (a -1,bj-1,cj-1,dj-1)
If j € A, then (a1,b ,c1,d1) := (a1.la,b -la,c -la,d1.la), with
-J -j -J    -J
a =sj v tj.
The above construction has been such that al = cl and b1 = d 
for all k i j, and such that all new acts are in Cid. For instance if
j € A, then a1-1, bj-1, cj-1, dj-1 € Cid imply, by simple manipulations,
a < a -1,a < b -1,a < cj-t,a < d -1 · Further an = cn, bn = dn
By repeated application of the already handled case  |A|| = 1,
we conclude that:
x-ASA > Y-ASA ** a  > b ** al > bl** ...**an > bn** cn > dn




By the above Lemma, the following definition is useful under
Assumption VI.4.2.
DEFINITION   V I.4.5. We write   xA  >A  YA if there exists   sAC   such   that
XAs  c  >  YAS  c   '   and  xAS  c   '   yAS  c  €  Cl'.
A      A          A       A
LEMMA VI.4.6. If xA >A YA, then xASAc , YA"Ac for aZZ sAc for which
xASAC , YASAC € C .
PROOF. Direct from Lemma VI.4.4.
0
The second and third consequence of comonotonic cardinal
coordinate independence are, with in the terminology of Chapter II,
"CA"   omitted:
DEFINITION  VI .4.7.> satisfies weak monotonicity   (w.mon.)  if  x>y
whenever xi > Yi for all i.
DEFINITION VI.4.8. > satisfies comonotonic strong monotonicity
(com. 8.mon.) if for all comonotonic {x,y} c (Tr with xi > Yi for all i,
and xi > Yi for a A-essential i, we have x > y.
LEMMA VI.4.9. > satisfies weak, and comonotonic strong, monotonicity.
PROOF. First we derive weak monotonicity. In three steps:
id
Assume y= x-ka, {x,y} comonotonic, say x,y €C  ; xk  a (VI.4.1)
Suppose we have x<x a. Contradiction is derived.-k
Define, for j = 0,...,n:
zl has z  = ... = z  = xk' zl+l = ... = z1 =
a. (VI.4.2)n
j         id                                kThen all z are in C . By Com.CI , X < X-ka implies z-kxk <
k          k    k-1
z-ka, i.e. z
<z . Each of the last three preferences implies
id-essentiality of k. Thus, by Com. CCI,
 z-ka K z-ka & z-ka   z-kxk & zlia > zlial
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implies zl a > zljxk ' i.e. z -1 > z1, for all j 1 1.
0 1 k-1 k k+1    ,, >z n=x.Apparently G=z >z  > ... >z >Z >Z
k
This, finally, contradicts  xk  >a.   The  case (VI.4.1)is handled.   Next :
id
Now assume y= x-ka, xk >a; say x€C (VI.4.3)
So {x,y} no longer has to be comonotonic. Let 1 be such that
xl > a, x. < a for all j > 1. Then, by repeated application of the
J
result  for  case (VI.4.1), x>x-kxk+1 > x-kxk+2  >  ','  > x_kxl  >  x-ka,
since every two subsequent acts are comonotonic (e.g. x-kxk+2 and
x-kxk+3 are in C  with w Ck+2) = k) . The case (VI.4.3) is handled. The
third case is the general case where xi > Yi for all i. Then, by
repeated application  of the above result,  x > x-1 1  >  C (x-1Yl  -2V2    
...   ((Cx-1Yl)-2Y: "' y ) = y. Weak monotonicity is proved.-n n
Next, to derive com.s.mon., suppose {x,y} comonotonic , say
id
{x,y}  C C     ,   further  x   >p  y    for  all   j,   and  x   N y]c  for an id-essential
k. To derive is x > y. Define:
z has z  = x  for all j 1 k, z  = y  for all j > k. (VI.4.4)
id
Then both (z=) z-kxk and z-kyk are in C  . By w.mon. x > z-kxk >
z-]cyk > Y. It is sufficient for com. s.mon. to show that z-kxk > z-kyk.
Suppose to the contrary that we have z-kxk < z-kyk. We derive a
contradiction.
Define z ,...,zn as in (VI.4.2), with a = Yk.kSince k is id-j
essential,  by  Com.  CCI,   [zlyk  <  zkkyk  &  ztkyk >  z-kxk  &  z-jyk  >
zijyk] implies z  yk > z  xl,' i.e. z -1 > zl, for all j 2- 1. So
yk > xk. This contradicts xk   yk.
0
COROLLARY VI.4.10. >i s triviaZ if and onZy if a>B for a ZZ a,B E C.
PROOF. If > is trivial, then a > B, so a > B, for all a,B. Next assume
a > B for all a,B. Then for any x in any C , and any a € C, xi > ai
for all i, and a € C , hence by w.mon .  we have x > a.
-          -
Analogously x < a. So x w a. Also x w a w y for all x,y,a : > is
trivial.
COROLLARY VI.4.11. One Tr has a. Tr-essentiaZ state, if and on Zy if every
A has a A-essentiaZ state.
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PROOF.   If  one   A   has  a Tr-essential state,   then > cannot be trivial.   By
Corollary VI.4.10 we have a<B for some a,B €C. Since a, B€C   for
every A, Lemma VI.3.8 implies that every w must have a 1-essential
state.
0
VI.5. THE MAIN THEOREM
In this section we give the main theorem of this chapter. After
the theorem we give a proof for the simplest implication (i) - (ii) in
it. The proof of  (ii) 4 (i), and of the uniqueness results, will be
carried out in following sections, and completed in section VI.9.
A survey is given in section VI.10.
THEOREM VI.5.1. Let n € m. Let C be a connected topoZogicaZ space,
that is separabZe if every permutation   on {1,...,n} has exactZy one
w-essentiaZ state.    For the binary   reZation   >  on   Crl,    the   foZZowing   two
statements are equivaZent:
(i)  There exist a capacity v on 2{1"."n}, and a continuous
u:C+ IR, such that x & /(u o x)dv represents >.
(ii) > is a continuous weak order that satisfies comonotonie cardinaZ
coordinate independence.
The foZZowing uniqueness resuZts hoZd for u, v of (i):
If some A has two or more A-essent€aZ states, then U (VI.5.1)
is eardinaZ, and v is un€queZy determined.
If > is not triviaZ, and no w has two or more (VI.5.2)
A-essentiaZ states, then U is Continuous Zy ordinaZ,
and v €8 uniqueZy determined.
If > is triviaZ, then u is any constant function, (VI.6.3)
and v is arbitrary.
0
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PROOF OF (i) 4 (ii) ABOVE. Suppose (i) holds. Obviously > is a weak
order.
The map x 5 (U(xl)'...'U(xn)) is continuous, so is, by Proposition
VI.2.4, the map (U(xl)'---'u(x )) » f(U o x)dv. The map x & /(U o x)dvn
is apparently continuous. This implies continuity  of  >.
All that remains is Com. CCI. For this, first suppose that:
x-ia < y-iB, X_i.Y   y-i.6; {x-ia, Y-:LB, x_iY, Y-id} c (Tr;  (VI.5.4)
i is A-essential.
The two preferences give, by (VI.2.7) (with the A in (VI.2.7)
identical  to our present Tr since  xi  >  x   -  U (xi)  1 U (x j ) ) :
Ek#ipw(k)U(xk) + P (i)U(a) 1 Ik0ipT(k)U(Yk) + P1(i)u(B)
and
Ik0l P  (k)U (xk) + P (i)U(y) 1 Ik0ip  (k)U(yj) + P (i)U(6) .
These two imply:
P'T(i)[U(a) - U(B)] 1 P (i)[U(y) - U(6)]. (VI.5.5)
Were P (i) = 0, then by (VI.2.7)  and the representation of >
by x»f(U o x)dv, i would be Tr-inessential.  So:
P1(i) > 0. (VI.5.6)
The last two numbered results imply:
U(a) - U(B) 1 U(y) - U(6). (VI.5.7)
Now suppose, besides (VI.5.4), also:
1T '
s_ a > t- B; {s_ a, t_ B, s- y, t_ 6) c C . (VI.5.8)
The preference implies:
7T'           17'              7T'
Iktjp (k)U(sk) + P  (j)U(a) 2 Ektjp (k)U(tk) + Plr'(j)U(B). This, and
(VI.5.7), implies:
Tr'              17'           7T'
Ek#j P  (k)U (sk) + P  (j)U(Y) 1 Ek0jp  (k)U (tk) + P  (j) u(6) .
Or: s_ y > t_ 6. This is exactly what, by Com. CCI, should follow from
(VI.5.4) and (VI.5.8).
0
Next we give some examples of decision making, discussed in Luce
and Raiffa (1957, Chapter 13, for instance page 282). These examples
have no expected utility representation with additive probability
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measures, but they can be represented by (i) in the above Theorem.
EXAMPLE VI.5.2. Let 1 -f k 1 n. Let v (A) = 0 if | |A| | < k, v (A) = l if
1|Al| l k. Then f (U o x)dv = U(x ), with U(x ) the
k-th highest value
in U(xt),···,U(x ). P"(T(k)) = 1, for all 1. The preference relat
ion
belongs to a "maximin"-decision maker if k = n, and to a "maximax"-
decision maker if k = 1.
EXAMPLE VI.5.3. Let 0<1<1. Let v(0) =0, v(I) =1, v(A) = X for
all remaining A. Here P (A(1)) = X, P (·,t(n)) = (1-A) for all 1, and
f (U ox)dv =A max{U(x ): 1 i j in} + (1-A)min{U(xj): 1 < j in}.The
preference relation belongs to a decision maker, adopting the "Hurwicz
criterion" with "pessimism-optimism index"   1-k, see Hurwicz   ( 1951) .
VI.6. PREPARATIONS FOR THE PROOF
LEMMA VI.6.1. Let C be a topoZogical space, > a weak order on Cn,
continuous  with   respect   to   the   product   topoZogy.    Then   for   aZZ   x   €   Cn,
{a€C:E>x}and {a €C:E<x}a r e open subBets of C.
PROOF. Let a > x. Then an open neighbourhood V c Cn of a exists such
that y>x for all y€V.W e may assume that V i s o f the form
Alx...xAn' with all A open subsets of C. No
w A :=11 =1Aj gives an open
neighbourhood of a within {a €C:a> x}. The latter is open.
Analogously {a €C:a<x}i s open.
0
LEMMA VI.6.2. Let no A have two or more 1-essentiaZ states. Let the
assumptions in Theorem VI. 6.1, and aZao (ii)   there,  hold.   Then  also
(i)   and  the  uniquene88 resuZts there  hoZd.   If  >  is  nontrivia Z,   then
v onZy takes the vaZues 0 and 1.
PROOF. If there is a A with no A-essential state, then by Lemma VI.3.8,
for all a,B € C, a w B. By Corollary VI.4.10, > is trivial. Now (VI.5.3) ,
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and (i), follow straightforwardly.
So we assume:
Every a has exactly one A-essential state. (VI.6.1)
The binary relation on C, also denoted by >, and defined by
a>B i f a>B (Notation IV.2.3) obviously is a weak order. By Lemma
VI.6.1 it is continuous. By Theorem III.3.1 there exists a, continuous-
ly ordinal, $ :C+ IR, representing>on C. We can set U: = $ ,a s w e
shall see; so any continuous strictly increasing transform of U can
be used.
Next we define v. Let A C I b e arbitrary. By nontriviality, there
are a and B such that a>B.I f a  B  >B,w e define v(A) := 1,A   cA
otherwise v(A) := 0. By com.s.mon. and Lemma VI.3.8 we see that
v(A) = 1, iff for any w with {A(1),...,A(k)} = A, A contains the w-
essential state. This shows that v is independent of the particular
choice of a and B above. Also it follows that P"(j) = 0 for all A-
inessential j, and P (j) = 1 for the A-essential j.
Now we show that with these constructions, (i) in Theorem VI.5.1
holds. Let x and y be two acts. Let x € C , y € C '. Let i be the A-
essential state, j the A'-essential state. Then, by Lemma VI.3.8,
- -
X w xi' y w y . There now follows:
x > y - xi > yi** U(xi) 1 U(yj) ** IPT (k)U(xk) 1 EPN,(k)U(Yk) **
f(U o x)dv 1 /(U o y)dv.
Finally we derive the uniqueness result (VI.5.2). We saw above
that U can be any continuous strictly increasing transform of $.
Since, obviously, U has to represent > on C, no other kind of U can
be taken : U is continuously ordinal.
For uniqueness of v, we consider an arbitrary A, and show that
P (i) = 0 for all A-inessential i. Then P (j) must equal 1 for the
A-essential j. These values P (.) uniquely determine v. So let,
finally, i = #(k) be A-inessential. Let a > B. Let x assign a to
I(1),...,w(k), B to 1(k+1),...,w(n). Then x and x-iB are in CW. By
A-inessentiality of i, x w x-iB Since U (a)  > U (B) , by (VI. 2.7) we
obtain P (i) = 0.
0
1 On
In cooperative game theory with side payments v's as above are
called " (monotonic) simple games", see Driessen   ( 1985, Definition
V.3.1).
DEFINITION VI.6.3. a€C i s mao:€ma Z [respectively minimaZ] if B>a
[respectively B < a] for no B € C.
id
VI.7. ADDITIVE VALUE FUNCTIONS ON C
id
In this section we derive results for C . Of course, the same
results hold for any C . Without further mention, we assume through-
out this section.
ASSUMPTION VI.7.1. The assumptions, and statements (ii), of Theorem
VI.5.1 hold. There are at least two id-essential states. Further we
assume that all states are id-essential. No maximal or minimal conse-
quences exist.
The assumption of at least two id-essential states is essential
for the sequel. The assumption that all states are id-essential is
only made for convenience. By Lemma VI.3.8 id-inessential states do
id
not affect the preference relation on C , and may just as well be
suppressed from notation. They will simply get additive value
id
functions V. assigned that are constant, say zero.
J
DEFINITION VI.7.2. Let C c Cn. Let (V ) =t be an array of functions,
each  from a subset  of  C  to the reals.  Then   (V.):      are  additive  vaZue
1 1=1
functions (for >) on C if x » E =1 V (x ) is well-defined for every
x € C, and represents > on C.
VI.7.1. ADDITIVE VALUE FUNCTIONS (Vz)n ON THE EZ,S.
j j=1
id   z     z
NOTATION VI.7.3. For z€C  ,E: =E l x •·· x EZ, with E  :=n
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{a€ C :a>zl ' E  := {a EC:a<zn-13' and for all j 0 1,j 0 n,
E; := {a €C:z j<a< zj-1}-
Note that zn plays no role in the above notatian. And z € Ez c Cid.
The EZ's are cartesian products, and they are comonotonic so that on
them the conditions of this chapter hold without the comonotonicity
premise. That enables us to apply the theorems of Chapter III.
PROPOSITION VI.7.4. For any z€c there exist continuous s€muZ-
id
taneous Zy   card€na Z   additive   vaLue   functions    (vz) n        for  >  on   Ez.
J ]=l
ZPROOF. Since no maximal consequences exist, there is a > zl in El
Z
Since no minimal consequences exist, there is B < zn-1 in En- Hence,
by id.essentiality of 1,n, and by com.s.mon.,z-la > z > z-n B. This
shows that 1 and n are essential on EZ. Since EZ, and any subset of
it, is comonotonic, the properties of Com. CCI and Com. CI all hold
without the comonotonicity restrictions. The topological assumption
III.2.11 on EZ will be guaranteed in the next subsection. Hence , for
the case of three or more essential states on EZ, Theorem III.3.7
gives all desired results. Otherwise only 1 and n are essential on EZ.
Then triple cancellation follows from (Com.) CCI, exactly as in Lemma
IV.3.2. And then Theorem III.3.6 gives all desired results.
0
In the proof of the above Proposition we have postponed one
matter: the topological assumption III.2.11. The problem is that, if
we  take the restriction  to  E   of the topology  on  C,   then  E   willJ
possibly be no longer connected. For instance let (i) of Theorem VI.
5.1 hold, where C = IR with the usual Euclidean topology, n = 2, v is
the additive probability measure assigning | A |/2 to every A c I,
and U:a»a sin a. Let z=  (0,0). Then E  = {a: U(a) 1 0}, is not
connected.
VI.7.2. THE TOPOLOGICAL ASSUMPTION FOR PROPOSITION VI.7.4
NOTATION   V I.7.5. The topology   on   C is denoted   as   T.   By   T (>) we denote
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the coarsest topology on C with respect to which > on C is con-
tinuous. By ... |E we denote: "restricted to E".
Of  course  T (>) is coarser  than  T,   so is connected  too.
LEMMA   VI.7.6.Any    Ec   C   of   the   form{a€   C    :    c   >   a   >T},
{a E C:c>a> I}, {a E C:a>a>T} , {a €C:G>a> T},
{a€C:a>a},REC:c>a}, {a E C:a> T},
or   {a   €   C    :   a  >   T} ,   is   connected with respect   to   T (>)  |E.
PROOF. Throughout this proof, "open" always referS to  T (>).   Let  E  have
a form as above. Let Fl' F2 be open in C. Let El =E n Fl' £2 =E n F2
Suppose El 0 0 0 E2' El A E 2=0'E l U E 2
= E. We derive a contra-
diction.
Let  al  €  El,   a2  €  E2.   T   does not separate between
equivalent
consequences,   so  01  Al a2 cannot  hold.   Say  al  < a2 Define:
Gl := [Fl n{a:a l<a< a2 ] U [{a :a< al l' and
G, := [F2 n{a:a l<a< 02 ] U [{a :a> 02 ]
Then Gl A G 2=0'G l 0 0 0 G2' and Gl U G 2=C since
{a :a  <a< a } c E.
First we derive openness of Gl. For any element of Gl' an open
neighbourhood H of it within Gl must be found. Let 6 € Gl- If 6 < al'
take  H= {a:a<a l  '  if  6>  a l'H=F l r l{a:a l<a<  a2} is taken .
So   finally let 6%
0 1 0
There   must  be   an open neighbourhood   H'o f 6
within Fl o f the form {a :a> 11}, or {a :v>a> 11}, or {a :v>a}
for some u,v € C. The first case is impossible since 02 € Fl. So,
finally, F= {a:v>a} can be taken, in both other cases.
Analogously openness of G2 is derived. Openness of Gl and G.4
contradicts connectedness of C.
0
The above Lemma shows  that,   if  we  use  T (>) instead  of  T,   then
Z
every E. is connected. Next we show:
J
idLEMMA VI.7.7. For any z€C  , > , restricted to EZ, is continuous with
respect  to  the  product  topoZogy  of  the  T (>)
1„:is.
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PROOF. Let x, y € EZ, x > y. We construct an auxiliary x such that
x>y,  and by means of this a subset Fl  X  · · ·X F   of {v €E Z:v> y},n
containing x, and with every F  c E  open w.r.t. T(>) |E . For the
construction of x1' consider:
V:={a€C:(a,x2'.  'xn) N Y '
By Lemma 0.1 this is open w.r.t. T. V contains x 1 so is nonempty. If
 V
V contains zl' then xl = zl and Fl = E  is taken.
If V does not contain zl' then by connectedness of C w.r.t. T,
V cannot be closed w. r.t. T, so not of the form {a :a> xl ' by
continuity of > on C (Lemma VI.6.1) with respect to T. Since V, by
w.mon., contains all a > xl' V must contain an a < xl. This a cannot
be   <z l  (that,  by w.mon., would imply zl  € V).So z l<a<x l:
a€ El. Take 91 =a,F l=E l n{B€C:B> a}.
r.,
Anyway, we have (xl' x2' ...' x )  - y' and Fl is open w.r.t.
T (>)|El
By analogous constructions we obtain x2' F2' ..., xn, Fn' such- -                                 Zthat: (xl, X2, ..., xj, xj+1 ..., xn)   y for all j, Fjz= E1 if-
x1 = z , therwise z  <x   <x   and F  = {a:a> x } A E . Finally,
(xl'  ..' xn)   y. For every w € Fi x ··· x Fn' in particular w = x,
-
w. >x. for all j. By w.mon.: w>x>y.
J       J
So indeed, if x>y,w e can construct Fl x ...xFcn
IE  A{w:w> y}] , containing x, and open w.r.t. the product topo-
logy of T(>)|E;,j = 1,...,n. Hence {x € EZ : x > y}is open w.r.t.
the latter product topology ,  for all y € EZ. Analogously {x € EZ :
x < y} is open, for all y. Continuity of > w.r.t. the product topology
of  the  T (>)IE; , follows.
0
We can now take care of the topological assumption III.2.11 for
Proposition VI.7.4. On every E  we take T(>) IE . By Lemma VI.7.6, E 
is connected. On EZ we take the product topology. By Lemma VI.7.7, >
on EZ is continuous w.r.t. this topology. So indeed we can apply the
theorems, mentioned in the proof of Proposition VI.7.4. These yield
additive value functions, continuous w.r.t. the T(>) IE 's; so
certainly w.r.t. the TIE 's.
124
VI.7.3. FITTING THE FUNCTIONS Vz TOGETHER ON Cid
J
id .
Our  next  step  is  to  show that there exist  V.     :   L  +  IR,
J
j = 1,...,n, such that for every z and j, V  can be taken to be the
restriction  of  V d  to  Ez.  Thi.s of course could never  be  done if there
1      1
were A c I, and s ,t€Cid,   such  that   (Vj) jEA  and   (Vj) j€A would  be
additive value functions for different binary relations on the "common
domain" X    (Es A Et). By comonotonic coordinate independence (Lemma
j€A j  J
VI.4.4) that never happens. Both
(V1) EA
and (Vt) are additive
j j€Aid
value functions for >A ' on appropriate domains.
id .
LEMMA VI.7.8. There exist, simuZtaneousZy card€naZ,  vj   :  l. +R,
j = 1,...,n, that are additive vaZue functions on EZ for every z € cid.
PROOF. On every EZ we are given additive value functions (V ) =t for
>, that are simultaneously cardinal. So we may add to every V  an
arbitrary "location" constant T (z), and multiply the V 's by one
common positive "scale" constant    c (z), to obtain again additive value
functions. Our plan in the sequel is to choose,in 5 stages, scales and
locations such that all. V ' s will "fit together", i.e. be the same on
J
common domains. They can then be considered the restrictions of one
array (V d) =1·
1    0
There must exist 8 ,B  € C such that Bl > B . We shall arrange
id 0 id  1
vj (B ) =0 for all j, and V  (B ) =1.
STAGE 1. Choice of scale and location on Er with r = 80.
-         1 r
Letr ("reference point") = BO. El = {a:a> BO}, contains B.E  =n
{a:a< 80}. For all j#l,j#n, < = {a:a w BO}.Of course we
choose scale and locations such that:
vr(BO) = 0 for all j, Vl(81) = 1. (VI.7.1)
J
Z Z
STAGE 2. Choice of scale on all EZ, and location for all Vl' V .
Let   now   z   €   Cid be arbitrary.   By  Com.    CI,    (Vl,   V )    and    (Vl,   V )
id
are additive value functions for the same > on (El O El) x{l,n} Z     Z
(Er  A  EZ).   Note   that  both   1   and  n are essential  on   (E   n  El   n  El)   Xn n
CEI 11 Enz) w.r.t. :4 .n}. By Lemma VI.7.6. 1 n E  and E  n E  are
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connected w.r.t. the restrictions of T(>), and by subsection VI.7.2
we may use the uniqueness result of Theorem III.3.6. So we can choose
the scale for  (Vl, V ),  (and hence for all  (V ) =1:;) and the locations
for (Vl, V ), such that Vl = Vl on El n El , and vn = Vn on En   En
Thus we have, even stronger:
s t st
Vl = Vl and Vn = V  on common domain (VI.7.2)n
for all s, t E Cid
This follows since,  on   (E   n  Et)   x   (Ens     E ) '   (Vl'  Vn)   andt   t
(Vl , Vn) are additive value functions for the same >  n}' hence they
can only differ w.r.t. their locations, and a common scale. However,
for j = 1,n, V  and V coincide (with V ) on E  fl E  fl E ; hence they
coincide on common domains.
STAGE 3. Intermediate observation.
In fact, for all s, t, j, V  and V  now have the same scale, and
only differ w.r.t. their location, as we shall show:
s t
There exist constants T.(s,t) such that on E. R E. , (VI.7.3)
s              t           J id J      JV. = T.(s,t) + V.; for all s,t€C  ,1<j<n.
J       J               J                                        --
For j=l o r j=n,b y (VI.7.2), in fact T.(s,t) =0.S o let
S          S S ttt ]
1 0 j t n. Then (Vl' V., V) and (Vl' V , V) are additive value
J idn                nfunctions for the same >{1,j,n, on  (E  fl E ) x  (E  fl E )  x  (EI A Ent)·
S
So they can only differ by location, and common scale. However, Vl
and V  , and V  and V  , coincide on their common domain (which con-
tains more than one element). The common scales must be the same.
STAGE 4. Choice of location for all V 's (j 0 1,n), having B  in their
domain.
Of course for all V 's as above we choose location such that
J
V (B ) = 0. Then we have not only (VI.7.1) to (VI.7.3), but also:
t 0
If V  and V. have B  in their domain then they (VI.7.4)
J          J
coincide on common domain.
This is direct from (VI.7.3).
AZO
Z
STAGE 5. Choice of location for remaining V 's.
Let now z€ Cid and j b e such that 80 €E  ,j 0 1,1 0 n.
Ej = {a idzj-1 >a > zj}. Say zj > BO  (zj-1 < BO is analogous) . Let
r(z) € C   be such that (r(z))i = zj-t for all i < j, (r(z))i = BO
for all i 1 j. Then E; c E (z) = {a : z -  > a > BO}·
-r (z)        0                                                                                                                  zIn Stage 4 we arranged v.   (B ) = 0. We now choose location of V.
such that V  = V (Z) on E . We now shall derive:




We check this only for the case where 1 0 j 0 n,B  is neither
in the domain  of  V ,   nor   in  that  of V (other cases are treated
before,   or are analogous),   and  s   >  BO.   Here  E    is  of   the  form
 « . s -1   a   sij  For El,to have<Xnempty intersection;, ;h E  ,
we must have t. >B. Now V. and V. coincide on E. n E. , so do




1          1             1       1                                            1               1
E (s) A E (t). The latter contains E  fl E .
id n
We can now define (V  ) =1. For any a € C, and 1 3 j in, we take
id
any z€C such that a € E: ,  z. = a suffices. Then we define
J        J
v d(a) := V (a). By (VI.7.5), this does not depend on the particular
id     z
choice of z; and every V  is now the restriction of V.  to E .J                                       J
id n
Finally the uniqueness result. Any (W  ) =1 ' for which real T  ,
j = 1,...,n , and positive a exist such that wid = T.+CV d for all
j, satisfy the requirements of the Le=na. Conversely, if (Wld)  =1
id
satisfy all the requirements of the Lemma, then so do U,  :=
J
[Wid - Wid(BO)] / [wid(81) - wid(BO)].
id 0 id  1
From U. (B ) = 0, Ul (B ) = 1, and from rereading the proof, the
]




Note that we may not yet conclude that (V  ) =1 are additive
id
value functions on aLL C
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id n idVI.7.4. THE
FUNCTIONS (V  ) =1
ARE ADDITIVE VALUE FUNCTIONS ON C
id id
LEMMA VI.7.9. For aZZ (id-easentiaZ) k: a>B#V k (a) 21 V k (B) .id         id
Hence a>B* * Evk  (a) 1 Evk  (B).
PROOF. Let a, B, k be arbitrary. First suppose a > B. Let xj. = a for
id
all j<k,x  =B for all j l k. Then x=x-kB and x-ka €C  , and
x-k B and x-ka € EX. By w.mon. and Lemma VI.7.8:
a x B-a>B a n d B>a-x-ka w x-kB - v d(a) = V d(B).
By com.s.mon. and Lemma VI.7.8:
id id
a>B=ox-ka>x-kB -v k (a) >V k (B)
Analogously:
id id
a<B„V k  (a)<Vk  (B).




id n   id            idLEMMA VI.7.10. Let x€C   ,x w G. Then I =lv   Mj) = Ej=tvj  (a) '
PROOF.   The  case  x.   Al  a   for  all   j is direct.   The  case  x.   >  a  for   some
J                                                            J
j and x, < a for no j, and the case x, < a for some j and x. > a for
J                                                 J                                   J
no j, are excluded by com.s.mon.
So suppose j<i exist such that x  >a, xj+1 w ... At Xi-1 w a,
Xi  <  a. We define  x   such  that  x    =  xk  for  all  x   0  a,   and
x   =  a   for  all  x   m  a.
1    id
Now suppose, for some 0 1 1 1 n-2, x €C has been defined such
1            id 1 id
that x  w G, and EVk (xk) = Ivk (xk)' with at least 1 coordinates of1
x  equal to a, and no coordinate equivalent but unequal to a. If in
1                                              1+1     1
fact x  has 1+1 or more coordinates equal a, define x    := x . If
not, then, say:
1 1   1 1
xa > a, xa+1 = ' ' = xb-1 = a, xb < a, with b = a+1+1.
If now (x a'  -ba  svc,   define x1+1 := Mlaa)-ba (= x1+2). If-               1+1    1
(xlaa)-ba<a, define a<x <x such that:a a
1+1 1+1x    := (X
1ba)-a(xa ,  Ala.
1+1
(Take  xa      in  {B  E C:   (xlba)-aB >a}n{B E C:   (xlba) -aB < a},
both involved sets are nonempty; closed by Lemma 0.1; they intersect
by connectedness.)
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1         -              1+1    1
If (x-aa)-ba > a, define a > xb  > xb such that
1+1
x        :-  (xlaa) -bx +1 53 a.
1          1+1      1         z
In any case, for z = x-aa, both x and x are in E , their a-th
1
coordinate is "between" x and  a,   their b-th coordinate "between"  aa-1
1+1 id 1+1and xl. Hence by Lemma VI.7.8, x1(w E) m x implies IVk (xk    =
id  1
Ivk (xk)'
-     -Finally  we   end  up  with  xn   1  0  a,   with n-1 coordinates equal  to  a.
n-1
Then by com. s.mon. the remaining coordinate of x must also be
equivalent, so equal, to a. And:
Ikvkd(xk)   =   Ikvkd(x )   =   ...   =   IkVid(x:-1)   = IkVid(a) follows.
0
Now, finally, to show that the (Vid)n are additive value
j  j=1
functions on Cid, let x,y € Cid be arbitrary. First we find "certainty
equivalents."
LEMMA VI.7.11. For every z € Cn there exista a such that z N E.
PROOF. For z € Cn there exist i,j such that xi > xk > x  for all k € I.
Let V: = {a€C:E>x} ,W: = {B€C:x> 8}. Then V n W=0.V a n d
W are open by Lemma VI.6.1. Now xi 9 W and x  i V by w.mon. By
connectedness of C, there is an a e V U W;s o a F u x.
0
We now give the main result of this section:
THEOREM V I.7.1 2. There   exist   continuous   simuZtaneous Zy   cardinaZ
id n id
additive vaZue functions (vj ) =1 for > on c
id id n
PROOF. Let x,y € C   be arbitrary. Let (V  ) =1 be as constructed
above.   Let   a,B   be   such   that   x  N  a,y  N   B    (Le=na   V I.7.1 1) .   Then   x  >  y
iff   Q  > 8, which by Lemma  V I.7.9   is   iff   Ikvid (a)   1  IkVid (B) .   The
id idlatter by Lemma V I.7.1 0 holds  iff  Ik k   (xk)   2-  Ik rk   CYk  '
0
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The following Corollary is not needed for the sequel, but may
have some interest of its own. It considers, as all of this section
does, an example of an additively decomposable representation on a set
that is not a cartesian product, but only a subset of that. The only
literature on this subject, known to the author, is Krantz et al.
(1971, section 6.5.5); and Fishburn (1967, 1971) for the case where
coordinate sets are mixture spaces (see Definition VII.2.1).
COROLLARY VI.7.13. Let > be a continuous weak order on
x:= {x € R + : xl i x2 2 ..· 1 x j' such that [xj lyj for aZZ j and
x 0 y] impZies [x>y]. Let n,3. The foZZowing two statements are
equivaZent:
(i)  There exist continuous simuZtaneous Zy cardinaZ additive vaZue
functions for > on x.
(ii) > satisfies   (comonotonic)   coordinate  independence.
PROOF. As Theorem VI.7.12. Weak, and (comonotonic) strong, monotonicity
are easily verified. We have all, so certainly three or more, coordi-
nates essential.   For  this  case   the only consequence  of  Com. CCI, (apart
from the monotonicities,) used in the proof of Theorem VI.7.12, is




VI.8. COMPLETION OF THE PROOF OF THEOREM VI.5.1 UNDER ABSENCE OF
MAXIMAL OR MINIMAL CONSEQUENCES
Throughout this section, with Theorem VI.8.8 excepted, we shall
assume:
ASSUMPTION VI.8.1. The assumptions, and statement (ii), of Theorem
VI.5.1 hold. There exists # with two #-essential states, say
lou
  = identity. By m we denote an id-essential state. No maximal or
minimal consequences exist.   Let   Bl  >  BO  be two fixed consequences.   For
every A with two or more A-essential states, the continuous simul-
taneously cardinal additive value functions (V ) =t for > on C" (that
exist according to the previous section) are chosen such that
v (B ) = 0 for all j, and E =1V (Bl) = 1.
Note that we have changed "scale", as compared to the previous
id 1 id  1
section. There   we   had  Vl    (B   )    =   1,
now Ej=tvj    (B    )    =   1.   Note   also   that,
at present, we may not yet conclude for different 1,  ', and x € C ,
y   E   CA:    that   x  >  y.  In     VT'(x   )    >   En     V '(y.).   The   only   consequences
j=1 j  j  - j=1 j  J
of comonotonic cardinal coordinate independence that we used in the
previous section (comonotonic coordinate independence, weak monotoni-
city, and comonotonic strong monotonicity) probably do not suffice for
this purpose. We shall essentially use:
LEMMA vI.8.2. Let there be at Zeast two A-essentiaL and two
1'-essentiaZ, states. Let k be w'-easentiaZ. Then for aZZ 1 € I,
7T         1T'
vl = 01 0 vk  for a constant or positive affine 01.
PROOF. Say 8' is identity. We write $ for $1. If 1 = A-inessential,
then Vl is constant, and $ is the same constant. So assume:
1 is A-essential.
id
By Lemna VI.7.9, (which applies to all essential k) V; and Vk
Tr       id
represent   the   same >, hence   Vl  =   $   0   Vk for.a continuous strictly
increasing $.
Note first that Com. CCI (Definition VI.4.1) implies the same
property with all preferences replaced by equivalences (compare Lemma
IV.2.7). This we write out with additive value functions brought in,
id
and with $ o V   for Vl everywhere, to give:
v 61(a) - 14(1(B) (1)I j0k[V d(yj) - V (1(xj)](2) (VI.8.1)
Vid CY)    -   Ykd (6)
and
0°vid(a) - 00Vid(B)(1)E   [VT'(t ) - V'r(s )] (VI.8.2)jtljj jj
impzy
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Ej01[V; (tj) - V;(sj)](1) 00V (1(y)- 00\,}:d(6) for all   (VI.8.3)
id
x-ka, y-kB, x-ky' y-k6 €C  ; s-la, t-18, s-ly, t-16 € cw
id id
Now let Vk (v) be an arbitrary element of int(Vk (C)). There can
id
be seen to be an interval S around Vk (P), so small that for allid id id id
Vk (a), Vk (8), vk CY)' and Vk (6) € S, there exist x,y such that
x-ka, Y-kB, x-ky' Y-k6 are in Cid, and such that (1  is satisfied.
For this we use the existence of an id-essential state i 0 k, which
idimplies nondegenerateness   of the interval  V, (C).Of course,ifi<k,1
then x. > a, xi > Y, Yi > B, y. > 6 will have to hold. If i > k, the1 1
converse has to hold. Furthermore, by continuity of $, S can be taken
so small that $(S) is small enough to guarantee existence of s and t
(3)
such that s-la, t- B, s-lY, t-16 are in C , and such that  =  holds.
id id id id
We conclude for all Vk (a), Vk (B), vk CY)' Vk (6) € s:
id id id id
Vk (a) - Vk (B) = v  (Y) - Vk (6)
- (VI.8.4)
id id id id
*Ovk  (a) - $0Vk  (B)  = $ovk  (Y)  -  ov   (6) .k
This is now shown by choosing x,y,s,t as above.(VI.8.4), only
for the case where B = y, already suffices to show that on S, 4
satisfies: 0((a + 6)/2) = [$(S) + $(6)]/2. Corollary VIII.3 gives
affinity of $.
0
For all = with two or more IT-essential states, we can, by Lemma
VI.8.2, and the fact that all V (B ) equal 0, define A  € R   such that,
with m id-essential:
V: = Aivid  (VI.8.5)J       J m
We define for all these A:
P; „ Aj / En.''id. (VI.8.6)
For 7Y with exactly one A-essential state, say 1, we define:
pl := 1, p  := 0 for all i 0 1. (VI.8.7)
We now define U:C+R.
n   id
DEFINITION VI.8.3. For all a € C, U(a) := E =lv  (a).
....
--
LEMMA VI.8.4. For aZZ 11 With two or more ir-essentiaZ states, and aZZ
a, \1(a) = p U(a). For aZZ w, Ep  = 1.
PROOF.   Let   A  have   two A-essential states.   Then  p U (a)   =
[A; / Eni=lkidltri=lvid(„)} = IA; / ri=lkid][Ei=lkidv; d(a)1 . v;(«). For
1T     Tr id A 1 id  1
such w,  Ep  = EX   / Ili   = IV  (B  )  / Evi  (B  )  = 1/1 = 1.
For  other   Tr,   with  only  one A-essential state,   [Ip     =    1]   is
direct.
0
LEMMA  V I.8.5.   Let  x  €  C'r ,   x  w  a.   11:en   Ip U (x )   =  U (a).
PROOF. If there are two or more A-essential states, then by Lemma VI.
7.10,  adapted to (11,  IV; (x )  =  IV; (a). Hence Ep U(x )  =  Ep;U(a)  -  U(a).
If A has exactly one A-essential state, say k, then by Le=la VI.
3.8, xwxk Hence by Lenuna VI.7.9, U(x ) = U(a), i.e. Ip U(x ) = U(a).
0
LEMMA VI.8.6. Let x € C; y € CT'.Then x> y•• E =.p;U(xj) 1
E =ip;U (Yj ).
PROOF. Let (Lemma   V I.7.1 1)    x  Al  E,y  Al  B.Then  x  >  y   iff   a  > B, which
by Lemma VI.7.9 is iff U(a) 1 U(B). By Lemma VI.8.5 the latter holds
iff Ep;U (x ) 1 Ep U (yj).
0
LEMMA VI.8.7. Let A CI. Let A = {Tr(1),...,TT(k)} = {Tr'(1),...,Tr'(k)}.
k 7r k lT'
Then Ij=lpj = Ij=lPj
PROOF. Let x  = Bl for all j € A, x  = B  for all j E A. Then x € C 
and x E C  . Apply the above Lemma with y = x.
0
The purpose of the last two sections has been to derive the
following result:
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THEOREM VI.8.8. Let the aBsumptions of Theorem VI.5.1 hold. Let (€i)
there ho Zd. Furthermore, Zet no maximaZ or m€nimaZ consequences exist,
and Zet there be a ir with two or more 1-essentiaZ states. Then (i),
and (VI.5.1), of Theorem VI.6.1 hold.
PROOF . According to Lemma  VI .8.7, and formula   (V I.2.1 1) ,   with   P  (j)    : =
77
p  for all 1,j, there exists a unique capacity v in accordance with
Definition VI.2.3. Lemma VI.8.6, and formula (VI.2.7) now verify (i)
of Theorem VI.5.1.
To derive (VI.5.1), say there are two id-essential states. Then
id n id
the fact that e  (j)U) =1 are additive value functions for > on C
id n
and simultaneous cardinality of (V. ). 1 in Theorem VI.7.12, give
J  J=
cardinality  of  U, and together  with [ Spilj) =1] uniquely determine
id  n
(P (j)j=1. Analogously(P"(j)) =1 are uniquely determined for any Tr
pith two or more A-essential states.  If A has exactly one A-essential
state k, then P (k) = 1 must hold, and P (j) = 0 for all j 0 k.
0
VI.9. MAXIMAL AND/OR MINIMAL CONSEQUENCES
In this section we derive the implication (ii) - (i), and the
uniqueness result (VI.5.1) in Theorem VI.5.1, for the case where
maximal and/or minimal consequences may exist, and where furthermore,
as we assume throughout this section without further mention:
ASSUMPTION VI.9.1. The assumptions of Theorem VI.5.1 hold. Also (ii)
there holds. There exists   ·rr  with   two   or  more A-essential states , say
A = identity.
LEMMA VI.9.2. Let a,y€C b e such that a>y. Then there exists B€C
such that a>B>Y.
134
PROOF. E: = {B:B>Y} and F: = {B:B<a} are open and nonempty.
Their union is C, for if B € Fc then. B > a so B > y. Hence by
connectedness of C, E and F must have nonempty intersection.
0
*
NOTATION VI.9.3. C := {a €C:a i s neither maximal nor minimal}.
(1* := CT' n (c*)n.
Since 1 = id has a A-essential state (even more than one), there
*
exists a > B. By Lemma VI.9.2, C  is nonempty, and has no ("new")
maximal or minimal consequences itself.
LEMMA VI.9.4. If i is essentiaZ on (Tr (i.e. Tr-eaaentiaZ), then it is
IT *
on C
PROOF. Say A i s identity. There exist a, B€C such that a>B.B y
Lemma VI.9.2, there exists y such that a>y>B, again Lemma VI.9.2
gives 6 such that y>6>B .   Let x€C have x = y for all k < i,
id
i              id*
xk = 6 for all k > i. Then x-iY' x-i
6 are in C , even in C . BY
com.s.mon. x-i  > x-i6.
0
Next we show that, on (C )n, (i) in Theorem VI.5.1 is satisfied.
PROPOSITION VI.9.5. There exist a capacity v, and a cont€nuouB
*      *                                  *                                    *nU     :   C    +   9 ,   such  that  x  »  / (U   o  x) dv  represents  >  on    (C   )    .
*
PROOF. By Lemma VI.9.2, C  itself has no maximal or minimal conse-
*n
quences. By Lemma VI.9.4, essentiality of states on (C )  is as on Cn.
The proposition now follows from Theorem VI.8.8, if the topological
assumptions in it can be guaranteed. This is done analogously to sub-
*
section  VI .7.2.   T (>)|C* is taken as topology  on  C . Mainly  by  Lemma
*n
VI.7.6 this preserves connectedness. Continuity of > on (C )  w.r.t.
the product topology  of   the   T (>)|C 's, differs   only in details   from
Lemma VI.7.7:
-
Let again x > y, for x,y € (C )n. We construct x > y, and by means
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of this a subset Fl x .- x F n o f{w€ (C )n :w>y}, containing x,
* -
and with every F  C C, open w.r.t. T |C . For the construction of x 1'
consider:
V: = {a E C: (a, x2'...' x )   y1. By Lemma 0.1 this is open w.r.t. T,
the "old" topology on C. V contains x 1 so is nonempty. If V = C, then
*../*
Xl €C  not being minimal, we take x 1 =a for any a€C  with a< xl.
If V *C, then by connectedness of C w.r.t. T, V cannot be closed
w.r.t. T, so not of the form {a :a> xlj' by continuity of >o n C
(Lemma VI.6.1) w.r.t. T. And since, by w.mon., V contains all a > x 1'
rw
V must contain an a < xl. Now take (Lemma VI.9.2) xl = B for any
a <B< xl. Then xl € C*.
- * - -
S o a lway s x 1 € C  i s found w i th x 1 < x 1 ' ( x l ' x2
'... ,xn) > x. Let
Fl := {a:a>xt}
Further we proceed as in the proof of Lemma VI.7.7.
0
* * * *We plan to define U(a) := sup(U (C )) [respectively inf(U (C ))]
for maximal [respectively minimal] a. Hence:
* *LEMMA VI.9.6. If a is mar£maZ [respective Zy min€maZ], then u (C ) is
bounded above [respective Zy beZow].
PROOF. Only for maximal a. Let i<j b e two id-essential states. Let,
only in this proof, (B,y) denote the act z with zk = B for k 1 i,
*
zk =y for k>i, for all B, y E C.B y com.s.mon., for all y€C,
a > (a,Y).
*
Let y€C  be fixed, let B (by Lemma VI.7.11) be such that
*                    *                          id *(a,y) w B (so B€C) . Now for all P€C  with w>y, (u,y) is in C   ,
and (U,Y) < (a,y) % 8, so:
*                                                                                          *                        *v({1,...,i})U (11) + [v(N) -v({1,...,i})]U (y) < U (B). (VI.9.1)
id *
Since i is essential on C , v({1,...,i}) is positive, and
*               *





DEFINITION VI.9.7. If a€C i s maximal, then U(a) := sup(U (C )). If
* *     *
a€C i s minimal, then U(a) := inf(U (C )). If a€C, then
*
U(a) := U (a).
As  we saw above,   U (a)   €   IR   for  all  a. We denote:
NOTATION VI.9.8.  C  := C  U{a€C:a i s maximal}.
With this we obtain:
LEMMA VI.9.9. For aZZ x E  (C+)n, and y E C with x =9, /(Uox)dv = U(y) .
id                                           +PROOF. Say x E C  .B y com.s.mon., y i s not minimal, so Y E C . If no
maximal a exists, Proposition VI.9.5 gives the desired result. So let
a be maximal. Let 0 Sk in be such that xl ea,...,xk N a, xk+1 <a,
..., x  <a. If y is maximal, then y Ri a, and by com.s.mon. k+1,...,nn
must be id-inessential. Then /(Uox)dv = U(y) follows.
There remains the most complicated case, where y is not maximal,
*
so, neither being minimal, is in C . First we show that /(Uox)dv 1 U(y).
*
By w.mon.,for all v€C  with Ca >)It > xk+1' we have
(P'....V.X ,x ) < y, i.e. f(Uo(v,...,11,Xk+1'" .,x ))dv < U(y).k+1""  n                                   n  *  -
Writing for all 1<jlk,U(x ) = UN) =sup{U(9):11€C,11>xk+1 
shows that f(Uox)dv f U(Y).
To see that 5(uox)dv 1 U(y), we consider 6 such that y> 6, so
x > 3. By standard arguments continuity of >, Lemma 0.1, and
connectedness  of C, imply existence  of  Pk  such  that  xk >  Pk  >  xk+1'
and x  v >3. Also, U exists such that x > Wk-1 > Uk and-k k k-1 k-1
(x-k,k-lwk'  Uk-1   > 3 Finally we end up with a > 01   112 >...Uk  such
that (111'*"'pk'xk+1' "'xn) > 6. Hence, for all u € C such that
a >1 1> 111 (>'   ' > 1,k , we obtain /(Uo N,...,P,xk+1'-"'xn-",xn))dv > U(6).*
Substituting, for 1 f-j l k, U(x ) = U(a) = sup{U(W) : p€c,
P   111  , shows that f (Uox)dv Z U(6). This holds for all 6 < y. Hence
f(Uox)dv 2-U(Y).
0
LEMMA VI.9.10. The map x » f (Uox)dv repreBenta > On (C+)n.
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PROOF. First for constant acts. Suppose  9  >  3,  with y maximal.   Then,
by Lemma VI.9.2, y>a>3 for some a€C.S o U(y) 1 U(a) > U(6)
follows, the latter strict inequality by Proposition VI.9.5. All other
cases of y>3* * U(y) 1 U(6) are straightforward.
Next let x,y € (C+)n be arbitrary. Let x N 9, y 0 3 (Lemma VI.7.
11). Then x>y* * >3* * U(y) 1 U(6) ** f (Uox)dv 1 f (Uoy)dv, the latter
by Lemma VI.9.9.
0
Next we must turn to (C  U{a€C:a i s minimal})n = Cn, and
show  that  also  here  x »  f (Uox) dv represents  >.  This  is very analogous
to the above, elaboration is left out. We conclude that the implication
(ii) =4 (i) in Theorem VI.5.1 is now also proved if maximal and/or
minimal consequences exist. For the uniqueness result (VI.5.1) in
Theorem VI.5.1, we must show that for maximal [respectively minimal] a
*                  *
no other choice for U(a), than sup(U(C )) [or inf(U(C ))] can be made.
This can for instance be seen from the proof of Lemma VI.9.9. Let i>j
be id-essential states. Then, with a maximal, xl = ·-· = xi = a,
a>x
  "    xn. the formula  f (Uox) dv  =  U (y) there uniquely deter-i+1
mines U(a). For minimal consequences matters are analogous.
VI.10. SURVEY OF THE PROOF OF THEOREM VI.5.1
The   implication   (i) -   (ii) in Theorem  V I.5.1   has been demonstrated
directly below the Theorem. The proof of (ii) =D (i) for the case where
no   r  has  two  or  more A-essential states,  and the proof  of the unique-
ness results (VI.5.2) and (VI.5.3), have been given in Lemma VI.6.2.
There remains   the case where   one   Tr  has   two  or  more A-essential states.
The case of no maximal or minimal consequences is handled in Theorem
VI.8.8, the existence of maximal consequences is handled in Lemma VI.
9.10, the general case in the final lines of section VI.9.
1RA
VI.11. STRONG SUB- AND SUPERADDITIVITY
In this section we study the following properties of capacities:
DEFINITION  V I.1 1.1. A capacity   v   :    2I   +   m is strongZy superadditive
[respectively BtrongZy subadditive] if for all A, B C I:
v(A U B)  + v(A   B) 1 [respectively i]  v(A)  + v(B) .
Other terms for strong superadditivity are 2-monotonicity, or
(strong) convexity. This property has received much attention as it is
a sufficient property for v to be the infimum of all additive proba-
bility measures, dominating v; and even stronger, this property of v
is necessary and sufficient for the Choquet integral with respect to v,
to be the infimum of all integrals with respect to the additive
probability measures which dominate v (see Huber, 1981, Propositions
*
10.2.5, and 10.2.1 applied to v (A) := 1-v(A ); or, for arbitrary state
spaces I, Schmeidler, 1984b, Proposition 3; or Anger, 1977). Such
dominating additive probability measures are called "core-elements" in
cooperative game theory with side payments. For strongly superadditive
(= "convex") v's [that do not have to satisfy (VI.2.2) or (VI.2.3)],
core-elements are studied in Shapley (1972). For strong subadditivity,
other common terms are 2-alternating, or (strong) concavity.
The following lemma reflects ideas of nondecreasing (or non-
increasing) marginal measure, and is like (6) in Shapley (1972). P1(i)
is as in Definition VI.2.3.
LEMMA  V I.1 1.2.   For a capae€ty   v   :   2I  +  m   the  foZZowzng  four  statemente
are equivaZent:
(i) v is strongZy superadditive.
(ii)   v(AO U Al U A2) - v(Al U A2) 2 v(AO U Al) - v(Al) for aZZ d€Bjoint
AO,Al'A2 c N.
(iii) v({i} UAU{j}) - v(A U {j}) 1 v({i} U A) - v(A) for aZZ disjoint
{i}, A, {j}.
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(iv)  Let l i k<n, and Zet 1, A' be two permutations on N, such that
x =  ' on N \ {k,k+1}, w(k) = 1r'(k+1),  (k+1) = T['(k).Then
P .(T(k)) 1 PA(A(k)).
The same ho Zds if superadditive in (i) is repZaced by subadditive,
and > by i everywhere.
PROOF. Only for strong superadditivity, and 1 everywhere. v is strongly
superadditive iff v(A U B) - v(A) > v(B) - v(A A B) for all A, B. This
is equivalent to (ii) above by the substitution A  = B\A, Al =A R B,
A2 = A\B. The implication (ii) - (iii) is by {i} = AO, A = Al, {j} = A2.
So suppose (iii), to derive is (ii).
Let there be given disjoint AO = {ia =1' Al' and A2 =   b b=l
a,b  _ f• 0,0We write Al   :- zil'...'ia} U Al U {jl'...'jb = So Al   = Al 
Furthermore:
k l 0.1. _ _k  r   a,1v(AO U Al U A2) - v(Al U A2) = v(Al' ) - v(Al' 1 - lia=llv(Al  )-v(A -1'1)].
Now for every a 1 1, by (iii):
v(A '1)  -v(A -1,1)  > v(Aa,1-1) - v(A -1,1-1) 1 ··· 21 v(A ,0) - v(A -1,0) .- 1
So the above summation is:
2- I:=l[v(A '0) - v(A -1,0) = v(At,0) - v(A '0) = v(AO U Al) - v(Al)'
(iii) ** (iv) is by taking A =  (1), ..., IT(k-1), i = ir(k), j =
#(k+1).
0
In section VI.1.2 we chose, for the calculation of the Choquet
integral of Uox (where x is an act) a permutation   such that a low
-1
value * (j) indicated that state j was "favourable"",, i.e. had a
relatively highly-preferred consequence x.. With this in mind, one
J
may formulate (iv) in the above lemma as: the weight P. (j) of state j
(j = ACk), in (iv)) does not decrease if j becomes less favourable.
This indicates a kind of pessimism.
DEFINITION VI.11.3. > is pessimistic [respectively optimistic] if for
all i 0 j,a>B>y>6 [respectively a>y>B> 6], and comonotonic
{(x . .B,6), (y . .y,6)} and {(x . .B,a), (y . .y,a)} for which
-1,1 -1,3 -1'J -1,1
a>x k>6 for no i*k#j, and a>Y k>6 for no i 0 k t j,w e have:
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(X-i'j B.6) > Cy-i,jY,61 - (VI.11.1)
(x    B,a) > Cy_, AY,a).-i,j ..J
For an elucidation of the pessimism definition, note that in both
preferences, the i-th state assigns a better consequence to the l
eft
act than to the right act, so may be interpreted as a positive argument
for preferring the left act. Further the j-th state may be interpreted
as a neutral argument. For the lower acts, state i is less favoura
ble
than for the upper ones, it no longer being more favourable tha
n state
j. So a pessimistic person will give at least as much weight to state
i when he is dealing with the lower acts, as when he deals with the
upper ones.
With this we obtain:
THEOREM VI.11.4. Let every A have at Zeaat three *-eBsentiaZ Stat
ea.
Let the aseumptions,and statements (i) and (i€), of Theorem VI. 5.
1
hoZd. Then v is stronZy superadditive if and onZy if > is pessimistic;
v is strongZy subadditive if and on Zy if > is optimistic, and v is
additive   if   and   only   if  >  is   both   Optimistic   and  peBsimiBtic.
PROOF. First suppose v is strongly superadditive. Let (x-i,j B,6) >
Cy-i,jY,6), where all conditions in the definition of pessimism
, apart
from the implication there, are assumed to be satisfied. To derive
 is
(X-i'jB,a) > Cy-i,jy'a).
Let r be such that (x 8,6) ,    C Y-i,j y'6)   €   CTI ,   and   for   some   k,
-i,j
11(k)  = i,  #(k+1)  = j. Let A' = 1 on N\ {k,k+1}, A' (k) = j,  Tr'(k+1)=i. Then
(X-i,j B,a), (y-i,jy,a)   €  CTT'.. The first preference above implies:
E   P (m)U(xm)+PT,(i)U(B)+P,(j)U(6) 1 (VI.11.2)m*i,j w
Emti,jPw (m)U(ym) +P,r(i)U(y)+P (j)U(6).
This,  PT'.(m)  =  Pw (m)   for  all  m  0  i,j,  and (Lemma VI.11.2.(iv) )
plt • (i) 1 P# (i) , together implies:
In10i,jP1'(m)U(xmt +Plr'(i)U(B)+P,I'(j)U(a)  2
I     P ,(m)U(ym)+PiT '(i)UCY)+P ,(j)U(a),
(VI.11.3)
mti,j A
i.e.    (x-i,j B,a) > (y-i,jY'a). Indeed  > is pessimistic.
Next suppose > is pessimistic. We derive (iv) in Lemma VI.11.2.
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Let k, 1, A' be as given there, i = 1(k), j = 1(k+1). Because of the
essentiality assumption in the Theorem, there exists m 0 i,j with
P (m) > 0, and U(C) is an interval consisting of more than one point.71
So we can find x, y, a, B, y, 6 such that (VI.11.2) holds w€th
equaZity, and such that:
U(XT[(1)) 1 ... 2. U(x,T(k-1)) .1 U(a) > u(B) > u(y) > u(6) 1
U(X  Ck+2)) 2- ... 1 U(XTT(n)),
and such that the same holds with y instead of x. Hence (x . .8,6),
-1,1
C -i,jY,6) € C , (x-i,j B,a), (y-i,jy,a) € C  . By pessimism of > we
may conclude that (VI.11.3) holds. This, (vI.11.2) with equality, and
U (B)   >  U (y),   imply  Pir ' (i)   1  PTT (i). By Lemma VI.11.2,    (iv)   4 (i) there,
v is strongly superadditive.
Analogously equivalence of strong subadditivity of v, and optimism
of >, is derived. The last statement of the theorem holds because
additivity of v is equivalent to the combination of strong sub- and
superadditivity of v.
0
Note that the last statement in the above theorem gives a further
way to characterize subjective expected utility maximization with
(additive) probability. Finally we give an example to show that the
condition of the three #-essential states in the above theorem cannot
be omitted.
EXAMPLE VI.11.5. Let N = {1,2}, C = 1, 0 i v({1}) = v({2}) 1 1, U is
identity.   Let >b e represented  by  x»f (Uox) dv.  Then  >i s  both  opti-
mistic and pessimistic; v is strongly superadditive and not strongly
subadditive for v({1}) < 3, v is strongly subadditive and not strongly
superadditive for v({1}) > J.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCAVITY ON MIXTURE SPACES
VII.1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we shall assume that X, the set of alternatives,
is a cartesian product of "mixture spaces", i.e. spaces endowed with
some sort of convex combination operation. Two main examples of mixture
spaces are, firstly, convex subsets of Euclidean spaces, and secondly,
sets of probability distributions, "lotteries" over a given set of
"certain outcomes". Mixture spaces have been introduced in von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944), mainly as generalizations of lotteries, and
have almost exclusively been studied with the purpose to obtain results,
useful for lotteries. Fishburn (1982) contains many results. See also
Luce and Suppes (1965). The applicability of mixture spaces to fields
such as quantum mechanics, and colour perception in psychology, is
indicated in Gudder (1977) and Gudder and Schroeck (1980).
We shall study mixture spaces mainly as generalization of convex
subsets of Euclidean spaces. We shall also study concave and convex
(representing) functions on them. To the best of our knowledge con-
cavity and/or convexity of functions on mixture spaces have not yet
been studied in literature, whereas mixture spaces do have the natural
structure for the study of these notions.
The first five sections of this chapter closely follow Wakker
(1986).  The first four sections study (quasi)concave additively de-
composable representing functions. (Quasi)concavity is a very usual
assumption in consumer and production theory, see section 1 in Debreu
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and Koopmans (1982). The recent study Crouzeix and Lindberg (1985)
mmtions usefulness of quasiconcave additively decomposable functions
in mathematical programming.
Section 5 applies results to decision making under uncertainty,
where concavity is associated with risk aversion. Arrow (1953) has
already noted the importance of the assumption of risk aversion in the
analysis of equilibrium with uncertainty. Shubik (1975) remarked  that
also without uncertainty the assumption of concavity of the utility
function (to be used in expected utility) is important. Without it, in
a Walras allocation the risk-loving agents would "create markets for
lotteries". (See Debreu, 1976, footnote 1.) See further Drhze (1971).
The final section follows Wakker ( 1984b) . It considers decision
making under uncertainty with monetary consequences, and characterizes
the most usual special case of expected utility maximization with risk
aversion: that with nonincreasing risk aversion. We shall see that
this further behavioural assumption simplifies the derivation of
expected utility maximization, and makes it possible to dispense with
the cardinal coordinate independence condition. Arrow (1971, Essay 3,
page 96) states that nonincreasing (in fact, decreasing) risk aversion
seems supported by everyday observation. Comments are given in Stiglitz
(1969a, 1969b). See also section 3 in Bernoulli (1738). An empirical
study, finding nonincreasing risk aversion, is Binswanger (1981). Many
more references are given in Machina (1983). The case of state-dependent
utility functions is studied in Karni (1985).
VII.2. PRODUCT TOPOLOGICAL MIXTURE SPACES
The notations for mixture spaces that we shall adopt below will as
much as possible be as in Euclidean spaces, to be of most convenience for
readers interested only in this special case.
DEFINITION VII.2.1. Let C be a nonempty set, and 8 a map from C x I 0,1]
x C to C. Let Aa + (1-A)B denote 8(a,A,B). 0 is a mixture operation
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if for all a,8 € C, A,0 € [0,1]:
la + (1-1)8 = (1-A)8 + Aa (commutativity). (VII.2.1)
u(Aa+(1-A)B)+(1-u)B = (PX)a +(1-VA)B (associativity). (VII.2.2)
10 + 08 = a (identity). (VII.2.3)
Here (C,0),or simply C, is called a mixture space.
We write a/U for (1/0)a, and la/u for (1/0)a. We say y is between
a and B if X € [0,1] exists such that y = la + (1-1)8.
The following result is proved in Fishburn (1970, section 8.4).
LEMMA VII.2.2. If C is a mixture space, then for aZZ a, B € C,
A,p.v € [0,1]:
Ua + (1-11)a = a. (VII.2.4)
A(ya + (1-0)8) + (1-A)(va + (1-v)8) = (VII.2.5)
(Xy + (1-X)v)a + (A(1-M) + (1-X)(1-v))B.
0
Some examples of mixture spaces:
EXAMPLE  V I I.2.3.   C   is a convex subset  of a linear space  over   m.    0   is
the usual convex combination operation.
EXAMPLE VII.2.4. C is a set of probability distributions ("lotteries")
over a measure space. For every Pl'P2 € C, and O fA < 1, the proba-
bility distribution Apl  +  (1-A)P2'  assigning Apl (A)  +  (1-A)P2 (A)  to
every A, is in C too.
One can consider Example VII.2.4 as a special case of Example
VII.2.3. As Gudder (1977) indicated, not all mixture spaces are iso-
morphic to convex subsets of linear spaces:
EXAMPLE VII.2.5. Let C = {(xl'x2) € IR2: x2 = 0, -1 6-xl 10} U
<M1,x2)   €   R2:   0   <  xl  3   1,   -xl  lx2   <  xl}.   Let   0  be as follows:
(i)  If xlyl 20, then 0((xl'x=),A,(yl'y2)) =
(Axl + (1-X)yl, Ax- + (1-A)Y2),.
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(ii) If xlyl < 0, then 8((xl'x2)' A, 51'y2)) is the unique point in
{ #X   :   0  1  P   <l}   U   {l l y:   0  1  U <l}with first coordinate
Axl + (1-X)Y1'
In the above example every "line segment" {z : z is between x,y}
can be considered isomorphic to {zl € IR : zl is between xl and Y 1  ·
Still C is not isomorphic to a convex subset of a linear space as
follows from 0((-1,0),1/2,(1,1)) = (0,0) = 8((-1,0), ,(1,-1)) whereas
of course (1,1) 0 (1,-1).
EXAMPLE VII.2.6. Let C = {g,u,b}, were g stands for "good", u for
"undetermined",  and b for "bad" . Let Ax + (1-A)y = :
g i f x=y=g,i f X=l a n d x=g,o r i f A=O a n d y=g;
b ifx=y =b, if X = 1 andx =b, or if X=0 andy =b;
u in all remaining cases.
The following adaptations of well-known notions for linear spaces
to mixture spaces are straightforward. Let C be a mixture space. A
subset E of C is convex if Xa + (14)8 € E for all a,B € E- 0< A< 1.
A function V:E+I R i s coneave if V(Aa + (1-X)B) 1 AV(a) + (1-A)V(B)
for a l l a,B€E,0<A<1.V i s convex if -V is concave, and V is
affine if it is both convex and concave. We prefer the term affine to
the often used term linear. Finally, V is quasiconcave if
V(Aa + (1-A)B) 1 min{V(a), V(B)} for all a,B € C, 0 f X i 1. The latter
holds   if   and  only   if, for every  11  €   IR,    {a  €C:   V(a) l w}i s convex .
Every concave function is quasiconcave.
DEFINITION VII.2.7. A triple (C, T, 6), is a topoZogicaZ mixture space
if C is a nonempty set, T a topology on C, and 8 a mixture operation
which is continuous (with respect to the product topology on
C X [0,1] X C).
Often we simply write C instead of (C, T, 0). Again, any convex
subset of a Euclidean space is a topological mixture space. The
following lemma will be used for Corollary VII.2.9, and in the proof
of Lemma VII.2.10.
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LEMMA VII.2.8. Let C be a topoZogicaZ mixture space. Let a,B € C. 19:en
0: [0,11 -C, defined by $ :A»A a+ (1-x)8, is continuous.
PROOF. Let E c C b e open. By continuity of 8,
{y,X,6) €C x [0,1] X C:X Y+ (14)6 €E}i s open. By Lemma 0.1,
{X € [0,1] : Aa + (1-X)B € E} is open. Continuity of 0 follows.
0
A direct consequence of Lemma VII.2.8:
COROLLARY   VII.2.9.A   topological   mixture   space   Cis   arceonnected,    hence
connected.
0
The following lemma is the straightforward generalization of re-
lated results for linear spaces (compare Lemma VIII.2), and will be
used in the proof of Theorem VII.3.5.
LEMMA VII.2.10. Let V be a continuous function from a mixture space C
to IR. Let there exist n>0 such that for aZZ a,B €C with
0   V(a) - V(B) 1 71, there exists 0<A<1 for which v(Xa + (1-1)8) 1
AV(a)  +  (1-A)V(B). Then V is concave.
PROOF. Let y,6 € C be arbitrary. We must show that V(Xy + (1-1)6) 1
AVCY) + (1-X)V(6) for all O l A 1 1.B y Lemma VII.2.8, 0:X» * XY+(1-A)6
is continuous. So W = Vo  is also continuous. The proof is complete if
we show that W is concave.
Let V E ]0,1[ be arbitrary. W being continuous, there is an open
interval S around u within [0,1], such that |W(c) - W(t)' 1 n for all
c,T in S. So for all a,T € S, with, say, W(a) 1 W (T),
O f V(ay + (1-0)6) - V(Ty + (1-T)6) i n. Hence 0<1<1 exists such
that:
v(A[ay+(1-0)6]+ (1-A)[Ty+(1-T)6]) 2- AV (ay+(1-0 )6)+ (1-A) V (TY+(1-·r) 6) .
To the left side of this inequality we apply (VII.2.5), to obtain:
V([AC+(1-A)T]Y+[1(1-0)+(1-X)(1-1:)]6)1 AV(ay+(1-a)6)+(1-A)V(TY+(1-·r)6).
Next we substitute W:
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W(XC+(1-X)9 , AW(a)+(1-A)W(T).
By Lemma VIII.2, W is concave.
0
As in linear spaces, a binary relation > on a mixture space C is
convex if {x E C:x>y}i s convex for every y€C.A weak order >
is convex if and only if [x > y] implies [Ax+(1-A)y > y] for all
x,y, X. This holds if and only if Ax+(1-A)y >x A y (A: see Notation
VI .3.7) .   If a function V represents  >,   then  > is convex  if  and  only  if
v is quasiconcave.
LE11MA VII.2.11. Let > be a continuous weak order on a topoZogicaZ
mixture space C. Let, for aZZ x>y,0<A<1 exist such that
Ax+(1-Hy > y. Then > is convex.
PROOF. Let s,t € C be arbitrary. Let s > t. We shall demonstrate that
s := {p € [0,1] : ps+(1-v)t > t} equals [0,1].
By continuity of >, {z €C:z>t}i s closed. By continuity of
8, {(v,V,w) €C x [0,1] x C: 1,v+(1- 1)w > t} is closed. By Lemma 0.1,
S is closed.
Let a,T E S, 0 0 T. Say as+(1-0)t > Ts+(1-·[)t > t. There exists
0<1<1 such that:
A[cs+(1-G)t]+(1-X)[Ts+(1-T)t] > Ts+(1-T)t.
By (VII.2.5) and transitivity this gives:
[AG+(1-X)T]s+IX(1-0)+(1-A)(1-T)]T > t.
So S is a closed subset of [0,1], containing 0 and 1, and con-
taining, for every a#T i n S,a n element between a and T, and different
from a and T. S = [0,1] follows.
0
The terminology in the following definition will be justified by
Theorem VII.2.13.
DEFINITION VII.2.12. For a sequence of mixture spaces (C.,ei)i=l' the
product mixture operation e : Xi=lci x [0,1] x Xi=ici + Xi=1Ci' is
defined by:
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0 : (x,X,y) 2 (Axl+(1-X)Yl,·-·,Axn+(1-A)yn) =: Ax+(1-A)y,
where x - (x ,...,x ), y = Cyl'  .'yn). We then call (Xi=lci,0), or1 n
simply X =lci' the product  mixture  space.
If the Ci's are topological mixture spaces, then X =lci' endowed
with the product topology, is the product topoZogica Z mixture space.
THEOREM  VII.2.13.A  product   mixture   space   ie   a  mixture   space.A  product
topo Zogica Z  mixture   space   ia   a   topo Zogica Z  mixture   space .
PROOF. Let
(Ci,ei)i=l,,0 be as in Definition VII.2.12. It is straight-
forward that 8 is a mixture operation. Now let Ti be a topology on Ci'
i = 1,...,n, let every ei be continuous. We derive continuity of 6.
-1
Let El € Tl. Then 6  (El x (2 x ... x Cn) equals, after a re-
ordering  of the coordinates of (x =lci)   x  [0,1]  x   (X =lci),  the  set-1
(e    (El))  x  (4=2Ci)  x (Xi=2Ci), which is open.  This can be shown,  not
only for El' but, mutatis mutandis, for any Ei € Ti. Continuity of 8
follows.
0
VII.3. THE CONCAVITY ASSUMPTION
In this section we shall assume without further mention:
ASSUMPTION  V I I.3.1.     Xi=lci   is a product topological mixture space .
Further, as throughout this monograph, > is a binary ("preference")
relation on X =lci. The following property is a generalization of
"Axiom  Q" in Yaari   (1978,  p. 109) which was formulated  for  the  case
where  Ci   =   IR    for  all   i,   and  for  this case  by some elementary analysis
can be seen to be equivalent to our present definition.(See also
Corollary VII.3.7.(ii) below.)
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DEFINITION VII.3.2. > satisfies the concavity assumption if for all
x, y, i, vi' Wi' and X:
x-ivi  >  y-i(Xvi+(1-X)wi)  -  x-i(Awi+(1-A)vi)  >  Y-iwi ,
If in the above definition the second preference > were replaced
by <, then it would   seem  that the "extreme" coordinates  vi   and  w.   were1
coming off relatively better than the "intermediate" coordinates
XV,+(1-X)w. and Aw.+(1-X)v.. This seems not in accordance with con-111
cavity, a concave function  assigning relatively high values to inter-
mediate arguments, as in the sequel can be inferred from (VII.3.1). The
following Lemmas adapt to the present context some results of Yaari
(1978; the Remark at section 4, and the Lemma 2 of section 5 and, by
that, the implication of "axiom D" through "axiom  Q").
LEMMA   V I I.3.3.   The   concavity   assumption   impZies   coordinate   independence .
PROOF. Let X=l i n the definition of the concavity assumption.
0
LEMMA  v I I.3.4.   Let  >  be  a  continuous weak order, that satisfies the
coneavity assumption. Then > is convex.
PROOF. By Lemma VII.2.11, it is sufficient to prove that v>w implies
v/2 + w/2 > w. For this it is sufficient to prove that even v/2 + w/2
> v, under the assumption:
v/2 + w/2 <w<v.
We define, inductively, for 0<j i n:
v  = v/2 + w/2, vj = v2jl:j; w  = w, wj = wlil(vj/2 + wj/2).
n
This gives v  =v,w  = v/2 + w/2. For j=O w e have, by assumption,
0 0 j-1   V1-1, for some l i j i n. Then:w >v. Now suppose w
(wj-1 = ) wljwj > vtj(v /2 + w /2)
(= vj-1 
By the concavity assumption with A = 1/2, this implies
wij (v /2  + w /2)  > vl v ,  i.e.  w  > v .
By repeated application, w  > v  follows, i.e. v/2 + w/2 > v.
0
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If three or more coordinates are essential, the above Lemma can
also be obtained as a corollary of Theorem VII.3.5 below. We are now
ready for the main result of this section:
THEOREM VII.3.5. Let the binary reZation > on the product topo ZogicaZ
mixture space x =1Ci have at Zeast two essentiaZ coordinates. Then the
foZZowing two statements are equivaZent:
(i)      There  exist  continuous  concave  additive  vaZue  functions    (vj)  = 1 for,·
(ii)   >  is  a  continuous weak order that satisfies the concavity
assumption, and furthermore the Thomsen condition of exactZy two
coordinates are essentiaZ.
Furthermore, (v . ) :  of (i) is s€mu Zaneous Zy cardina Z .
J J=1
PROOF. Suppose (i). Then all of (ii), except the concavity assumption
follows straightforwardly, see Theorems III.3.6 and III.3.7.
For the concavity assumption, first note that twofold application
of concavity of Vi ' and addition of inequalities, gives:
Vi (Avi+(1-A) wi)+Vi (Awi+(1-X) vi) 1 Vi (vi)+Vi (Wi)
(VII.3.1)
If we now had:
X-ivi > Y-i(Xvi+(1-X)wi)  and y-iwi > x-i(Xwi+(1-A)Vi),
then we could express these two preferences in inequalities of sums
of additive value functions, add up these two inequalities, cancel all
terms V (x ) and V (y ) (j 0 i), and end up with formula (VII.3.1)
with "<" instead of ">" : contradiction!
Next we assume (ii) above. To derive is (i), and the uniqueness
result. The existence of continuous additive value functions (V )  =1'
simultaneously cardinal, directly follows from Lemma VII.3.3, and
Theorems III.3.6 and III.3.7. So only concavity of the V.'s remains
]
to be proved.
Rewriting the definition of the concavity assumption in terms of
additive value functions, with A = 1/2, gives:
(1)
Vi(vi)-Vi(vi/2 + wi/2)   2.  Ij,0i[Vj(yj)-Vj (x )] (VII.3.2)
(2)„ Ij+i[vj(yj)-vj(xj)] S Vi(vi/2 + wi/2)-Vi(wi) ·
1 cO
This means that, for all v., wi' for which x,y can be found to
(1)                           1
make  >  hold with equality, we have:
 Vi (vi) + Vi (wi) ]/2 1 Vi (v./2 + wi/2).
(VII.3.3)
At least one coordinate j 0 i i s essential, so V.(C.)  (, by
connectedness of C  and continuity of V  an interval,) must have length
greater than n for some n > 0. For any vi and wi with
0 1 Vi(vi)-Vi(wi) i n, we can find xj, yj with Vj(yj)-Vj(xjll;
Vi(vi)-Vi(wi)  Taking xk = Yk for all k 0 i, k 0 j, gives   1 with
equality.
Now concavity of Vi' analogously of any V  , follows from Lemma
VII.2.10.
0
The statement (i) above is equivalent to the statement that there
exists a cardinal concave continuous additively decomposable repre-
senting function V : Xi=lci + IR, as mainly follows from the fo
llowing
result.
PROPOSITION VII.3.6. Let V  :C   +8 for aZZ 1 1 j < n. Let V:x»
E =1Vj(xj). Then v 68 coneave if and onZy if every v  is concave.
PROOF. Let V be concave. Vl (Xx 1+(1-A)Yl) equals, for any arbitrary z,
V(1(z .x)+(1-X)(z  Yl))- E   V (z.).-11           -1       j01 j  J
By concavity of V this is greater/equal
XV(z-lxl) + (1-X)V(z-lyl) - I j01Vj(zj)
The latter equals AV1(xl) + (1-X)Vl(yl). Concavity of Vl' ana-
logously of any V., follows.
]
Next assume: Every V. is concave. Then every VI, assigning V.(x.)
J                                      J                    JJ




In Yaari (1977) and Debreu and Koopmans (1982, Theorem 2, and end
of section 4) it is demonstrated that a quasiconcave additively de-
composable function has all but one of its terms concave. By Lemma
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VII.3.4, (ii) in Theorem VII.3.5 implies convexity of the preference
relation. This in turn implies quasiconcavity of the representing
additively decomposable function V, that exists according to section
III.3. So now, by the theorem of Debreu and Koopmans, all but one of
the additive value functions in (ii) above are concave. At this stage,
we do not see an easy way to proceed to derive concavity of the re-
maining additive value function. Hence we have chosen a proof, which
does not employ the results of Debreu and Koopmans.
Also, from the above observations, one may divine that in (ii)
above we might replace the concavity assumption by three conditions,
as follows. First one uses coordinate independence (and the Thomsen
condition) to guarantee the existence of additive value functions.
Next one uses convexity of > to guarantee quasiconcavity of the sum of
the additive value functions, which by the result of Koopmans and
Debreu implies concavity of all but one of the additive value
functions. Thirdly, one adds one weak condition for > to guarantee
concavity of the one remaining additive value function. We have not
been able to find a weak condition for > as described after "thirdly"
above. Hence we have taken our alternative approach. Figure VII.4.1
3
(, mainly f  there,) will show that a further (weak) condition as
after "thirdly" above, cannot be dispensed  with. The earliest reference
for this observation, given in Debreu and Koopmans (1982), is Slutsky
(1915).
The following Corollary applies Theorem VII.3.5 to the case where
Ci = ]R   for all i, and > is WeakZy cA monotonic (xi 1 yi for all i.
then x > y; see Definition II.3.7.b). The property after "furthermore"
in (ii) below is simply a reformulation of the concavity assumption,
so of Yaari's axiom Q, which may appeal to the idea of nonincreasing
marginal utility.
COROLLARY VII.3.7. Let n 1 3, and Zet > be a binary re Zation on <  .
The   foz zowing two statements are equivaZent:
(i)  There exist concave (so continuous) nondecreasing nonconstant
additive value functions (vj);=1 ·
154
(ii) > is a continuous weak order, weakZy cA monotonic, every coordi-
nate is essentiaZ, and furthermore:
x-ia > y-iB - x-i (a-E) > y-i (B-E) whenever (a-B)& 1 0.
0
Of course the results in this section can easily be adapted to
deal with convex additive value functions; e.g. by replacing every-
where > by <, and V. by -V . Also results on concavity and results
J          j
on convexity can be combined, to obtain results for affine additive
value functions. This, under the addition of continuity conditions,
gives characterizations, alternative to those in Fishburn (1965),
Pollak (1967), and Keeney and Raiffa (1976, Theorem 6.4).
VII.4. SOME COUNTEREXAMPLES
In this section we give all logical relations between the state-
ments (VII.4.1) through (VII.4.4) in Figure VII.4.1. Throughout we
assume:
ASSUMPTION VII.4.1. > is a continuous weak order on a product topological
n nmixture space Xi=lli· Further m< n is the number of essentiaZ coor-
dinates.
In the sequel of this section we shall give elucidations to the
seven counterexamples of Figure VII.4.1.
Counterexample (1). For m = 1, statement (VII.4.2) does not imply
(VII.4.1), even if a representing function V exists. This follows from
Kannai (1977, p.17), or from fs in the Figure. This function fs is
straightforwardly seen to represent a binary relation >, satisfying
5
the concavity assumption. Our f  is a minor variation on the example
of Artstein in Kannai (1981 , p.562), where it is shown not to be
5"concavifiable",   i.e. >, represented  by  f   ,   has no concave repre-
sentation.
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There exists an array of continuous concave additive (VII.4.1)
vazue functions for>.
*
fl'' f--1: counterexample (1), V = fs By Th.VII.3.5
    .•   m=
2: counterexample   (2) ,   V  = f2 for  m12;  b   
1 1   m>3: correct by Theorem VII.3.5 analogously for m=1I t. -                                   J  ....
> satisfies the concavity assumption. (VII.4.2)
1ft  'm=1: counterexample  (3) ,V=f by.
 | QI m=2: counterexample (4), V - f3 Lemmas,•;
11                                3
Il   m>3: counterexample (5), V=f VII.3.3 & VII.3.4
11 -- . V.
> is convex and CI. (VII.4.3)
1       
m=1: correct
4
11 '€m=2: counterexample (6), V=f direct 4 '
11'1                                    2                         flm13: counterexample  (7),V=f
.../
> 13 convex. (VII.4.4)
FIGURE  V I I.4.1.  >  is a continuous weak order  on  R +  ,   with m essential
coordinates. In the counterexamples the function V represents >. The
solid arrows downwards indicate implications that hold, the broken
arrows upwards indicate implications that do not always hold. For all
1<k<5,--
k                        nf  is a function from R to   IR:
++
fl(x) = l if xl 1 1, fl(x) = xl if xl 1 1;
f2(x) = In .x. + min({x.}n  ),
f·'(x) = d-1 )«"1 + r.:i-22gxl '
f4(x) = -(En  (x.-2))2;
1=1  J
fs(x) = x1-1 for 0 < xt < 1, fs(x) = (xl-1)2 for 1 1 xl < 2,
f5(x) =3-x l for xl 12.
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Counterexample (2). For m = 2, (VII.4.2) does imply (VII.4.1) if
and only if > satisfies the Thomsen condition. That >, represented by
2
f , does not satisfy this for m = 2, hence has no additive value
functions,   can  be  seen  from:
(1,4,9,...,9) w (2,2,9,...,9), (2,8,9,...,9) R (4,4,9,...,9),
(1,8,9,...,9) > (4,2,9,...,9). Still this > by some elementary
arguments can be seen to satisfy the concavity assumption.
1
Counterexample  (3) . That >, represented by f , does not satisfy
the concavity assumption, follows from(1/2,1,...,1) > (1,...,1) <
(3/2,1,...,1).
3
Counterexamples (4) and (5). That f  is quasiconcave, thus repre-
sents a convex >, can be derived from 6.28 of Arrow and Enthoven (1961).
3
Here f is a sum of additive value functions of which the first is not
concave.   For  m  2-  2 any additive value functions are positive  af fine
transformations of the above ones, so have the first one not concave.
3
So >, represented by f (,satisfying the Thomsen condition for m = 2,)
must violate the concavity assumption.
The observation that (VII.4.3) does not imply (VII.4.2) for m 1 2,
is closely related to the observation that quasiconcavity and additive
decomposability of V do not imply (VII.4.1), i.e. concavity of V.
This latter observation has some times been made in literature. The
earliest reference to this, given in Debreu and Koopmans (1982), is
Slutsky (1915).
4
Counterexample   (6) .  That  for  m  ,  2,  > as represented by  f  ,  is  not
coordinate independent, follows from (2,...,2) > (2,3,2,...,2) and
(1,2,...,2) < (1,3,2,...,2).
.
Counterexample (7). That for m 1 3, the > as represented by f ,
is not coordinate independent, follows from (1,6,1,...,1) >
(3,3,1,...,1), (1,6,3,...,3) < (3,3,...,3).
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VII.5. SUBJECTIVE EXPECTED UTILITY WITH RISK AVERSION
In this section we assume C. = C for all i. So we have:1
ASSUMPTION VII.5.1. Cn is a product topological mixture space.
In this section we again adopt the terminology of decision making
under uncertainty. We combine cardinal coordinate independence and
the concavity assumption to obtain a concise characterization of sub-
jective expected utility maximization with "risk aversion", which here
is simply defined to mean concavity of the utility function.
DEFINITION VII.5.2. > satisfies coneave cardinat coordinate indepen-
denee if for all acts x,y,v,w, all consequences a,B,y,6, every X € [0,1],
every state j, and every essential state i:
X-i a < Y-i B and   v   a          >w.B-j                 -J
X-i Y   y-i(Xy+(1-A)6)
imply v ,(16+(1-X)y) > w .6.
-J                 -J
LEMMA VII.5.3. Let > be a continuous weak order. Let > satisfy eoneave
cardina Z coordinate independence . Then > satisfies eard€na Z coordinate
independence, and the coneavity assumption.
PROOF. That CCI holds can be seen by setting X=O i n Definition VII.
5.2. So only the concavity assumption remains to be derived. Let:
x-i=Y   y-i(AY + (1-1)6). (VII.5.1)
To prove is:
X-i(X 6 + (1-X)Y) > y-i6. (VII.5.2)
If i is inessential this is immediate. So let i be essential.
Suppose there  are  n,   4  €  C  with  x-in <   X.ic ;    if  no  such n,4 should exist
(VII.5.2) would be direct. Our plan is to find a, B in C such that:
X-i  a   At   y-i B. (VII.5.3)
1 D8
If we succeed in this, then we can apply concave cardinal coor-
dinate independence, with i = j, x = v, y = w, to obtain (VII.5.2).
So finally, by means of n, C as above, we derive (VII.5.3) for some
a, B.
Suppose firstly that y-i(Xy + (1-A)6) > x-in. Then x-iY >
y-i(xY + (1-A)6) > x-in. By restricted solvability (Lemma III.2.13),
with B := XY + (1-X)6, we obtain an a such that (VII.5.3) holds.
Secondly, suppose y-i(Xy + (1-1)6) < x-in. Then y-i(ly + (1-X)6)
<  x-in  < Y-ic. By restricted solvability, with a := Ti, we obtain B
such that (VII.5.3) holds.
0
With the above lemma we obtain:
THEOREM VII. 5.4. Let at Zeast two states be easentiaZ with respect to
the  binary  reZation  >  on   the  product   topo ZogicaZ  mixture   space   Cn.
The fozzowing three statements are equiva Z.ent:
(i) There ex€Bts a SEU mode Z [cn, >,  (P )n   , u] for >, with u con-
j j=1
cave and continuous.
(ii)  > €8 a continuous CCI weak order; > satisfies the concavity
assumption, or > is convex.
(iii) > is a continuous weak order, satisfying coneave cardinaZ
coordinate independence.
PROOF. We derive (i) - (iii) 4 (ii) - (i). First assume (i). Obviously
> is a continuous weak order. For concave cardinal coordinate
independence, let i be essential. Now x-ia < y-iB and x-iY >
y-i(xY + (1-1)6) imply
U(a) - U(B) 1 U(y) - U(Xy + (1-A)6), compare (IV.2.4) in the proof of
Lemma IV.2.5. By concavity of U, the latter righthand side is smaller/
equal U(16 + (1-X)y) - U(6) . Now U(a) - U(B) f U(16 + (1-X)y) - u(6)
and v_ a> w_ B, imply v_ (A 6 + (1-X)y) > w_ 6.
Concave cardinal
coordinate independence is derived, hence (iii).
By Lemma (VII .5.3 the implication (iii) 4 (ii) follows
. So finally
we assume (ii), and derive (i). By Theorem IV.3.3 there exists a SEU
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model  for  >,  with U continuous. Of course   (p U) ;=1 are additive value
functions for >. If now > satisfies the concavity assumption, then,
> satisfying the Thomsen condition if exactly two states are essential,
by Theorem VII .3.5 there must exist simultaneously cardinal concave
additive value functions (V ) =1 for >. Further every V  then is a
positive affine transformation of p,U, and since at least one p. is
J                                             J
positive, U must be concave.
If > is convex, then it is well-known that U must be concave , see
for example Debreu and Koopmans (1982, near the end of section 1).
0
A derivation of the SEU model with concave utility, using
differentiability conditions, is given in Stigum (1972).
VII.6. SUBJECTIVE EXPECTED UTILITY WITH NONINCREASING RISK AVERSION
In this section we consider again the context of decision making
under uncertainty. In Theorem IV.3.3, we have characterized (roughly)
the class of all preference relations, representable by subjective
expected utility with continuous utility. Usually one is not interested
in all of this class, but only in a subclass of those preference
relations that furthermore have certain "desirable behavioural proper-
ties". For instance, in the previous section we considered "risk averse"
preference relations. For such further "desirable properties" of the
preference relation then necessary and/or sufficient properties of the
probabilities and/or utilities are searched, usually under the
presupposition that a subjective expected utility model exists.
In this section the further "desirable property" of the preference
relation that we shall consider, is (mainly) nonincreasing risk aversion.
Necessary and sufficient properties of the utility function for this
are well known, from the work of Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965, 1971).
Our aim in this section is to show a, surprising, extra implication of
nonincreasing risk aversion for an earlier part of the characterization
lou
work: together with, mainly, the concavity assumption, nonincreasing
risk aversion implies subjective expected utility maximization, and
makes cardinal coordinate independence superfluous. This applies to
the context where consequences are real numbers (say, amounts of
money):
ASSUMPTION  VII .6.1.  Let  in this section  C  c  IR  be a nondegenerate
interval. Let C. = C for all i.
1
VII.6.1. PREPARATORY RESULTS
DEFINITION VII.6.2. Let [Cn, >, (pj) =1, U] be a SEU model for >. Then
> is risk averse if x<a for all x and a with a= Ip,x..JJ
If a decision maker T (i.e. his preference relation) is risk
averse, then T will never strictly prefer an act x to its "expected
value" Ej=lpjxj. The characterization  (i)  *• (ii) below of risk aversion
is well known.
PROPOSITION VII.6.3. Let n 2- 2. Let [Cn, >.  Cp )n   . u] be a SEU mode Zj j=i.
for>· with aZZ pj > 0, and u cont€nuous. Then the foZZowing three
statements are equivaZent:
(i) u is concave.
(ii) , is risk averse.
(iii) > satisfies the concavity assuwption.
PROOF. (i) ** (iii) is by Theorem VII.5.4, and (i) =* (ii) is straight-
forward. Next assume (ii).
Let y = pla + (1-pl)B. By risk aversion, y > (a,B,...,B), so
U(Pla  + (1-Pl)B) 1 Ptu (a) + (1-pl)U(B). By Lemma VIII.l,  U is concave.
0
One may argue that the Definition VII.6.2 of risk aversion re-
flects more decision maker T's attitude towards the (linear structure
of) money, than his attitude towards risk or uncertainty. Statement
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(i) above supports this. Some authors, inspired by Kahneman and
Tversky   ( 1979) , have introduced new definitions  of "risk aversion",
reflecting more T's attitude towards risk and probability, see Quiggin
(1982) and Yaari (1984).
DEFINITION VII.6.4. > has nonincreasing [respectively nondecreasing;
or constant] (abso Zute) risk aversion if for all E>0 [respectively
E  <  0;   o r E€  IR],   and  for  all  x,x+E  in  Crl,  a,a  +E€C,w e  have:
-         -    -   -
X>a= >X+E>a+E.
Say a decision maker T has a preference relation with nonincreasing
risk aversion. If then he is willing to take a (possibly) risky act x,
instead of a certain amount a of money, then certainly he is willing
to do so if his wealth is increased by an amount E.
DEFINITION VII.6.5. > has Conatant re Zative risk avers€on if for all
X   €  IR      ,   x,Ax  in  Crl,   a,Aa  E  C,   we  have:++
x  >  a  »  Ax  >  A a.
Now let decision maker T have a preference relation with constant
relative risk aversion. Say he is willing to invest an amount a into
a risky undertaking, instead of keeping amount a for himself; where
the risky undertaking gives him in return x./a per invested unit, if
]
state of nature   j   is   the true state. Then,   if the amount  to be invested
is Aa instead of a, he is still willing to invest it in the risky under-
taking. In other contexts than decision making under uncertainty, the
above property of preference relations is often called "homotheticity".
With > strongZy eA monotonic if x>y whenever xj 1 y  for all j,
and x, > y. for some j, we have the following result, mainly due toJ      j
Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965, 1971).
THEOREM VII.6.6. Let n 1 2. l'ke foZZowing three statements are equivaZent
for the nondegenerate intervaZ C, and the binary reZation > on Cn:
(i) There exists a SEU mode Z [Cn, >, (p.)1  ., u] for >, with aZZ
J J=1
pj > 0, and with u continuous, strietZy increasing, concave, and
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for aZZ a 2 B L Y>6 i n C:
E » [uca+E) - U(B+E)] / [Ucy+E) - U(6+E)] (VII.6.1)
is a nondecreasing function on its domain.
(ii)  There existe a SEU mode Z [Cn , ,, (p )n  , ul for >
, with aZZ
j j=1
p  > 0, u continuous, strietZy increasing. Further > is risk
averse, and has noninereasing risk aversion.
(iii) > is a continuous strongZy cA monotonic CCI weak order, it satis-
fies the coneavity assumption, and has nonincreasing risk
averston.
PROOF. Apart from the statements on nonincreasing risk aversion, and
the statement on the function defined in (VII.6.1), everything is
straightforward from Theorem IV.3.3, and Proposition VII.6.3. The re-
maining statements  do not immediately follow from, mainly,   (e)   in
Theorem 1 of Pratt (1964), because there U was assumed twice continuous-
ly differentiable, and because here we only have a fixed and finite
number of probabilities Pl,.··,P . The present results follow from
Wakker, Peters, and Van Riel (1985, Theorem 4.1 and Lemma A.7.4), mainly
-      -
by comparing > with >', defined by x >' y if x-E > y-E. For brevity,
we omit elaboration.
0
We  added the formulation   in   ( iii)   to  give a "complete" character-
ization of (i), i.e. a formulation of necessary and sufficient conditions,
completely in terms of properties of the preference relation. Hence we
could not use the property of risk aversion in it, as this needs the
probabilities for its definition.
One can replace nonincreasing risk aversion by nondecreasing risk
aversion in (ii) and (iii) above, if one replaces nondecreasingness of
the function defined in (VII.6.1) by nonincreasingness. Analogously
one can of course substitute "constant risk aversion"  in  (ii)  and  (iii),
and constantness of the function, defined in (VII.6.1). In the latter
case  either  U is affine or exponential  (a ,+ T  + laP; concavity implies
P i 1), as can be derived from Theorem VII.6.12 in the sequel. Finally,
if  C  =  IR  ,    one can replace "nonincre
asing risk aversion"   in   (ii)   and
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(iii)  above by "constant relative risk aversion",  if one replaces  the
statement on the function defined in (VII.6.1) by the statement that
U:a# log a, or U:a# Aa ,as can be derived from Theorem VII.6.11
in the sequel.
VII.6.2. REMOVING CARDINAL COORDINATE INDEPENDENCE
The major mathematical difficulty of this section is dealt with
in the following lemma.
LEMMA  V I I.6.7.   Let   (V. ) .b e  continuous  nondecreasing  additive  vaZue
J J=1
functions  for >,  with  vl'  and at  Zeast one other Of them, nonconstant.
Let, for j= 1,...,n, there exist f. :C+l i t such that v.(a) - v.(B) =
J
f]B,a[ fj(T)dr (Lebesgue integnaZ) for aZZ a>B i n C. Let > have non-
increasing,    or  nondecreasing,   risk   aversion.    Then   there   exist   ·rj   €   IR.
and cj € R  , such that Vj = Tj+ vt for aZZ j 1 2.
PROOF. First the case where > has nonincreasing risk aversion. By
Theorem 6 of Chapter VI of Hartman and Mikusi6sky (1961), every function
which can be written as an integral, so also every Vj, is Lebesgue
almost everywhere differentiable on every [a,B] c C; hence on C. So
there is a subset E of C, with Lebesgue measure zero, such that for
every j, Vj is differentiable on C\E. We may assume that E includes
boundary points of C, and that f vanishes on E, f  = V  on C\E, for
every j, by the above-mentioned theorem. Note that V' , hence f, , is
J                 J
nonnegative.
First we derive an auxiliary result:
fi(a)fj(B) = f (a)fi(B) for all i,j, and a,B E C. (VII.6.2)
Because of symmetry in i and j, it is sufficient to prove:
If i 0 j, and a > B, then fi(a)fj(B) > f.(a)f.(B). (VII.6.3)-1   1
The result is direct if a o r B E E, then fi(a)fj(B) =0=
f (a)fi(B). So let a,B in C\E, i.e. the f 's are derivatives of the
Vk's and a,B are in int(C).
First we derive (VII.6.3) for those B for which 6>0 exists such
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that 8-6€C, and Vj(B-6) = Vj(B). Then Vj is constant on [B-6,B],
and f (B) = V (B) = 0. Also then B  (8-6) w B. We add a-8, apply non-
increasing risk aversion, and get a .(a-6) > a. Consequently
V (a-6) 1 V (a), i.e. V  is constant on [a-6,crl. Also f (a) = 0, and
f.(a)f.(8) -0= f.(a)f.(B): (VII.6.3) holds.1 ] 1      1
Next we derive (VII.6.3) for those B for which 6>0 exists such
that 8+6€C, and Vi(8+6) = vi(B). We can have 6 s o small that
a+6€C. Now B+3% (8+6)-iB. By nonincreasing risk aversion
0+6< (0+3)-ia' Consequently Vi(a+6) = Vi(a), and f.(a) =0= f.(B),1 1
and again (VII.6.3) follows.
Remains the case where V,(y) < v,(B) for all y < B, and V, (y) >J           J
Vi(B) for all y > B. For this case we first take (a ):=1, (rk):=1 E
IR   such that++
k       k             k                            k
O  + 0, T  + 0, V. (B+T ) - v. (B) = V (B) - v (B-G ) (VII.
6.4)
1            1 j j
for all k.
k
By continuity of Vi, V , indeed such ak, T  exist. Now, for 
all k,
(B . .(B+Tk),(B-ak)) SS B follows. By nonincreasing risk aversion
-1'J                                                           k
(a .  .(0+Tk),(a-ok)) > a hence V. (a+Tk) - V. (a) > V.(a) - V.(a-c ),
-1,1                            1          1    -  ]       J
for all k. We obtain:
k    k k
fi(a)fj(B) = lim[Vi(a+tk) - Vi(a)][Vj(B) - Vj(B-a )]/T a  1
k-+CO
lim[V.(a)  - V, (a-ak)][Vi(B+Tk)  - V. (B)]/ak.rk = f (a) fi(B) .J            J                                 1k-+-
So (VII.6.3) always holds, hence (VII.6.2) holds. Now we use this,
with j = 1. Since Vl is not constant, fl(n) > 0 for some n. We define
Ci := fi(n) / fl(n) for all i. By (VII.6.2),with B = n, j = 1, we have
fi(a) = °ifl(a) for all a € C. So Vi(a) - Vi(B) = f(B,a)fi(r)dr =
5     0-f.(T)dT = ci[Vl(a) - Vl(B)] follows. Of course now(B,a) 1 1
Ti := Vi(n) - Civl(n)
For the case where > has nondecreasing, instead of nonincreasing,
risk aversion, the proof is like above, with minor changes, mainly
reversals of inequalities and preferences. Let then a<B i n (VII.6.3),
next let 6 always be negative, etc.
0
With this we obtain the main mathematical result of this section:
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THEOREM VII.6.8.  Let > have continuous nondecreasing additive vaZue
functions (V1) =t, such that, for j = 1....,n, there exist f. with
J
v.(a) - v.(B) = f ]B,a[fj(T)d·r, for aZZ a > B. Let at Zeast two statesJ            J
be essentiaZ, and Zet > either have nonincreasing, or nondecreasing,
abso Zute  risk aversion. Then there exists a SEU modeZ (Cn, ). (pj) =l,U)
for  ,.
PROOF. Say state 1 is essential, so Vl is not constant. Apply Lemma
VII.6.7, let U := Vl' 01 := 1, and p  := c./I =lai for all j.
]    1
0
In all characterization theorems of this monograph after Chapter
II, it has been our aim to use in the characterizing statements (mostly
numbered (ii)) only conditions directly in terms of the preference
relation. The above theorem as such is not well suited to be considered
a characterization theorem, because the assumption on the existence of
the f.'s has to the author's knowledge no equivalent formulation inJ
terms of simple appealing properties of the preference relation. It
does however serve as a starting point to derive characterization
theorems.
COROLLARY VII.6.9. In (i€€) Of Theorem VII.6.6, for n 13 the CCI
assumption may be omitted.
PROOF. The strong cA monotonicity assumption there implies that every,
so (n 2 3) at least three, states are essential. By Theorem VII.3.5,
the concavity assumption implies existence of continuous concave
additive value functions (V )  =1
· Strong cA monotonicity implies non-
decreasingness, even strict increasingness, of every V.. By concavity
J
of every V , Corollary 24.2.1 of Rockafellar (1970) implies existence
of f  such that V (a)  - V (B)  = f]B,a f (r)dz for all a>B i n int(C),
e.g. f. may be the right or left derivative of V.. By continuity of V.
J                                                                     J                                 J
this also holds for a and/or B boundary points of C, e.g. let f  := 0




Of course, the same as above holds with nondecreasing, instead
of nonincreasing, risk aversion. For characterization purposes, the
following conjecture, if true, would be useful. It would show
equivalence of (i) and (iii) in Theorem VII.6.6, if concavity of U in
(i) was left out, and CCI in (iii) was left out, further in (iii) the
concavity assumption was replaced by coordinate independence (= sure-
thing principle) ; for n 1 3.
CONJECTURE VII.6.10. In Theorem VII.6.8, existence of the f.'s can beJ
left out.
We   do   not   need   the   "f . -condition" in Theorem VI I.6.8 i f C=I R
J
and  we have constant absolute risk aversion,   or  if  C   = IR and we++
have constant relative risk aversion. First we give the latter result,
this being directly derivable from Stehling (1975).
THEOREM VII.6.11. Let C = IR+.1.. The fozzowing two statements are
equivaZent for the binary re Zation > on Cn:
(i)   There exists a SEU mode Z [C , >,  (pj)  =1, u] for >, with aZZ
pj   >   0, and either  u   :   a ,+  Aa
p for some X,p € ]R with Ap > 0, or
U   :   a  &  log  a.
(ii) > is a continuous strongZy cA monotonic coordinate independent
weak order, satisfying the Thomsen condition if n = 2; > has
constant re Zative risk aversion.
PROOF. Suppose (i). Then, for any V > 0, x € Cn, for the expected
utility EU, EU(Ux) = v9EU(x) or EU(px) = P+EU(x). From this, constant
relative risk aversion, and all of (ii) follows straightforwardly. So
we suppose (ii), and derive (i).
If n = 1, the choice Pl = 1 and U = identity, by strong cA mono-
tonicity gives  (i). So let n 12. By strong cA monotonicity every
state is essential. By Theorems III.3.6 and III.3.7, there exist
continuous additive value functions (V ) =1 for >. By strong mono-
tonicity, every  V is strictly increasing. Define  V:C r l+R,  0:C
+ R, W : Cn + m by:
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v:x» IV.(x.), 0:a»V(a) ,W:x» 0-10 V(x).
J    ]
Then V and W represent >. Wca) = ot, [w(x) = a-xr= a], W(Wx) =
PW (x)   for  U   >  0   (W is "linearly homogeneous",   so  V is "homothetic") .
By Stehling (1975, Theorem 2), or Eichhorn (1978, Theorem 2.5.2),
either:
V : x 8 4 [P(Hj=lx  )] for a continuous strictly (VII.6.5)
increasing 4, positive W, and nonzero p1,···,p  that sum to one,n
or:
V:x» 11,[( E n_   ajx  ) 1/P]   for a continuous strictly (VII.6.6)J-1
increasing 4, positive al'...'an' and nonzero p.
In case of (VII.6.5), V is a strictly increasing transform of
x  »  Hx  1,   so, by taking logarithms,   of  x  »  Ip  log (x )  . By
strict   in-
creasingness of every V , every p  is positive. So indeed we have a
SEU ·model  for  >,   with  U   :   a 5  109  a.
Next suppose (VII.6.6). First assume p > 0. Then V is a strictly
increasing transform of Ec.x. . So we have a SEU model for >, with
pj := 01/I =lai for every j, and U: a# a; so A=l i n (i) above.
Finally, suppose (VII.6.6), with p < 0. Then V is a strictly
decreasing transform of x » Ic x  , so a strictly increasing trans-
form of x » Ia.(- (x.P)). We have a SEU model for >, with
J         J
pj := a./I: .a. for every j, and U :at-* -(a ), so in (i) above, X = -1.1  1-1 1
0
From this we derive:
THEOREM VII.6.12. Let C = IR. 2'he foZZowing two statements are
equivatent for the binary relation > on Cn :
(i)  There exists a SEU ·modeZ [Cn, >, Cpj ) j=1, u] for >, with aZZ
pj >0, and u:a» Xepa for some A,p €m with Ap >0,o r u
identity.
(ii) > is a continuous strongZy cA monotonic coordinate independent
weak order, satisfying the Thomsen condition if n = 2: > has
constant absoZute risk aversion.
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PROOF. Suppose (i). Then, for any 0 > 0, x € Cn, the expected utility
EU(x) has EU(x+U) = epuEU(x) or EU(x+0) = P+EU(x). From this constant
absolute risk aversion,   and  all  of (ii), follows straightforwardly.   So
we suppose (ii), and derive (i).
Define L : :El   + R  by L : (xl'...'xn) H (109(xl)'   '109(xn))'
and define >' on IRn by x >' y iff L(x) > L(y) . Then it follows++
straightforwardly  that >' satisfies   (ii) of Theorem  VII.6.11.   We
obtain, for  all  x,y  €  IRn:
X.
x > y ** L-1 (x) >'  L-1 (y) 44 Ip U(e 1)  1 I:p U(e  ), with U. p   ,  and
also A, p as in (i) of Theorem VII.6.10.
0
Most probably the last two theorems also hold for any interval
C  c   IR  ,     respectively   C  c   :R,     but   we   do   not   know  of   a   reference   where
the   analogue of Stehling' s (1975) theorem, needed to prove  that,   is
readily available. For the study of the extendability of the above
results, for the case of constant risk aversion, to multidimensional
consequences, Rothblum (1975) may be useful.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONTINUOUS FUNCTIONS ON INTERVALS
In this chapter we derive some elementary properties of functions
from nondegenerate intervals to the reals. These properties have been
used, and referred to, in many places in this monograph.
VIII.1. GENERALIZATIONS OF MIDPOINT CONVEXITY
The first two results give conditions sufficient for convexity of
a  function  0, by means of properties  that are variations on "midpoint-
convexity" [$((11+v)/2) f $(1,)/2 + 0(v)/2)]. When formulated for -$,
these conditions of course are sufficient for concavity of 4, and
when formulated both for $ and -$, they are sufficient for affinity of
0, see for example Corollary VIII.3. The first Lemma, and its elegant
proof, are due to Hardy, Littlewood and P61ya (1959, Theorem 88).
LEMMA VIII.1. Let S c I R b e a nondegenerate intervaZ. Let 0:s + IR
be continuous. For aZZ c<T E S Zet there exist 0<p<1 such that
0(pa + (1-p)T) i p$(c) + (1-p)0(T). Then 0 is convex.
PROOF. Suppose 0 were not convex. Then we had X<W<v i n S such that
the point (U,$(V)) of the graph G of $ lies strictly above the straight
line 1 through (A,$(A)) and (v,0(v)). Let then (c,$(a)) and (T,$(T))
be the points of intersection of G and 1, closest to (W,$(V)), with
c<M<T. Then A l a<K i<I<v. Between a and T all of G lies above
1, contradicting the existence of the p as in the Lemma.
0
1/U
LEMMA VIII.2. Let S C I R b e a nondegenerate intervaZ. Let $ :S+E
be   continuous.    Let,   for   every   v   €   int (s),   an   open   neighbourhood  w  of
v   within   s b e   given   such   that   for  aZZ c<r i n w, there exists
0<p<1 such that $(pa + (1-p)T) i p$(a) + (1-p)0(7). Then t i s
convex.
PROOF. For every v in int (S) there must exist an interval ]v-6, \)+6[
around v within S, such that for all a,T within this interval, a p as
in the Lemma exists. By Lemma VIII.1, 0 is convex on ]v-6, v+6[. This
implies convexity of 0 on all of int(S), for instance because 4 has
a nondecreasing right derivative. By continuity, 0 is convex on all
of S.
0
COROLLARY VIII.3. Let S C I R b e a nondegenerate intervaZ. Let $ :S+R
be   continuous.    Let,    for   every   v   €   int (s),   an   open   neighbourhood   w   of   v
within s b e given such that for aZZ c<z i n w, there exists 0<p<1
such that $(pa + (1-p)T) = p$(a) + (1-p)$(T). Then 0 is affine.
PROOF. Apply Lemma VIII.2 to $ and -¢.
0
VIII.2. CONTINUITY OF TRANSFORMATIONS
The following results consider transformations $, such that
f = 409 for two functions f, g.
LEMMA VIII.4. Let C b e a connected topoZogiea Z space. Let f,g:C+IR
be   continuous.    The foZZowing three statements   are   equivaZent:
(i)   f = 009 for a nondecreasing 0.
(ii)  f = 009 for a nondecreasing continuous 0.
(iii) 9(a) 1 9(B) 4 f(a) 1 f(B) for aZZ a, B € C.
PROOF. (ii) = (i) and (i) 4 (iii) are obvious. So we assume (iii) . To
derive is (ii). If g(a) = 9(8), then g (a) 1 9(8) and g(B) 1 9(a), so
171
f(a) > f(B) and f(B) > f(a). f(a) = f(B) follows. Hence f = 4.g for-           -
some 4. By (iii), $ must be nondecreasing. Continuity is postponed
to the next lemma.
0
Throughout the sequel we assume:
ASSUMPTION. C is a connected topological space. Further f and g are
continuous functions from C to R, and f = $09 for a transformation $.
We now investigate the kinds of properties that $ may have, such
as continuity.
LEMMA VIII.5. If 0 is nonincreasing or nondecreasing, then it is
continuous.
PROOF. 4 is a nondecreasing or nonincreasing function from the con-
nected g(C) onto the connected f(C), hence must be continuous. (It
cannot make "jumps".)
0
The following results are only used in section IV.4. Lemmas
VIII.6 and VIII.8, and Example VIII.7, were found, and communicated to
the author, by A.C.M. van Rooij in 1985.
LEMMA  VIII.6.0   has   the   intermediate vaZue property.
PROOF. Let G- {g (a) , f (a)  :a€C}c R2.  G i s the graph of $. Since
f and g, thus al-* (g (a), f (a) ), are continuous, G is connected. Now
let U < v, and let 0(9) < $(v)[0(P) > 0(v) is analogous]. Let
0(v) < X < 0(v) for some X. Let V = {(G,T) €G : a ili, or v <.a < v
and T l X}, and W={(a,T) €G:a,v,o r 1·1 1 0 1\ ' and T 1 X}. Then
V U W=G, (p,$(p))€V00, A,$(v)) €W 0 0,V a n d Wareclosed sub-
sets of G. By connectedness of G, V A W 0 0. Let (a,T) €V O W. There
follows T=A and u<a<v. Since $(a) =T, the intermediate value
property has been obtained.
0
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EXAMPLE VIII.7. $ is not necessarily continuous: Let $ : IR + IR assign
0   to  0,   and  sin (- ·)
to every  U  0   0.   Let  G  be the graph  of   $ .   Let  C   =  G.
Let f be the projection on the second coordinate, g that on the first.
Then indeed C is connected, f and g are continuous, f = 009; $ is not
continuous in 0.
0
LEMMA  V I I I.8.I f t  is  bijective,   then   it  is  strictZy  increasing  or
strictZy decreasing.
PROOF. It is sufficient to show, for any X<v<v i n the domain of 4,
that either $(A) < $(U) < $(v), or 4(X) > $(V) > 4(v). Say, for
A<U<v, 0(X) < 0 (v). Now were $(w) < 0 (A), then by Lemma VIII.6 any
value between $(A) and $(u), would be taken by $ at least two times:
once between X and w, and once between u and v. By bijectivity this
cannot hold. An analogous violation of bijectivity occurs if $(P) >
$(v). Also $(P) = $(A) or $(P) = 4(v) violates bijectivity. Hence
$(X) < $(U) < $( ) follows.
0
The following lemma shows that in the main case of interest for
us, where C is a convex subset of a Euclidean space, $ must be con-
tinuous.
LEMMA VIII.9. If C is arceonnnected, then 0 is continuous.
PROOF. It is sufficient to show that any sequence (Pj)j=1 in g(C),
00
converging to v in g(C), has a subsequence (u  )i=1 such that
1
lim $(u  ) = $(U). So let (U ) converge to u. We may
assume Uj 0 U
i-Ho        i                                                              -                °°
tor all J. There must exist a subsequence (vi)i=1 of (Wj)j=1 that
either strictly increases or strictly decreases; say the first. Now
take arbitrary al' a in C such that 9(al) = vl' 9(a) = 0. Of course
at 1 a. We use arcconnectedness by taking an arc A from al to a, i.e.
A : [0,1] + C is continuous, with A(0) = al' 1(1) = a. Now go X is
continuous,  (goX) (0) = vl'  Mox) (1)  - V. By the intermediate value
property, (cj)j=l in [0,1] exists such that (goX)(a ) = v  for all j.
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ax)
So (r.). - on X ([0,1]) exist with Tj := A(c ) for all j, g(I ) = v J ]=l
00
for all j. Since X([0,1]) is compact, (T.) has a convergent sub-
J j=1 00 00sequence (1:ji)i=l ' with limit say T. Also (g('rj.))i=l and (f(Tji))i=1
1
must converge to g(T), respectively f(T). This can only hold if
g(T) = v, and lim $(v. ) = lim 0(g(T. )) = lim f (T. ) = f (T) = 0(g(T))=
i-+oo J i i+°o J i              ie.oo            J i0(0).
0
COROLLARY VIII.10. 0 is continuous if it is nonincreasing, nondecreasing,
bijective, or if C is arcconnected.
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In deze monografie worden representatiestellingen voor beslissings-
theorie afgeleid. Nadruk zal daarbij liggen op stellingen die toepas-
baar zijn op beslissen bij onzekerheid.
Allereerst worden in hoofdstuk 0 enige elementaire definities ge-
geven.
Vervolgens geven we in hoofdstuk I aan wanneer er verband bestaat
tussen preferentierelaties en keuzegedrag, en bespreken we enige intuI-
tieve veronderstellingen. In hoofdstuk I veronderstellen we nog niet
dat structuur op de verzameling alternatieven gegeven is (behalve
verzamelingstheoretische structuur). In volgende hoofdstukken zal
steeds meer structuur op de verzameling alternatieven worden ingevoerd.
In hoofdstuk II voeren we de belangrijkste structuur van deze
monografie in: we veronderstellen dat de verzameling van alternatieven
een cartesisch product is. Iedere coordinaat van een alternatief be-
schrijft een relevant aspect van het alternatief, en bij een keuze
tussen alternatieven moeten de voor- en nadelen betreffende de diverse
aspecten tegen elkaar worden afgewogen. Deze benadering is dusdanig
algemeen dat toepassing op velerlei gebied mogelijk is. De zes belang-
rijkste economische toepassingegebieden in deze monografie worden ge-
geven in paragraaf II.1. In de daaropvolgende paragrafen worden diverse
monotoniciteitseigenschappen behandeld. Met behulp van de in deze para-
grafen verkregen resultaten tonen we in paragraaf II.6 aan dat "coor-
dinaat onafhankelijkheid" de enige waarneembare implicatie is van de
monotoniciteitseigenschappen, onder de in het vervolg van deze mono-
grafie steeds gemaakte veronderstelling dat slechts de preferentie-
relatie op de verzameling alternatieven waarneembaar is.
In hoofdstuk III, en alle volgende hoofdstukken, veronderstellen
we dat de verzameling alternatieven voorzien is van een samenhangende
producttopologie.  Met behulp van deze kunnen we in het vervolg con-
tinuiteitsveronderstellingen formuleren. In de paragrafen III.3 en
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III.4 geven we veralgemeniseringen van bekende stellingen over het be-
staan van representerende functies die als som van coordinaatfunc-
ties te verkrijgen zijn.
We nemen vanaf hoofdstuk IV (, met uitzondering van de paragrafen
VII.1 tot en met VII.4,) steeds aan dat alle coordinaatverzamelingen
identiek zijn. Stelling IV.3.3 geeft een hoofdresultaat van deze mono-
grafie: een karakterisering van subjectief verwacht nut maximalisatie
met behulp van een nieuwe eigenschap voor preferentierelaties, namelijk
cardinale coordinaat onafhankelijkheid. Dit gebeurt onder restricties
die in economische contexten gewoonlijk vervuld zijn. Verder worden
in de hoofdstukken IV, V en VI vele veralgemeniseringen van stelling
IV.3.3 gegeven. Ook geven we toepassingen aan voor andere contexten
dan beslissen bij onzekerheid; dynamische contexten vooral.
In hoofdstuk V breiden we het resultaat van stelling IV.3.3 uit
naar willekeurige, mogelijkerwijs oneindige, toestandsruimten. We be-
kijken dan zowel a-additieve, als eindig additieve, kansmaten.
Hoofdstuk VI breidt stelling   I V.3.3  uit tot "capaciteiten",   dat
wil zeggen "niet-additieve kansmaten". Deze zijn in beslissingstheorie
ingevoerd door Schmeidler (1984 a,b). Sub- en superadditiviteit zijn
veel bestudeerde eigenschappen van capaciteiten; ze worden gekarakte-
riseerd in paragraaf VI.11.
In hoofdstuk VII wordt weer een nieuwe structuur op de verzame-
ling alternatieven ingevoerd. We veronderstellen  dat de coordinaat-
verzamelingen zogenaamde "mengruimten" (mixture spaces)   zijn.   Stan-
daardvoorbeelden van mengruimten zijn convexe deelverzamelingen van
lineaire ruimten. We karakteriseren dan coneave representerende
functies die te schrijven zijn als som van coordinaatfuncties. In pa-
ragraaf VII.6 veronderstellen we dat de coordinaatverzamelingen con-
vexe deelverzamelingen zijn van de verzameling van redle getallen.
Hier hebben we te maken met de meest gestructureerde verzameling van
alternatieven in deze monografie. In paragraaf VII.6 laten we dan zien
dat veronderstellingen over (nietstijgende) risicoafkerigheid op een
verrassende wijze de karakterisering van verwacht nut maximalisatie
vereenvoudigen.
Hoofdstuk VIII tenslotte geeft enige wiskundige resultaten be-
treffende functies op intervallen. In vorige hoofdstukken is al vaak
naar deze resultaten verwezen.
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